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Overseas Security Advisory Council
Bureau of Diplomatic Security
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Iraq Country Security Report

Published: July 8, 2024

This report is intended to supplement the U.S. Department of State Iraq Travel Advisory and Iraq Country Information Page.

Embassy & Consulate Contact Information

​U.S. Embassy Baghdad: Al Kindi Street, Baghdad. Tel: +964-0760-030-3000; Regional Security Office Operations Center (24 hrs.): +964-0760-030-2833 (from Iraq local cell/landline) or 1-301-985-8841 ext. 2833/3343 (from the U.S.). Foreign Commercial Service Office: baghdad@trade.gov. Hours of Operation: 0800 – 1700, Sunday to Thursday.

U.S. Consulate General: 413 Ishtar, Ankawa, Erbil. Tel: +964-066-211-4554 (from Iraq) or 1-240-264-3467 extension 4554 (from the U.S.). Hours of Operation: 0800 – 1700, Sunday to Thursday.

OSAC Country Chapter(s)

The Country Chapter in Baghdad meets quarterly. The Country Chapter in Erbil meets in person quarterly with virtual connectivity for those out of country.  Both Chapters maintain group chats for sharing routine and emergency information. 

Contact OSAC’s Middle East & North Africa Team with any questions.

Iraq Travel Advisory

The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses that travelers should not travel due to terrorism, kidnapping, armed conflict, civil unrest and limited capacity of the Department of State to provide support to U.S. citizens.

Crime

The U.S. Department of State has assessed Baghdad as being a CRITICAL-threat location and Erbil as being a LOW-threat location for crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.

The U.S. Department of State has not included a Crime “C” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Iraq.

Crime and lawlessness remain a serious threat throughout the country. In Baghdad, organized crime, uncontrolled militia activity, and corruption remain formidable obstacles to free enterprise and business. Most international corporations under contract with or employed in Iraq must adhere to strict safety and security procedures when traveling in and around Baghdad. Private security companies (PSCs) employing armored vehicles and protective security details (PSDs) remain a standard security practice for companies and diplomatic missions alike within Baghdad, including for travel within the International Zone (IZ). These procedures mitigate the threat posed by small-arms fire and improve survivability in events involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs); they also reduce the potential for criminal targeting. There are considerable militia threats to all PSCs in Iraq; militias consider all PSCs to be “American.”

Some groups may capitalize on the disarray inside the current Iraqi government to incite further chaos inside the country. Currently, there is a minimal threat of IEDs targeting U.S. citizens or interests. Although while they are still present, they are primarily used by tribal infighting or family quarrels. In addition to this, Iranian-Aligned militia groups (IAMGs) use low-yield and crude sound bombs in Baghdad city to intimidate and extort small business owners in protection rackets.

Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):

Crime statistics and/or crime reporting mechanisms in the IKR are unreliable relative to U.S. crime-data collection methods. The IKR is emerging from an economic downturn and fiscal crisis that officials claim had resulted in a slight decrease in crime reported in 2023. Informally, IKR officials have commented that property thefts and thefts from residences have risen in the past several years. To date, most crime is nonviolent, and criminals generally do not target Westerners. Most Western expatriates in Erbil live in apartment or housing development communities with effective access controls and private security. 

Most homicides committed in the IKR were related to family or tribal disputes and did not involve foreigners. Homicides that do involve foreigners are more likely to be associated with terrorism. Nevertheless, Western expats must take basic precautions to prevent being at risk for wrong place/wrong time violence.

The most common type of violent crime in Erbil and the surrounding area is clashes between families or tribes involving firearms. The number of shootings reported by the police shootings in 2023 was 60. Some of these incidents happened at upscale cafes or restaurants and in proximity to areas where diplomats and expatriates congregate. Such incidents are not so frequent that diplomats and expatriates cannot minimize the chance of wrong place/wrong time violence by adjusting their routines. Foreigners are not targets in such crimes on account of their nationality.

Burglary against offices and businesses is more common than burglary from residences because offices and businesses are vacant at night. Most business owners must take basic precautions to prevent this type of crime, including installing window grilles, storing valuables in a safe and minimizing cash on-hand, practicing strong operational security, installing CCTV cameras, and in some cases, hiring private security. This includes businesses diplomats and expatriates frequent. There are no known cases of burglary in high-end hotels. Prostitution is prevalent even in nicer establishments; guests inviting prostitutes into their room are much more likely to be targeted for robbery or other crimes.

The most common type of non-confrontational theft is “snatch-and-grab” robbery. Perpetrators may target handbags or cell phones. Such crimes occur more often during hours of darkness and in high crime and popular tourist areas, such as downtown near the citadel. The increased number of refugees and internally displaced persons has likely increased this type of crime in the last several years. Expatriates do not seem to be specific targets, but those moving through the city without security details report taking security precautions that include group travel and avoiding high crime areas after dark.

Business scams are the most common type of fraud committed in Erbil, and these scams have targeted U.S. aid agencies and development partners. In most cases, criminals propose to carry out work, but after receiving payment, they disappear. Locals are also targets of business-related scams.       

Kidnapping Threat

The U.S. Department of State has included a Kidnapping “K” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Iraq, indicating that criminal or terrorist individuals or groups have threatened to and/or have seized or detained and threatened to kill, injure, or continue to detain individuals in order to compel a third party (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing something as a condition of release.

 

Kidnappings for political or monetary gain are common throughout Iraq. The threat ISIS and militia groups pose to conduct such operations remains high. Criminal organizations continue to use kidnapping as a method to fund operations, as well as a bargaining method to demand concessions from the government. In Baghdad, the kidnapping threat comes almost exclusively from militia groups, who may use it as a method to undermine U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic objectives in Iraq, or from criminal groups targeting individuals they perceive to be wealthy.

In 2023, an Israeli doctoral student from Princeton University was kidnapped by an Iraqi militia in Baghdad.

U.S. nationals are at high risk for kidnapping while in Iraq. Due to these concerns, the U.S. government requires personnel to live and work under strict security guidelines. All U.S. government employees under the authority of the Chief of Mission follow strict security procedures including the mandatory use of PSDs when traveling outside U.S. facilities. The Department of State advises U.S. organizations in Iraq to use PSDs to mitigate risk to their employees. Additional security information is available on the U.S. Embassy website.

Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):

Most kidnappings in Erbil are related to family and tribal disputes. On the rare occasion when expatriates have been targets, the Kurdish police and security forces have been successful in resolving the cases. One recent case involved an Indian national who owned a popular Indian restaurant in Erbil. The owner’s brother was kidnapped, and a ransom demanded. After locating the hostage and perpetrators, the police determined the criminals were employees of the restaurant and targeted the family because they were open about their wealth. Expatriates who do not always travel with a protective detail report using basic mitigations to minimize the risk of kidnapping, such as practicing good operational security (e.g., not advertising wealth or their personal schedule, not giving their address to taxi drivers) and by varying their routines.

Terrorism

The U.S. Department of State has assessed Baghdad and Erbil as being CRITICAL-threat locations for terrorism directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.

The U.S. Department of State has included a Terrorism “T” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Iraq, indicating that terrorist attacks have occurred and/or specific threats against civilians, groups, or other targets may exist.

Terrorist and insurgent groups regularly attack Iraqi security forces and civilians. Anti-U.S. militias threaten U.S. citizens and international companies throughout Iraq. Attacks using improvised explosive devices, indirect fire, and unmanned aerial vehicles occur in many areas of the country, including Baghdad and other major cities. The Islamic State in Iraq, also known as ISIS, is a designated terrorist organization, which is active in northern and western Iraq. ISIS and its associated terrorist groups indiscriminately commit attacks and violent atrocities in Iraq despite improved Iraqi government control. ISIS, militia groups, and criminal gangs target U.S. citizens for attacks and hostage-taking. Iraq’s northern and western borders are especially dangerous due to the continued threat of attacks by terrorist groups, armed conflict, aerial bombardment, and civil unrest. U.S. citizens should especially avoid areas near armed groups in northern Iraq, which have been targeted with aerial strikes by neighboring countries’ militaries.

The following list is illustrative of the types of attacks and security events conducted during 2024 in Iraq:

  • On January 8, ISIS shelled Iraqi military barracks in the eastern Rutbah province.
  • On January 10, Kurdish authorities downed a drone at Erbil airport (EIA), IRI claimed responsibility for targeting facilities.
  • On January 16,  a prominent Kurdish business man was killed along with his one-year-old daughter and another Iraqi–British businessman in an Iranain missiles attack on his residence in Erbil.
  • On January 20, multiple ballistic missiles and rockets were launched by Iranian-backed militants in western Iraq targeting al-Assad Airbase.
  • On January 25, a drone struck a gas field in Sulaimaniya, damaging civilian infrastructure.
  • On January 25, Kurdish authorities downed a drone fired by militia groups at a base hosting U.S.-led counter ISIS forces in Erbil
  • On April 24, ISIS shelled a base of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in the village of Qaryat al-Lakalak.
  • On April 26, a drone attack on the Khor Mor gas field killing four.
  • On May 1, IS shelled Iraqi military barracks in the villages of Adhirban and Tarfawi in Kiruk.
  • On May 14, five Iraqi soldiers were killed after ISIS fired on their barracks and ambushed a patrol coming to aid the base.

Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):

The IKR enjoys a strong relationship with the U.S. despite internal political divisions, Turkish military activity targeting of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) near the Iraq-Turkey border, political instability in Baghdad and areas of southern Iraq, and the ongoing ISIS threat. The IKR remains relatively secure.

Although ISIS no longer holds physical territory, the group has shown resilience. Remaining ISIS elements in the IKR are typically restricted to smuggling, financial operations, and planning. However, ISIS maintains lethal capabilities and presents a serious threat almost anywhere along the 700-mile-long Peshmerga and Iraqi Army defensive line. Throughout Ninewa, Diyala, and Kirkuk provinces, ISIS can conduct asymmetric attacks, to include the use of vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), ambushes, small unit infantry-style assaults, and assassinations. Terrorists often target Iraqi and coalition forces and Iraqi infrastructure, including highways and oil refineries.

Although on the defensive, ISIS remains capable and extremely dangerous. Recent reporting indicates that ISIS maintains sleeper cells in Mosul and along the Kurdish control line. ISIS remnants constitute a threat to Westerners operating in Diyala, Kirkuk, or traversing Mosul and traveling west toward Tal Afar and Sinjar.

Kurdish security forces conduct counter terrorism operations in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah regularly, but most operations occur outside of the Kurdish Coordination Line (KCL) Turkish operations against the PKK have increased since the beginning of spring 2024. Turkey has dedicated large troop numbers, along with equipment and special operations units with the intent of ending the PKK presence in Northern Kurdistan by the end of 2024.

Following the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict, drones targeting U.S. bases in the IKR significantly increased. The Iraqi Resistance in Iraq (IRI) claimed responsibility for the attacks. Airborne threats against the bases and immediate vicinity remain one of the most significant risks to U.S. interests in the IKR.

The PKK maintains a presence in the Sinjar region and throughout the IKR. Fighting between the PKK and Kurdish regional authorities increased in 2022, particularly in Dohuk province and the northern areas of the Erbil Governorate. 

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) devotes considerable resources to protect its key government buildings, vital infrastructure, the diplomatic community, and soft targets such as hotels, churches, mosques, and shopping areas.

Individuals required to live or travel in Iraq should use an in-country security advisor or some type of PSD support to limit potential terrorist and criminal threats. Travelers to the IKR should consider using all available security assets to minimize any potential terrorist or criminal risks to include protective security or a local driver who knows routes, speaks the local language, and knows which areas may present a higher degree of risk.

Political Violence and Civil Unrest

The U.S. Department of State has assessed Baghdad and Erbil as being CRITICAL-threat locations for political violence directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.

The U.S. Department of State has included a Civil Unrest “U” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Iraq, indicating that demonstrations, protests, and/or strikes occur frequently, and/or that local law enforcement may have limited ability to respond adequately. Civil unrest can develop quickly without prior notice, often interrupting logistics and services. Avoid demonstration activity, as even those planned to remain peaceful have the potential to turn violent. 

Elections/Political Stability

After over a yearlong stalemate, Iraq’s parliament selected a prime minister and the first cabinet since 2005 without any Sadr-aligned members. The 2022 elections resulted in a plurality for the Shia cleric Sadr and his allies, but he was unable to form a coalition government while excluding Iranian-aligned political parties. The Sadr-led bloc eventually resigned in protest, relinquishing control of parliament to the Iran-supported parties. Massive street protests, occupation of parliament by protestors, and fighting ensued, leading to at least 30 dead and dozens injured. After withdrawing, rocket attacks were launched against parliament and the Green Zone in Baghdad in an attempt to disrupt the government formation process. However, Iraq’s Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani assumed office in late 2022 and the government was formed; violent protests have subsided. In December 2023, Iraq held its first local elections in a decade. Fifteen provinces held elections, and provincial governments have since began appointing governors.

The Kurdistan Region was set to hold parliamentary elections on June 10, 2024; Kurdistan Democratic Party announced in March 2024 that it would boycott the parliamentary elections due to recent ruling by the Iraqi federal court on the minority quota seats and the division of the Region into four constituencies. The independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) proposed September 5, 2024, as a new date of elections but this date is still to be confirmed by Kurdistan President Nechirvan Barzani.

Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):

The Kurds are an important U.S. partner and are public in their desire for a continued U.S. diplomatic and military presence in Iraq.  Traditionally, the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) has been one of the most prosperous and stable regions in Iraq.  However, deteriorating relations between the IKR’s two largest political parties – the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) – have hindered Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) operations and threatened the KRG’s ability to deliver on the region’s interests in Baghdad.  The United States is of the firm belief that a lack of cooperation among the IKR’s political parties not only hurt the strength of the IKR’s position within a united and federal Iraq, but also harm overall security and stability in Iraq.  The U.S. government has supported efforts to reduce tensions between the parties to strengthen their effectiveness both in the IKR and in Baghdad.  The KDP and the PUK recently initiated a process to address political, economic, and security disputes between the two parties.  While that process is currently paused, the United States is encouraging both sides to resume dialogue and establish a united front in its dealings with Baghdad on critical issues including the budget, hydrocarbons management, and security. 

Protests & Demonstrations

Small protests are frequent in Baghdad and other major cities and can occur without much warning. Larger, organized protests are generally proceeded by significant social media messaging. Some OSAC members have reported tension in areas to the south of Baghdad centered on water scarcity and electricity supply issues. Media reporting confirms these claims.  Recent protests have centered around the Israel-Hamas conflict.

Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):

Demonstrations in the IKR are typically centered around domestic issues ranging from salary and pension disputes, civil and economic issues such as corruption, poverty, and unemployment as well as rights of less represented groups. They are typically peaceful but have resulted in the police utilizing tear gas to disperse large gatherings. 

Anti-U.S./Anti-Western Sentiment

The threat of kidnapping, rocket and mortar attacks, use of IEDs, and small-arms fire against official and private U.S. interests remains high. IAMGs such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), KH, and the nationalistic Peace Brigades Militia have previously targeted U.S. interests. There are multiple reports of attempted targeting of U.S. nationals, and Westerners at large for kidnapping. There are also new reports of militia groups kidnapping locals, foreign workers, and members of international organizations, and demanding ransoms from either their families or their employers.

Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):

Kurds generally have a favorable view of U.S. citizens and other Westerners, despite protests and social media expressing anger with U.S. foreign policy. The KRG prioritizes the safety of U.S. citizens and other Westerners.

Attacks and serious security incidents have occurred in the Iraqi provinces of Anbar, Baghdad, Salahaddin, and Ninewa on a far more frequent basis than in the IKR. However, the threat of attacks in the IKR remains a concern. The heavy presence of the Peshmerga on Kurdish defensive lines has been a stabilizing force, especially when working in tandem with Coalition air power and U.S. advise/assist efforts. This combination has undoubtedly prevented significant acts of terrorism in Erbil and other major urbans areas in the IKR. Except for the December 2023 attack on Erbil Air Base which injured one U.S. service member, there were no serious attacks against U.S. citizens or other Westerners in the IKR in 2023.

Law Enforcement

The emergency line in Iraq is 130. Visitors and expatriates should always carry proper identification to avoid harassment and delays at checkpoints. Cooperate with instructions if Iraqi security personnel approach you.

The emergency line for police in IKR is: 104

Numerous domestic security forces operate throughout the country. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are organized administratively within the Ministries of Interior and Defense, as well as within the quasi-ministerial Counterterrorism Service. The Ministry of Interior is responsible for domestic law enforcement and maintenance of order; it oversees the Federal Police, Provincial Police, Facilities Protection Service, Civil Defense, and Department of Border Enforcement. Energy police, under the Ministry of Oil, are responsible for protecting energy infrastructure. Conventional military forces under the Ministry of Defense also carry out counterterrorism and internal security operations in conjunction with the Ministry of Interior. The Counterterrorism Service reports directly to the prime minister and oversees the Counterterrorism Command, an organization that includes three brigades of special operations forces. The National Security Service intelligence agency reports directly to the prime minister. The security of the International Zone in Baghdad is controlled by the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), and Special Division (SD) of the Iraq Security Force. 

The country’s regular armed forces and domestic law enforcement bodies struggled to maintain order within the country, operating in parallel with the Popular Mobilization Committee, a state-sponsored umbrella military organization composed of approximately 60 militia groups, also known as Popular Mobilization Forces. Although the Popular Mobilization Forces are part of the Iraqi Security forces and receive funding from the government’s defense budget, their operations are often outside government control and in opposition to government policies. Most popular mobilization unit members are Shia Arabs, reflecting the demographics of the country, while Sunni Arab, Yezidi, Christian, and other minority groups tended to organize their own units, generally operating within or near their home regions. All popular mobilization units officially report to the chairman of the Popular Mobilization Committee and are under the ultimate authority of the prime minister, but several units were in practice also responsive to Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The two main Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, each maintain an independent security apparatus. Under the federal constitution, the Kurdistan Regional Government has the right to maintain internal security forces, but the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party separately control additional Peshmerga military units, as well as separate police forces under nominal Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior control. The constitution also allows for a centralized, separate Asayish internal security service; however, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also each maintain Asayish forces. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also maintain separate intelligence services, nominally organized under the Kurdistan Region Security Council.

Federal civilian authorities did not maintain effective control over some elements of the security forces, particularly certain Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Force units and the Popular Mobilization Committee. Poorly defined administrative boundaries and disputed territories between the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the central government led to confusion over the jurisdiction of security forces and the courts. Members of the security forces committed numerous documented abuses.

Police Response

Iraqi police do not meet U.S. or Western standards. ISF maintains a large presence in most major urban areas to limit potential terrorist, insurgent, and militia activity, though they have a limited ability to respond to security incidents, terrorist attacks, and criminal activities. Response times and capabilities may vary wildly. There are many permanent, manned checkpoints in and around major cities. Temporary checkpoints often appear without advance notice.

Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):

Kurdish police and security services are out in adequate numbers. Visitors can move around urban areas in relative safety. When a Western expatriate has been the victim of a crime, Kurdish police take the case seriously and typically identify and arrest the perpetrators. KRG police and military units can respond quickly to security incidents, terrorist attacks, and criminal activities. KRG police and security services have sufficient training and command and control to direct their officers where required and have modern weapons and security equipment. Specialized units, such as tactical response and explosive ordinance disposal teams, have enhanced training and equipment. KRG police and security services are professional and highly responsive to diplomats, U.S. citizens, and other Westerners.

Travelers with Special Considerations

For specific traveler concerns in Iraq, review the local laws and circumstances on the Department of State’s Country Information Page.

 

Rule of Law, Arbitrary Detention, Official Harassment, Corruption, & Transparency

The U.S. Department of State has not included a Risk of Wrongful Detention “D” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Iraq.

The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government does not implement the laws effectively. The law allows some individuals convicted of corruption to receive amnesty upon repaying money obtained through corruption, effectively allowing them to keep any profits derived from the stolen funds.

Corruption remained a chief obstacle to effective governance at all institutional levels, including in the IKR. Bribery, money laundering, nepotism, and misappropriation of public funds are common at all levels and across all branches of government. Family, tribal, and ethno-sectarian considerations significantly influence government decisions at all levels and across all branches of government. Federal and KRG officials frequently engage in corrupt practices with impunity.

Anticorruption efforts were hampered by a lack of agreement concerning institutional roles, political will, political influence, lack of transparency, and unclear governing legislation and regulatory processes. The existence of armed militias, which were directly involved in corruption and provided protection for corrupt officials, made serious and sustainable anticorruption efforts difficult to enforce.

Cybersecurity

There are no cybersecurity concerns specific to private-sector organizations operating in Iraq.

Import/Export Restrictions

Customs officers have the broad authority to search persons or vehicles at Iraqi ports of entry. Officers may confiscate any goods they deem may pose a threat to the peace, security, health, environment, or social order of Iraq. Authorities may confiscate antiquities or cultural items suspected of illegal export, as well as undeclared goods. Visitors may also have to return such goods, at their expense, to the jurisdiction from which they came. Satellite phones are permitted in Iraq (and IKR).

A country-specific listing of items/goods prohibited from being exported to the country or that are otherwise restricted is available from the U.S. International Trade Agency website.

Additional resources and reports can be found in the OSAC Traveler Toolkit.

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