Last Updated: April 18, 2023
Travel Advisory
The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses that travelers should not travel due to terrorism, kidnapping, armed conflict, civil unrest and limited capacity of the Department of State to provide support to U.S. citizens. Review OSAC’s report, Understanding the Consular Travel Advisory System.
The Institute for Economics & Peace Global Peace Index 2022 ranks Iraq 157 out of 163 worldwide, rating the country as being at a Very Low state of peace.
Crime Environment
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Baghdad as being a CRITICAL-threat location and Erbil as being a LOW-threat location for crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Crime “C” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Iraq.
The crime emergency line in Iraq is 130. Review the State Department’s Crime Victims Assistance brochure.
Crime: General Threat
Crime and lawlessness remain a serious threat throughout the country. In Baghdad, organized crime, uncontrolled militia activity, and corruption remain formidable obstacles to free enterprise and business. Most international corporations under contract with or employed in Iraq must adhere to strict safety and security procedures when traveling in and around Baghdad. Private security companies (PSCs) employing armored vehicles and protective security details (PSDs) remain a standard security practice for companies and diplomatic missions alike within Baghdad, including for travel within the International Zone (IZ). These procedures mitigate the threat posed by small-arms fire and improve survivability in events involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs); they also reduce the potential for criminal targeting. There are considerable militia threats to all PSCs in Iraq; militias consider all PSCs to be “American.” PSCs in early January 2021 took steps such as leaving Baghdad temporarily and moving vehicles behind compound walls in attempts to avoid targeting.
In November 2022, an American aid worker was killed while driving a car in Baghdad. While these types of attacks against foreigners are rare, this instance exemplifies the potential risk of terrorism, crime, and kidnapping against Westerns when traveling in Iraq without PSD support.
Some groups may capitalize on the disarray inside the current Iraqi government to incite further chaos inside the country. Currently, Iranian-Aligned militia groups (IAMGs) use low-yield and crude IEDs in Baghdad city to intimidate and extort small business owners in protection rackets.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
Crime statistics and/or crime reporting mechanisms in the IKR are unreliable relative to U.S. crime-data collection methods. The IKR is emerging from an economic downturn and fiscal crisis that officials claim had resulted in a slight decrease in crime reported in 2023. Informally, IKR officials have commented that property thefts and thefts from residences have risen in the past several years. To date, most crime is nonviolent, and criminals generally do not target Westerners. Most Western expatriates in Erbil live in apartment or housing development communities with effective access controls and private security.
There were 62 homicides in Erbil in 2022 compared to 79 homicides in 2021. Sulaymaniyah, the next largest city in the IRK reported 41 homicides in 2023, down from 61 homicides in 2022. Most homicides committed in the IKR were related to family or tribal disputes and did not involve foreigners. Homicides that do involve foreigners are more likely to be associated with terrorism. Nevertheless, Western expats must take basic precautions to prevent being at risk for wrong place/wrong time violence.
The most common type of violent crime in Erbil and the surrounding area is clashes between families or tribes involving firearms. The number of shootings reported by the police shootings in 2023 was 60. Some of these incidents happened at upscale cafes or restaurants and in proximity to areas where diplomats and expatriates congregate. Such incidents are not so frequent that diplomats and expatriates cannot minimize the chance of wrong place/wrong time violence by adjusting their routines. Foreigners are not targets in such crimes on account of their nationality.
Burglary against offices and businesses is more common than burglary from residences because offices and businesses are vacant at night. Most business owners must take basic precautions to prevent this type of crime, including installing window grilles, storing valuables in a safe and minimizing cash on-hand, practicing strong operational security, installing CCTV cameras, and in some cases, hiring private security. This includes businesses diplomats and expatriates frequent. There are no known cases of burglary in high-end hotels. Prostitution is prevalent even in nicer establishments; guests inviting prostitutes into their room are much more likely to be targeted for robbery or other crimes.
The most common type of non-confrontational theft is “snatch-and-grab” robbery. Perpetrators may target handbags or cell phones. Such crimes occur more often during hours of darkness and in high crime and popular tourist areas, such as downtown near the citadel. The increased number of refugees and internally displaced persons has likely increased this type of crime in the last several years. Expatriates do not seem to be specific targets, but those moving through the city without security details report taking security precautions that include group travel and avoiding high crime areas after dark.
Business scams are the most common type of fraud committed in Erbil, and these scams have targeted U.S. aid agencies and development partners. In most cases, criminals propose to carry out work, but after receiving payment, they disappear. Locals are also targets of business-related scams.
The Global Organized Crime Index is a tool designed to measure levels of organized crime in a given country and assess its resilience to organized criminal activity. The most recent index ranks Iraq 8 out of 193 worldwide for criminality, with 1 being the worst possible ranking; and 142 out of 193 worldwide for resilience, with 1 being the best possible ranking.
Crime: Areas of Concern
There have been reports of snatch-and-grab thefts in the Ankawa neighborhood of Erbil, where the Consulate is located, especially along the main thoroughfares where criminals can escape quickly on motorbikes.
Rusafa District, Sadr City, Baladiat District, New Baghdad, and Shula District of Baghdad are areas that experience regular violence, such as small arms fire, IEDs, and other criminal activities.
Review OSAC’s reports, All That You Should Leave Behind, Hotels: The Inns and Outs, Considerations for Hotel Security, and Taking Credit.
Kidnapping Threat
The U.S. Department of State has included a Kidnapping “K” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Iraq, indicating that criminal or terrorist individuals or groups have threatened to and/or have seized or detained and threatened to kill, injure, or continue to detain individuals in order to compel a third party (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing something as a condition of release. Review OSAC’s reports, Kidnapping: The Basics and Active Shooter and Kidnapping Response Tips.
Kidnappings for political or monetary gain are common throughout Iraq. The threat ISIS and militia groups pose to conduct such operations remains high. Criminal organizations continue to use kidnapping as a method to fund operations, as well as a bargaining method to demand concessions from the government. In Baghdad, the kidnapping threat comes almost exclusively from militia groups, who may use it as a method to undermine U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic objectives in Iraq, or from criminal groups targeting individuals they perceive to be wealthy.
U.S. nationals are at high risk for kidnapping while in Iraq. Due to these concerns, the U.S. government requires personnel to live and work under strict security guidelines. All U.S. government employees under the authority of the Chief of Mission follow strict security procedures including the mandatory use of PSDs when traveling outside U.S. facilities. The Department of State advises U.S. organizations in Iraq to use PSDs to mitigate risk to their employees. Additional security information is available on the U.S. Embassy website.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
Most kidnappings in Erbil are related to family and tribal disputes. On the rare occasion when expatriates have been targets, the Kurdish police and security forces have been successful in resolving the cases. One recent case involved an Indian national who owned a popular Indian restaurant in Erbil. The owner’s brother was kidnapped, and a ransom demanded. After locating the hostage and perpetrators, the police determined the criminals were employees of the restaurant and targeted the family because they were open about their wealth. Expatriates who do not always travel with a protective detail report using basic mitigations to minimize the risk of kidnapping, such as practicing good operational security (e.g., not advertising wealth or their personal schedule, not giving their address to taxi drivers) and by varying their routines.
Drug Crime
Drug use and cross border drug trafficking are becoming more serious concerns. Most drug possession in Iraq is for personal use rather than for large-scale sales, distribution, or cross-border trafficking. Many airports and border control agencies have drug detecting technology. Penalties for transporting and possessing illegal drugs can be severe.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
The IKR has seen an increase in drug trafficking and use, especially in the first six months of 2022. Government officials reported seizing 1,217 kgs of illicit drugs over the past three years and attribute the high drug use to unemployment.
Consult with the CIA World Factbook’s section on Illicit Drugs for country-specific information.
Terrorism Environment
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Baghdad and Erbil as being CRITICAL-threat locations for terrorism directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Terrorism “T” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Iraq, indicating that terrorist attacks have occurred and/or specific threats against civilians, groups, or other targets may exist. Review the latest State Department Country Report on Terrorism for Iraq.
The Institute for Economics & Peace Global Terrorism Index 2022 ranks Iraq 2 out of 163 worldwide, rating the country as having a Very High impact from terrorism.
Terrorism: General Threat
Terrorist and insurgent groups regularly attack Iraqi security forces and civilians. Anti-U.S. militias threaten U.S. citizens and international companies throughout Iraq. Attacks using improvised explosive devices, indirect fire, and unmanned aerial vehicles occur in many areas of the country, including Baghdad and other major cities. The Islamic State in Iraq, also known as ISIS, is a designated terrorist organization, which is active in northern and western Iraq. ISIS and its associated terrorist groups indiscriminately commit attacks and violent atrocities in Iraq despite improved Iraqi government control. ISIS, militia groups, and criminal gangs target U.S. citizens for attacks and hostage-taking. Iraq’s northern and western borders are especially dangerous due to the continued threat of attacks by terrorist groups, armed conflict, aerial bombardment, and civil unrest. U.S. citizens should especially avoid areas near armed groups in northern Iraq, which have been targeted with aerial strikes by neighboring countries’ militaries.
The following list is illustrative of the types of attacks and security events conducted during 2023 in Iraq:
- On January 13, the Khormor gas field in the city of Chamchamal in Sulaimaniyah Province was targeted with a missile.
- On January 26, there was a rocket attack near the Kor Mor gas field in Chamchamal City, Sulaimaniyah.
- On February 5, a prominent Iraqi activist campaigning for the preservation of the famed Mesopotamian marshes was kidnapped by armed men south of Baghdad.
- On February 22, a pilot working in the Iraqi Air Force was assassinated in the Fallujah district of Anbar Province.
- On February 26, four members of the Hit Tribal Mobilization Forces were killed after a terrorist attack targeted their checkpoint.
- On March 1, ISIS members attacked five people collecting truffles in the Al Nukhaib desert in Al Anbar Province, killing two and kidnapping three, including two security officers.
- On March 6, nine civilians were killed and wounded in two terrorist attacks northeast of Baqubah in Diyala Province.
The following list is illustrative of the types of attacks and security events conducted during 2022 in Iraq:
- On January 21, ISIS militants launched an attack on Iraqi army barracks north of Baghdad, resulting in 11 killed.
- On May 24, ISIS members launched attacks in Kirkuk and Diyala provinces, resulting in 12 dead and at least six wounded
- On August 26, an explosive device detonated targeting an Austrailian diplomatic convoy near Baghad’s Green Zone, resulting in no casualties or injuries.
- On September 13, the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched missiles and drones against Iranian Kurdish dissidents, resulting in 13 killed and 58 wounded.
- On September 28, three rockets were launched at Baghdad’s Green Zone, resulting in seven wounded.
- On October 13, at least nine rockets were fired at the Iraq’s parliament building in Baghdad, resulting in five injuries.
- On October 20, a car bomb exploded in Sulaimaniya. Resulting in two killed.
- On November 14, the IRGC launched rockets and drones against the headquarters of Iranian Kurdish parites in the IKR, resulting in at least two killed and ten wounded.
- On November 22, the IRGC launched missiles and kamikaze drones against a Kurdish Iranian group in the IKR.
- On December 18, an explosive device detnonted in the village of Ali al-Sultan in the Riyadh district of the province of Kirkuk, resulting in at least nine Iraqi federal police members killed.
- On December 19, gunmen attacked the village of Albu Bali northwest of Fallujah, resulting in eight killed and three injured.
- On December 22, an explosion occurred in the Makhmour district in northern Iraq, resulting in two soldiers killed and three injured.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
The IKR enjoys a strong relationship with the U.S. despite internal political divisions, Turkish military activity targeting of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) near the Iraq-Turkey border, political instability in Baghdad and areas of southern Iraq, and the ongoing ISIS threat. The IKR remains relatively secure.
Although ISIS no longer holds physical territory, the group has shown resilience. Remaining ISIS elements have transitioned to recruitment, fundraising, and insurgency operations. ISIS maintains lethal capabilities and presents a serious threat almost anywhere along the 700-mile-long Peshmerga and Iraqi Army defensive line. Throughout Ninewa, Diyala, and Kirkuk provinces, ISIS can conduct asymmetric attacks, to include the use of vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), ambushes, small unit infantry-style assaults, and assassinations. Terrorists often target Iraqi and coalition forces and Iraqi infrastructure, including highways and oil refineries.
Although on the defensive, ISIS remains capable and extremely dangerous. Recent reporting indicates that ISIS maintains sleeper cells in Mosul and along the Kurdish control line. ISIS remnants constitute a threat to Westerners operating in Diyala, Kirkuk, or traversing Mosul and traveling west toward Tal Afar and Sinjar.
On multiple occasions in 2022, one-way attack unmanned aircraft systems (OWUAS) and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) were launched towards the IKR from Iran impacting areas of known Iranian dissident groups. In 2020 and 2021, OWUAS and rockets targeted the Erbil International Airport and the airbase collocated at the airport. These attacks have caused significant property damage and resulted in one non-U.S. casualty. Airborne threats against the airport and immediate vicinity remain one of the most significant risks to U.S. interests in the IKR.
The PKK maintains a presence in the Sinjar region and throughout the IKR. Fighting between the PKK and Kurdish regional authorities has increased in 2022, particularly in Dohuk province and the northern areas of the Erbil Governorate. In October 2020, Kurdish security forces arrested PKK cells in Dohuk and Erbil, whom they accused of plotting attacks against the governor of Dohuk and Turkish diplomatic and business interests in Erbil.
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) devotes considerable resources to protect its key government buildings, vital infrastructure, the diplomatic community, and soft targets such as hotels, churches, mosques, and shopping areas.
Individuals required to live or travel in Iraq should use an in-country security advisor or some type of PSD support to limit potential terrorist and criminal threats. Travelers to the IKR should consider using all available security assets to minimize any potential terrorist or criminal risks to include protective security or a local driver who knows routes, speaks the local language, and knows which areas may present a higher degree of risk.
The following list is illustrative of the types of attacks and security events conducted during 2022 in the IKR:
- On March 13, Iran conducted a ballistic missile strike against a compound in Erbil.
- On May 11, Iran conducted artillery and OWAUAS strikes on the Democratic Party of Iran Kurdistan (KDP-I) sites in NE Erbil Province.
- On May 22, Turkey conducted several airstrikes in Chamchamal and Makhmur targeting the PKK.
- On June 6, unknown actors used IED to target an Iranian dissident member in Erbil.
- On September 27, Iran conducted ballistic missile strikes across the Kurdistan Region.
- On October 7, unknown actors conducted an IED attack against a military officer in Erbil.
- On November 14, Iran conducted ballistic missile strikes across the Kurdistan Region.
- On November 21, Iran conducted ballistic missile strikes and OWAUAS strikes across the Kurdistan Region.
- On December 12, an unknown assailant attacked Asayish headquarters in Duhok.
Political Violence and Civil Unrest Environment
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Baghdad and Erbil as being CRITICAL-threat locations for political violence directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
Elections/Political Stability
After over a yearlong stalemate, Iraq’s parliament selected a prime minister and the first cabinet since 2005 without any Sadr-aligned members. Elections were held over a year ago, resulting in a plurality for the Shia cleric Sadr and his allies, but he was unable to form a coalition government while excluding Iranian-aligned political parties. The Sadr-led bloc eventually resigned in protest, relinquishing control of parliament to the Iran-supported parties. Massive street protests, occupation of parliament by protestors, and fighting ensued, leading to at least 30 dead and dozens injured. After withdrawing, rocket attacks were launched against parliament and the Green Zone in Baghdad in an attempt to disrupt the government formation process. However, the government was formed in late 2022, and violent protests have subsided.
IDF attacks against U.S. locations in Iraq hit a peak in 2021 and 2022, but sharply declined after the formation of the Sudani government in October of 2022.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
The Kurds are an important U.S. partner and are public in their desire for a continued U.S. diplomatic and military presence in Iraq. Traditionally, the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) has been one of the most prosperous and stable regions in Iraq. However, deteriorating relations between the IKR’s two largest political parties – the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) – have hindered Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) operations and threatened the KRG’s ability to deliver on the region’s interests in Baghdad. The United States is of the firm belief that a lack of cooperation among the IKR’s political parties not only hurt the strength of the IKR’s position within a united and federal Iraq, but also harm overall security and stability in Iraq. The U.S. government has supported efforts to reduce tensions between the parties to strengthen their effectiveness both in the IKR and in Baghdad. The KDP and the PUK recently initiated a process to address political, economic, and security disputes between the two parties. While that process is currently paused, the United States is encouraging both sides to resume dialogue and establish a united front in its dealings with Baghdad on critical issues including the budget, hydrocarbons management, and security.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Civil Unrest “U” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Iraq, indicating that demonstrations, protests, and/or strikes occur frequently, and/or that local law enforcement may have limited ability to respond adequately. Civil unrest can develop quickly without prior notice, often interrupting logistics and services. Avoid demonstration activity, as even those planned to remain peaceful have the potential to turn violent.
Protest & Demonstration Activity
The most recent political violence (in the form of protests) was centered around the election formation process in late 2022.
Small protests are frequent in Baghdad and other major cities and can occur without much warning. Larger, organized protests are generally proceeded by significant social media messaging. Some OSAC members have reported tension in areas to the south of Baghdad centered on water scarcity and electricity supply issues. Media reporting confirms these claims.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
Demonstrations in the IKR are typically centered around domestic issues ranging from salary and pension disputes, civil and economic issues such as corruption, poverty and unemployment as well as rights of less represented groups. They are typically peaceful but have resulted in the Police utilizing tear gas to disperse large gatherings.
Review OSAC’s report, Surviving a Protest.
Law Enforcement Concerns: Security Agencies
Numerous domestic security forces operate throughout the country. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are organized administratively within the Ministries of Interior and Defense, as well as within the quasi-ministerial Counterterrorism Service. The Ministry of Interior is responsible for domestic law enforcement and maintenance of order; it oversees the Federal Police, Provincial Police, Facilities Protection Service, Civil Defense, and Department of Border Enforcement. Energy police, under the Ministry of Oil, are responsible for protecting energy infrastructure. Conventional military forces under the Ministry of Defense also carry out counterterrorism and internal security operations in conjunction with the Ministry of Interior. The Counterterrorism Service reports directly to the prime minister and oversees the Counterterrorism Command, an organization that includes three brigades of special operations forces. The National Security Service intelligence agency reports directly to the prime minister. The security of the International Zone in Baghdad is controlled by the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), and Special Division (SD) of the Iraq Security Force.
The country’s regular armed forces and domestic law enforcement bodies struggled to maintain order within the country, operating in parallel with the Popular Mobilization Committee, a state-sponsored umbrella military organization composed of approximately 60 militia groups, also known as Popular Mobilization Forces. Although the Popular Mobilization Forces are part of the Iraqi Security forces and receive funding from the government’s defense budget, their operations are often outside government control and in opposition to government policies. Most popular mobilization unit members are Shia Arabs, reflecting the demographics of the country, while Sunni Arab, Yezidi, Christian, and other minority groups tended to organize their own units, generally operating within or near their home regions. All popular mobilization units officially report to the chairman of the Popular Mobilization Committee and are under the ultimate authority of the prime minister, but several units were in practice also responsive to Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The two main Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, each maintain an independent security apparatus. Under the federal constitution, the Kurdistan Regional Government has the right to maintain internal security forces, but the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party separately control additional Peshmerga military units, as well as separate police forces under nominal Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior control. The constitution also allows for a centralized, separate Asayish internal security service; however, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also each maintain Asayish forces. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also maintain separate intelligence services, nominally organized under the Kurdistan Region Security Council.
Federal civilian authorities did not maintain effective control over some elements of the security forces, particularly certain Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Force units and the Popular Mobilization Committee. Poorly defined administrative boundaries and disputed territories between the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the central government led to confusion over the jurisdiction of security forces and the courts. Members of the security forces committed numerous documented abuses.
Police Response
Iraqi police do not meet U.S. or Western standards. ISF maintains a large presence in most major urban areas to limit potential terrorist, insurgent, and militia activity, though they have a limited ability to respond to security incidents, terrorist attacks, and criminal activities. Response times and capabilities may vary wildly. There are many permanent, manned checkpoints in and around major cities. Temporary checkpoints often appear without advance notice.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
Kurdish police and security services are out in adequate numbers. Visitors can move around urban areas in relative safety. When a Western expatriate has been the victim of a crime, Kurdish police take the case seriously and typically identify and arrest the perpetrators. KRG police and military units can respond quickly to security incidents, terrorist attacks, and criminal activities. KRG police and security services have sufficient training and command and control to direct their officers where required and have modern weapons and security equipment. Specialized units, such as tactical response and explosive ordinance disposal teams, have enhanced training and equipment. KRG police and security services are professional and highly responsive to diplomats, U.S. citizens, and other Westerners.
Law Enforcement Concerns: Emergency Contact/Information
The emergency line in Iraq is 130. Visitors and expatriates should always carry proper identification to avoid harassment and delays at checkpoints. Cooperate with instructions if Iraqi security personnel approach you.
Transportation Security
Road Safety
Road conditions throughout Iraq are reasonably good, and roads are generally well constructed. Urban and interstate roads are usually asphalt, while rural roads are typically hard-packed dirt/gravel. Most roads do not have an adequate shoulder for emergency stops. Most roads outside of urban centers are one lane in each direction. Vehicle security checkpoints and dense urban populations often result in significant traffic congestion. Drivers do not typically exhibit U.S. standard road etiquette or adhere to traffic laws/road markings. Expatriates and visitors who decide to drive should do so defensively. Drivers in the IKR can be aggressive and will routinely exceed posted speed limits, tailgate, and attempt reckless lane changes and passing. When on long trips, carry water, a medical kit, appropriate seasonal clothing, and adequate cash in the event you have an accident requiring vehicle repair or urgent medical care.
Consider taking up-to-date paper maps, use a GPS navigation device, and call in-country contacts to give status checks (waypoints) while in transit. These periodic updates will assist in the event of a road mishap or a delayed arrival. Driving a serviceable vehicle reduces the possibility of a breakdown and subsequent hazards associated with isolation on the road overnight. Know the locations of Kurdish defensive lines, recently liberated areas, and disputed internal boundaries. Border areas between neighboring countries can be dangerous and often not clearly defined. Use established border crossings.
Roadside IEDs are common around Baghdad but tend to be set to attack logistics convoys that supply U.S. bases. It is best to avoid trailing behind large truck convoys that may potentially be targets of IEDs.
Roadside IEDs are not common in the Kurdistan region, but smaller handheld explosives and unexploded ordnance (UXO) are present, especially in areas previously under ISIS control. Avoid unstable structures heavily damaged from ground fighting and airstrikes. Consulate personnel only travel using PSDs and in armored vehicles. Armored vehicles and local security teams are available in the IKR for hire on short- and long-term contracts.
For detailed, country-specific road and vehicle safety information, read the World Health Organization’s Global Status Report on Road Safety.
Review OSAC’s reports, Road Safety Abroad, Driving Overseas: Best Practices, and Evasive Driving Techniques; and read the State Department’s webpage on driving and road safety abroad.
Public Transportation Safety
Poorly maintained city vehicles are frequently involved in accidents or breakdowns. Though city buses run regularly, their routes and stops change frequently and without notice. Long-distance buses are in poor condition, and often drive at speeds unsafe for road conditions. Train and passenger rail infrastructure remain inadequate. Avoid using local buses and trains.
Taxis are plentiful and clearly marked, but it is best to call a reputable taxi company or private car service ahead of time from an apartment or a hotel front desk, rather than hailing a taxi from the street.
Aviation Concerns
Airports throughout Iraq are functional and provide varying levels of security and operational capability.
On March 12, 2020, the FAA issued a Notice to Airmen (KICZ A0036/20), which prohibits U.S. civil aviation operations in the Baghdad FIR (ORBB) at all altitudes. The flight prohibition for U.S. civil aviation contained in NOTAM KICZ A0036/20 is in addition to Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) No. 77, 14 C.F.R. § 91.1605, which remains in effect. Note this does not include aviation operations in Erbil or Sulaymaniyah FIR. See the FAA’s Background Information-Iraq document for additional information.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
The Turkish Air Force regularly carries out air strikes against members of the PKK in border regions between IKR, Turkey, Syria, and Iran. The air strikes are an effort to weaken the PKK, which the U.S. government considers a terrorist organization. Foreign carriers closely monitor the security situation in Erbil and are willing to suspend service with little or no notice if they perceive a risk to their aircraft.
Review OSAC’s Report, Security in Transit: Airplanes, Public Transport, and Overnights; and consider the European Union Air Safety List.
Maritime Security
Consult with the Stable Seas Maritime Security Index for detailed information and ratings regarding rule of law, law enforcement, piracy, and other maritime security indicators.
Personal Identity & Human Rights Concerns
Significant human rights issues include credible reports of unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings by the government; forced disappearances by the government; torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for offenses allegedly committed by an individual; unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers by the Popular Mobilization Forces; serious restrictions on free expression and media, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests and prosecutions against journalists, censorship, and existence of criminal libel laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; restrictions on freedom of movement of women; forced returns of internally displaced persons to locations where they faced threats to their lives and freedom; threats of violence against internally displaced persons and returnee populations perceived to have been affiliated with ISIS; serious government corruption; lack of investigation and accountability for gender-based violence; crimes involving violence targeting members of ethnic minority groups; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; significant restrictions on worker freedom of association; and the existence of the worst forms of child labor.
Safety Concerns for Women Travelers
U.S. citizens, especially female dual nationals of Iraq, have traveled to Iraq with family members and have been subject to threats, kidnappings, and extortion, including incidents of loss of custody of children or forced marriage. Women and children should pay particular attention to any warning signs, including husbands or other family members withholding money or travel documents after arrival in Iraq. The Iraqi police and legal system may offer little protection.
The law criminalizes rape and sexual assault of women, men, and children, but does not specifically mention spousal rape; it permits a sentence not exceeding 15 years, or life imprisonment if the victim dies. The rape provisions of the law do not define, clarify, or otherwise describe “consent,” leaving the term up to judicial interpretation. The law requires authorities to drop a rape case if the perpetrator marries the survivor, with a provision protecting against divorce within the first three years of marriage. The survivor’s family sometimes agreed to this arrangement to avoid the social stigma attached to rape. There were no reliable estimates of the incidence of rape or information on the effectiveness of government enforcement of the law. The law prohibits sexual harassment, including in the workplace.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the UN reported a significant increase in the reports of rape, domestic violence, spousal abuse, immolation and self-immolation, self-inflicted injuries due to spousal abuse, sexual harassment of minors, and suicide due to increased household tensions because of COVID-19 lockdowns, as well as economic hardship due to the country’s declining economy.
KRG law criminalizes domestic violence, including physical and psychological abuse, threats of violence, and spousal rape.
NGOs and the KRG reported the practice of female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) persisted in the IKR, particularly in rural areas of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Kirkuk Provinces, despite a ban on the practice in IKR law. Rates of FGM/C, however, reportedly continued to decline. NGOs attributed the reduction in FGM/C to the criminalization of the practice and sustained public outreach activities by civil society groups. FGM/C was not common outside the IKR.
The law permitted “honor” as a lawful defense in violence against women, and so-called honor killings remained a serious problem throughout the country. A provision of the law limits a sentence for a murder conviction to a maximum of three years in prison if a man is on trial for killing his wife or a female dependent due to suspicion that the victim was committing adultery or engaged in sex outside of marriage. The UN reported that several hundred women died each year from honor killings. Some families reportedly arranged honor killings to appear as suicides.
There were reports that women and girls were sexually exploited through so-called temporary, or pleasure, marriages, under which a man gives the family of the girl or woman dowry money in exchange for permission to “marry” her for a specified period. Young women, widowed or orphaned by ISIS offensives, were especially vulnerable to this type of exploitation. In similar cases NGOs reported some families opted to marry off their underage daughters in exchange for dowry money, believing the marriage was genuine, only to have the girl returned to them months later, sometimes pregnant.
Female political candidates suffered harassment online and on social media, including posting of fake, nude, or salacious photographs and videos meant to harm their campaigns and their reputations – often labeled as “staining their family’s honor.” The Iraqi Women’s Network NGO cited several cases of women candidates being targeted because of their gender during the election campaign. Local human rights NGOs stated that the harassment was particularly targeted against independent women candidates or those from new political parties that lacked recourse or political connections to government security services.
NGOs also report cases in which courts changed the registration of Yezidi women to Muslim against their will because of their forced marriage to ISIS fighters.
Various methods of contraception were widely available, including in the IKR; however, women in urban areas generally had greater access than those in rural parts of the country.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
Kurdish males may believe women in Western dress may be open to sexual advances, especially if they see Western women consuming alcohol or engaging in other behaviors that are culturally taboo for women in the region. This prejudice occasionally leads to sexual violence if women find themselves alone with Kurdish males, such as in a taxi or alone on a dark street. Female expatriates living in the community generally only travel in groups at night, stay on well-lighted streets, and patronize reputable establishments.
The Solo Female Travel Safety Index combines the experiences of solo female travelers with other reliable indices to award a single rating indicating the relative security female travelers might experience in a given country. The qualitative portion of the index examines risk of scam, theft, and harassment, as well as the country’s perceived attitude towards women. As of the date of this report’s publication, Iraq has a score of 3.7 on a scale of 1.0 (safest) to 4.0 (least safe). All solo female travelers are able to share their solo travel experiences by signing up with the Solo Female Travelers portal; the organization draws qualitative data from women traveling solo, depending on active participation and honest information.
Consider composite scores given to Iraq by the UN Development Program (UNDP) in its Gender Development Index, measuring the difference between average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development, and Gender Inequality Index, measuring inequality in achievement in reproductive health, empowerment, and the labor market. For more information on gender statistics in Iraq, see the World Bank's Gender Data Portal.
Review the State Department’s webpage for female travelers.
Safety Concerns for LGBTI+ Travelers
The penal code criminalizes consensual same-sex conduct if those engaging in the conduct are younger than age 18, while it does not criminalize any same-sex activities among adults. Despite repeated threats and violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) individuals, specifically gay men, the government failed to identify, arrest, or prosecute attackers or to protect targeted individuals. Some political parties sought to justify these attacks, and investigators often refused to employ proper investigation procedures. LGBTQI+ individuals also faced intimidation, threats, violence, and discrimination, and LGBTQI+ individuals reported they could not live openly without fear of violence at the hands of family members, acquaintances, or strangers.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
LGBTI+ individuals also face intimidation, threats, violence, and discrimination in the IKR. LGBTI+ individuals report they could not live openly in the IKR without fear of violence at the hands of family members, acquaintances, or strangers. LGBTI+ individuals struggle to be accepted by their family members and the IKR community and disguise their identity from their families due to fear of violence, verbal abuse, and killing.
The Equaldex Equality Index measures the status of LGBTI+ rights, laws, and freedoms, as well as public attitudes towards LGBTI+ people around the world. As of this report’s publication date, Iraq has a score of 15/100, ranking 177 out of 198 countries on the index.
Consider information from Destination Pride, a data-driven search platform associated with PFLAG Canada that visualize the world's LGBTQ+ laws, rights, and social sentiment; as well as from ILGA World, a worldwide federation that produces an annual map showing sexual orientation laws from around the world, available in multiple languages.
Review OSAC’s report, Supporting LGBT+ Employee Security Abroad, and the State Department’s webpage on security for LGBTI travelers.
Safety Concerns for Travelers with Disabilities
Iraqi law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, access to health care, and other state services. The government enforces the law in the public sector, but not in the private sector. Access for persons with disabilities to buildings and in educational and work settings remains inconsistent. Public and government buildings, as well as public bathrooms, may not be accessible.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
Disability rights advocates in the KRG reported that the IKR’s disability protections lack implementation, including the 5% employment requirement. Lack of accessibility remains a problem with more than 98% of public buildings, parks, and transportation lacking adequate facilities to assist the more than 110,000 registered persons with disabilities in the region.
Review the State Department’s webpage on security for travelers with disabilities.
Safety Concerns for Travelers Based on Race, Religion, & Ethnicity
The constitution holds that all citizens are equal before the law without discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, origin, color, religion, sect, belief, or opinion, or economic or social status. It prohibits any entity or program that adopts, incites, facilitates, glorifies, promotes, or justifies racism or ethnic cleansing. Nonetheless, restrictions on freedom of religion as well as violence against and harassment of minority groups committed by the ISF remained widespread outside the IKR, according to religious leaders and representatives of NGOs. Incidents of ethnic and sectarian violence remain frequent in Iraq. Most of these events occur in mixed-sect neighborhoods.
Ethnic and sectarian-based fighting continues in mixed provinces, although at lower rates than in 2019.
The law does not permit some religious groups, including Baha’i, Zoroastrian, and Kaka’i, to register under their professed religions, which, although recognized in the IKR, remained unrecognized and illegal under federal Iraqi law. The law also forbids Muslims to convert to another religion. In the IKR, this law was rarely enforced, and individuals were generally allowed to convert to other religious faiths without KRG interference.
Discrimination continued to stoke ethno-sectarian tensions in the disputed territories throughout the year. Government forces, particularly certain PMF groups, targeted members of ethnic and religious minority groups, as did remaining active ISIS fighters. Some government forces, including PMF units, forcibly displaced individuals due to perceived ISIS affiliation or for ethno-sectarian reasons. In January 2021, social media users created the hashtag “justice for Diyala,” reacting to a report published by a local NGO that highlighted human rights abuses by militias against Sunnis and other members of minority groups in disputed areas. The abuses included running outlaw detention facilities, blackmailing tradesmen, seizing properties owned by members of minority groups, and imposing royalties on local markets.
The country’s population included Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and Shabak, as well as members of ethnic and religious minority groups, including Chaldeans, Assyrians, Armenians, Yezidis, Sabean-Mandaeans, Baha’is, Kaka’is, and a very small number of Jews. The country also had a small Romani (Dom) community, as well as an estimated 1.5 to 2 million citizens of African descent who resided primarily in Basrah and adjoining provinces. Because religion, politics, and ethnicity were closely linked, it was difficult to categorize many incidents of discrimination as based solely on ethnic or religious identity.
The penal code stipulates that any person convicted of promoting Zionist principles, association with Zionist organizations, assisting such organizations through material or moral support, or working in any way to realize Zionist objectives, be subject to punishment by death. According to the code, Jews are prohibited from joining the military and cannot hold jobs in the public sector. The KRG did not apply the central government’s anti-Zionist laws and relied on IKR law number five, which provides protections for the rights of members of religious minority groups, including Jews.
A very small number of Jewish citizens lived in Baghdad. According to unofficial statistics from the KRG Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, there were as few as 100 to 250 Jewish families in the IKR. The Jewish community did not worship in public due to fears of retribution, discrimination, or violence by extremist actors.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
ISIS denied religious freedom and persecuted minority groups across the territory it held. The KRG has sought to reduce inter-religious tensions and control clashes between ethnic groups. The possibility of attacks and incidents rises around religious and civic holidays and dates of historical significance. While the IKR hosts nearly one million Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) within its governorates, along with additional IDPs in the KRG-controlled portions of Ninewa, the provinces of Erbil, Duhok, and Sulaimaniya have not experienced serious religious or ethnic strife. In general, Iraqi Kurds are tolerant, accepting, and generous to all groups persecuted and displaced by ISIS.
IKR law forbids “religious, or political, media speech individually or collectively, directly or indirectly that brings hate and violence, terror, exclusion, and marginalization based on national, ethnic, or religious or linguistic claims.” According to a representative of the Yezidi NGO Yazda, KRG authorities continued to discriminate against minorities, including Turkomans, Arabs, Yezidis, Shabak, and Christians, in territories claimed by both the KRG and the central government in the northern part of the country.
Review the latest U.S Department of State Report on International Religious Freedom for country-specific information.
Review OSAC’s report, Freedom to Practice, and the State Department’s webpage on security for faith-based travelers.
Anti-U.S./Anti-Western Sentiment
The threat of kidnapping, rocket and mortar attacks, use of IEDs, and small-arms fire against official and private U.S. interests remains high. IAMGs such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), KH, and the nationalistic Peace Brigades Militia have previously targeted U.S. interests. There are multiple reports of attempted targeting of U.S. nationals, and Westerners at large for kidnapping. There are also new reports of militia groups kidnapping locals, foreign workers, and members of international organizations, and demanding ransoms from either their families or their employers.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
Kurds generally have a favorable view of U.S. citizens and other Westerners, despite protests and social media expressing anger with U.S. foreign policy. The KRG prioritizes the safety of U.S. citizens and other Westerners.
Attacks and serious security incidents have occurred in the Iraqi provinces of Anbar, Baghdad, Salahaddin, and Ninewa on a far more frequent basis than in the IKR. However, the threat of attacks in the IKR remains a concern. The heavy presence of the Peshmerga on Kurdish defensive lines has been a stabilizing force, especially when working in tandem with Coalition air power and U.S. advise/assist efforts. This combination has undoubtedly prevented significant acts of terrorism in Erbil and other major urbans areas in the IKR. In 2022, there were no serious attacks against U.S. citizens or other Westerners in the IKR.
Concerns involving the Rule of Law, Arbitrary Detention, Official Harassment, Corruption &/or Transparency
The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government struggled to implement the laws effectively. The law allows some individuals convicted of corruption to receive amnesty upon repaying money obtained through corruption, which had the effect of allowing them to keep any profits from stolen funds.
Corruption remained a chief obstacle to effective governance at all institutional levels. Bribery, money laundering, nepotism, and misappropriation of public funds were common at all levels and across all branches of government. Family, tribal, and ethno-sectarian considerations significantly influenced government decisions at all levels and across all branches of government. Federal and KRG officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There were, however, notable steps in 2020, including the approval of a national anticorruption strategy and subpoenas issued for and conviction of government officials for corruption in the IKR and the rest of the country.
Anticorruption efforts were hampered by a lack of agreement concerning institutional roles, political will, political influence, lack of transparency, and unclear governing legislation and regulatory processes. The existence of armed militias, which were directly involved in corruption and provided protection for corrupt officials, made serious and sustainable anticorruption efforts difficult to enforce.
Border corruption continues to be a problem. In July 2020, the prime minister launched a campaign to secure borders with Iran and other neighboring countries. He granted extended powers to the Iraqi military and navy to control borders with Iran and Kuwait and provided the border guards with additional reserve forces. KRG officials launched an investigation in September 2020 into corruption and smuggling at the Parwez Khan border crossing with Iran.
Communication Issues
The constitution provides for the right of free expression, including for the press if such does not violate public order and morality, express support for the banned Baath Party, or advocate altering the country’s borders through violent means. Despite this provision, media and social activists face various forms of pressure and intimidation from authorities, making the primary limitation on freedom of expression self-censorship due to a credible fear of reprisals by the government, political parties, ethnic and sectarian forces, militias, terrorist and extremist groups, or criminal gangs. A media environment in which press outlets are closely affiliated with specific political parties and ethnic factions, an opaque judiciary, and a developing democratic political system combine to place considerable restrictions on freedom of expression, including the press.
Despite the constitutional protection for freedom of expression, central government and KRG oversight and censorship sometimes interfered with media operations, at times resulting in the closure of media outlets, restrictions on reporting, denying access to public information, and interference with internet service.
Government forces occasionally prevented journalists from reporting, citing security reasons. Some media organizations reported arrests and harassment of journalists, as well as government efforts to prevent them from covering politically sensitive topics, including security matters, corruption, and government failure to provide adequate services. Journalists continued to face threats, intimidation, and attacks by militia or security forces. Several journalists have been killed during the course of their work, some reportedly by militia or security forces.
The government restricted or disrupted access to the internet and censored online content, and there were credible reports the government monitored private online communications without appropriate legal authority. Government restrictions on access to the internet were overt, but the government denied that it monitored private online communications without appropriate legal authority. Despite restrictions, political figures and activists used the internet to criticize politicians, organize demonstrations, and campaign for candidates through social media platforms. Militias used bots and disinformation campaigns to attack and defame activists, independent elections candidates, and the electoral commission.
The government acknowledges it interfered with internet access in some areas of the country, reportedly due to the security situation and the disruptive use of social media platforms by ISIS. While Wi-Fi and 3G access is largely restored, connectivity remains weak, making social media and streaming difficult. Slow speeds, or the throttling of internet access, greatly limits the ability of users to upload video and photographic content.
Individuals were able to criticize the government publicly or privately but not without fear of reprisal. Paramilitary militias harassed activists and new reform-oriented political movements online and in person, including through online disinformation, bot attacks, and threats or use of physical violence to silence them and halt their activities.
Iraqi Security Forces (mostly those under the Ministry of Interior, within the NSS, or from the PMF), in addition to KRG forces (primarily Asayish), arrested and detained protesters and activists critical of the central government and of the KRG, respectively, according to statements by government officials, NGO representatives, and press reports.
Throughout the IKR there were reports of beatings, detentions, and death threats against media workers, particularly toward journalists working for opposition-affiliated outlets. In some cases, the aggressors wore KRG military or police uniforms.
Paramilitary militias in the PMF frequently threatened Sunni and minority communities with terrorism charges to silence their dissent, especially in areas where the militias have taken over local land and economic activities and blocked the return of Sunni IDPs.
The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index measures how the rule of law is experienced and perceived worldwide based on surveys in 139 countries and jurisdictions, and is the leading source for original, independent data on the rule of law. The most recent index does not rank Iraq.
The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Iraq 157 out of 180 worldwide, where 1 means most transparent.
The Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index ranks Iraq 150 out of 180 worldwide, where 1 means most freedom. The Freedom House Freedom on the Net report rates Iraq’s internet freedom as Partly Free, but its Freedom in the World report rates Iraq’s freedom of speech as Not Free.
Review OSAC’s report, Lèse Majesté: Watching what you say (and type) abroad.
Health Concerns
Emergency Health Services
The emergency line in Iraq is 130.
Use Iraqi hospitals only as a contingency for urgent life-or-death emergencies. Most hospitals and emergency medical services do not meet U.S. standards. Local hospitals have substandard staffing and equipment and may not carry basic medicines. The facilities in operation do not meet U.S. standards, and the majority lack medicines, equipment, and supplies. American Citizen Services (ACS) maintains a list of doctors and hospitals; request it by e-mailing BaghdadACS@state.gov. For security reasons, ACS does not post the names of organizations and individuals on its webpage.
Basic, modern medical care and medicines are not widely available. Conflict has left some medical facilities non-operational and medical stocks and supplies severely depleted. Blood banks exist, though the blood supply may not be sufficient in the event of an emergency, and likely has not been tested under U.S. standards for infectious disease. In addition, many areas suffer rolling power outages, and generators are not always available.
There is limited mental health or psychiatric care available. As Iraq is a country under conflict, pre-existing mental health conditions and symptoms may resurface or exacerbate due to exposure to ongoing events and the environment.
Serious illnesses/injuries often require medical evacuation (medevac). Such services are very expensive and are generally available only to travelers who either have travel insurance that covers medevac services or who can pay for the service in advance. The cost for medical evacuation may range from U.S. $40,000 to $200,000. U.S. citizens in Iraq should not expect any medical assistance from the U.S. Government. Review the State Department’s webpage on health insurance overseas.
Tuberculosis, MERS, Cholera, and food-borne illnesses are prevalent, as are breathing problems caused by frequently hazardous air quality, especially in Baghdad.
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Health “H” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Iraq. Review the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) country-specific Travel Health Notices for current health issues that impact traveler health, like disease outbreaks, special events or gatherings, and natural disasters.
See OSAC’s Guide to U.S. Government-Assisted Evacuations; review OSAC’s reports, The Healthy Way, Shaken: The Don’ts of Alcohol Abroad, Health 101: How to Prepare for Travel, and Fire Safety Abroad; and visit the State Department’s webpage on Your Health Abroad for more information.
Vaccinations
Strongly consider COVID-19 vaccination prior to all travel.
Review the CDC Travelers’ Health site for country-specific vaccine recommendations.
Issues Traveling with Medications
Always carry your prescription medication in the original packaging with your doctor’s prescription and in sufficient supply for your entire stay.
Review OSAC’s report, Traveling with Medication.
Water Quality
Iraq's drinking water quality is mixed and often poor.
Review OSAC’s report, I’m Drinking What in My Water?
Environmental Hazards
Iraq’s environment is harsh. Temperatures in Baghdad can fall below 32°F (0°C) in the winter and exceed 120°F (49°C) during the summer. Dust storms, which can reduce visibility and impede movement of aircraft, occur frequently during the spring. Heavy fog often lasting for hours is common during the winter. Winter snow typically falls in areas of higher elevation, closing roads until warmer temperatures return. By U.S. or Western standards, the IKR lacks road treatment and clearing equipment sufficient to mitigate hazards associated with snow and ice on roadways. This is especially true outside major urban centers.
Cybersecurity Concerns
There are no cybersecurity concerns specific to private-sector organizations operating in Iraq.
Review OSAC’s reports, Cybersecurity Basics, Best Practices for Maximizing Security on Public Wi-Fi, Traveling Abroad with Mobile Devices, and Guide for Overseas Satellite Phone Usage.
Counterintelligence Issues
There are no counterintelligence concerns specific to private-sector organizations operating in Iraq.
Other Security Concerns
Landmines
Iraq is the country most contaminated with landmines, partly due to those laid by ISIS to defend the territory it once controlled.
Iraq was already heavily contaminated because of the 2003 invasion by the U.S.-led coalition, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. The number of mines planted in Iraq is not known.
Import/Export Restrictions
Customs officers have the broad authority to search persons or vehicles at Iraqi ports of entry. Officers may confiscate any goods they deem may pose a threat to the peace, security, health, environment, or social order of Iraq. Authorities may confiscate antiquities or cultural items suspected of illegal export, as well as undeclared goods. Visitors may also have to return such goods, at their expense, to the jurisdiction from which they came. Satellite phones are permitted in the IKR.
A country-specific listing of items/goods prohibited from being exported to the country or that are otherwise restricted is available from the U.S. International Trade Agency website.
Photography
Avoid unauthorized photography. Photos of ISF personnel and checkpoints are illegal. Iraqi military personnel may confiscate equipment and temporarily detain individuals taking unauthorized photographs.
Review OSAC’s report, Picture This: Dos and Don’ts for Photography.
ID Requirements
Visitors and expatriates should always carry proper identification to avoid harassment and delays at checkpoints.
Critical Infrastructure Concerns
There are no critical infrastructure concerns specific to private-sector organizations operating in Iraq.
OSAC Country Chapters
The Country Chapter in Baghdad meets three times per year. The Country Chapter in Erbil meets in person quarterly with virtual connectivity for those out of country. Both Chapters maintain group chats for sharing routine and emergency information. Contact OSAC’s Middle East & North Africa Team with any questions.
Embassy Contact Information
U.S. Embassy: Al Kindi Street, Baghdad. Tel: +964-0760-030-3000; Regional Security Office Operations Center (24 hrs.): +964-0760-030-2833 (from Iraq local cell/landline) or 1-301-985-8841 ext. 2833/3343 (from the U.S.). Foreign Commercial Service Office: baghdad@trade.gov. Hours of Operation: 0800 – 1700, Sunday to Thursday.
U.S. Consulate General: 413 Ishtar, Ankawa, Erbil. Tel: +964-066-211-4554 (from Iraq) or 1-240-264-3467 extension 4554 (from the U.S.). Hours of Operation: 0800 – 1700, Sunday to Thursday.
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