Valid Accounts

Sub-techniques (4)

ID	Name
T1078.001	Default Accounts
T1078.002	Domain Accounts
T1078.003	Local Accounts
T1078.004	Cloud Accounts

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. ^[1]

ID: T1078

Sub-techniques: T1078.001, T1078.002, T1078.003, T1078.004

Tactics: Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access

Platforms: AWS, Azure, Azure AD, GCP, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS

Permissions Required: Administrator, User

Effective Permissions: Administrator, User

Data Sources: AWS CloudTrail logs, Authentication logs, Process monitoring, Stackdriver logs

Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Application control, Firewall, Host intrusion prevention systems, Network intrusion detection system, System access controls

CAPEC ID: CAPEC-560

Contributors: Mark Wee; Netskope; Praetorian

Version: 2.1

Created: 31 May 2017

Last Modified: 20 June 2020

Version Permalink

Live Version

Procedure Examples

Name	Description
APT18	APT18 actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services.^[29]
APT28	APT28 has used legitimate credentials to gain initial access, maintain access, and exfiltrate data from a victim network. The group has specifically used credentials stolen through a spearphishing email to login to the DCCC network. The group has also leveraged default manufacturer's passwords to gain initial access to corporate networks via IoT devices such as a VOIP phone, printer, and video decoder.^[21]^[22]^[23]
APT33	APT33 has used valid accounts for initial access and privilege escalation.^[16]^[17]
APT39	APT39 has used stolen credentials to compromise Outlook Web Access (OWA). ^[33]
APT41	APT41 used compromised credentials to log on to other systems.^[36]
Carbanak	Carbanak actors used legitimate credentials of banking employees to perform operations that sent them millions of dollars.^[9]
Dragonfly 2.0	Dragonfly 2.0 compromised user credentials and used valid accounts for operations.^[12]
Duqu	Adversaries can instruct Duqu to spread laterally by copying itself to shares it has enumerated and for which it has obtained legitimate credentials (via keylogging or other means). The remote host is then infected by using the compromised credentials to schedule a task on remote machines that executes the malware.^[6]
FIN10	FIN10 has used stolen credentials to connect remotely to victim networks using VPNs protected with only a single factor.^[24]
FIN4	FIN4 has used legitimate credentials to hijack email communications.^[13]^[14]
FIN5	FIN5 has used legitimate VPN, RDP, Citrix, or VNC credentials to maintain access to a victim environment.^[18]^[19]^[20]
FIN6	To move laterally on a victim network, FIN6 has used credentials stolen from various systems on which it gathered usernames and password hashes.^[26]^[27]
FIN8	FIN8 has utilized Valid Accounts during and Persistence and Lateral Movement.^[10]
Leviathan	Leviathan has used valid, compromised email accounts for defense evasion, including to send malicious emails to other victim organizations.^[15]
Linux Rabbit	Linux Rabbit acquires valid SSH accounts through brute force. ^[7]
menuPass	menuPass has used valid accounts shared between Managed Service Providers and clients to move between the two environments.^[11]
Night Dragon	Night Dragon has used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems.^[30]
OilRig	OilRig has used compromised credentials to access other systems on a victim network.^[31]^[32]
PittyTiger	PittyTiger attempts to obtain legitimate credentials during operations.^[8]
Sandworm Team	Sandworm Team have used previously acquired legitimate credentials prior to attacks.^[39]
SeaDuke	Some SeaDuke samples have a module to extract email from Microsoft Exchange servers using compromised credentials.^[5]
Silence	Silence has used compromised credentials to log on to other systems and escalate privileges.^[37]
Soft Cell	Soft Cell leveraged valid accounts to maintain access to a victim network.^[35]
Suckfly	Suckfly used legitimate account credentials that they dumped to navigate the internal victim network as though they were the legitimate account owner.^[25]
TEMP.Veles	TEMP.Veles has used compromised VPN accounts.^[34]
Threat Group-3390	Threat Group-3390 actors obtain legitimate credentials using a variety of methods and use them to further lateral movement on victim networks.^[28]
Wizard Spider	Wizard Spider has used valid credentials for privileged accounts with the goal of accessing domain controllers.^[38]

Mitigations

Mitigation	Description
Application Developer Guidance	Ensure that applications do not store sensitive data or credentials insecurely. (e.g. plaintext credentials in code, published credentials in repositories, or credentials in public cloud storage).
Password Policies	Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment. ^[4] When possible, applications that use SSH keys should be updated periodically and properly secured.
Privileged Account Management	Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. ^[1] ^[2] These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. ^[3]

Detection

Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. ^[40] Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).

Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.

Valid Accounts

Sub-techniques (4)

Procedure Examples

Mitigations

Detection

References