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Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
Other sub-techniques of Supply Chain Compromise (3)
ID | Name |
---|---|
T1195.001 | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools |
T1195.002 | Compromise Software Supply Chain |
T1195.003 | Compromise Hardware Supply Chain |
Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.
Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.[1] [2]
Procedure Examples
Name | Description |
---|---|
APT41 |
APT41 gained access to production environments where they could inject malicious code into legitimate, signed files and widely distribute them to end users.[6] |
CCBkdr |
CCBkdr was added to a legitimate, signed version 5.33 of the CCleaner software and distributed on CCleaner's distribution site.[4][5][1] |
Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team has distributed NotPetya by compromising the legitimate Ukrainian accounting software M.E.Doc and replacing a legitimate software update with a malicious one.[7][8] |
Mitigations
Mitigation | Description |
---|---|
Update Software |
A patch management process should be implemented to check unused applications, unmaintained and/or previously vulnerable software, unnecessary features, components, files, and documentation. |
Vulnerability Scanning |
Continuous monitoring of vulnerability sources and the use of automatic and manual code review tools should also be implemented as well.[3] |
Detection
Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity.
References
- Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
- Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
- OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved April 3, 2018.
- Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.
- Rosenberg, J. (2017, September 20). Evidence Aurora Operation Still Active: Supply Chain Attack Through CCleaner. Retrieved February 13, 2018.
- Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019.
- Counter Threat Research Team. (2017, June 28). NotPetya Campaign: What We Know About the Latest Global Ransomware Attack. Retrieved June 11, 2020.
- Cherepanov, A.. (2017, June 30). TeleBots are back: Supply chain attacks against Ukraine. Retrieved June 11, 2020.