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User Execution: Malicious Link

ID Name
T1204.001 Malicious Link
T1204.002 Malicious File

An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Link. Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via Exploitation for Client Execution. Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via Malicious File.

ID: T1204.001
Sub-technique of:  T1204
Tactic: Execution
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Permissions Required: User
Data Sources: Anti-virus, Process monitoring, Web proxy
Version: 1.0
Created: 11 March 2020
Last Modified: 11 March 2020

Procedure Examples

Name Description
APT32

APT32 has lured targets to download a Cobalt Strike beacon by including a malicious link within spearphishing emails.[40]

APT33

APT33 has lured users to click links to malicious HTML applications delivered via spearphishing emails.[7][8]

APT39

APT39 has sent spearphishing emails in an attempt to lure users to click on a malicious link. [11]

BackConfig

BackConfig has compromised victims via links to URLs hosting malicious content.[6]

BlackTech

BlackTech has used e-mails with malicious links to lure victims into installing malware.[3]

Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group has sent emails containing malicious links that require users to execute a file or macro to infect the victim machine.[12][13]

Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 has used various forms of spearphishing in attempts to get users to open links.[14][15]

Elderwood

Elderwood has leveraged multiple types of spearphishing in order to attempt to get a user to open links.[16][17]

Emotet

Emotet has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through spearphishing.[1][2]

FIN4

FIN4 has lured victims to click malicious links delivered via spearphishing emails (often sent from compromised accounts).[18][19]

FIN8

FIN8 has leveraged Spearphishing Links attempting to gain User Execution.[20][21][22]

Leviathan

Leviathan has sent spearphishing email links attempting to get a user to click.[23]

Machete

Machete has has relied on users opening malicious links delivered through spearphishing to execute malware.[24][25][26]

Mofang

Mofang's spearphishing emails required a user to click the link to connect to a compromised website.[38]

Molerats

Molerats has sent malicious links via email.[39]

Night Dragon

Night Dragon enticed users to click on links in spearphishing emails to download malware.[10]

OilRig

OilRig has delivered malicious links to achieve execution on the target system.[27][28][29]

Patchwork

Patchwork has used spearphishing with links to try to get users to click, download and open malicious files.[42][43][44][6]

PLEAD

PLEAD has been executed via malicious links in e-mails.[3]

Pony

Pony has attempted to lure targets into clicking links in spoofed emails from legitimate banks.[5]

TA505

TA505 has used lures to get users to click links in emails and attachments. For example, TA505 makes their malware look like legitimate Microsoft Word documents, .pdf and/or .lnk files. [30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37]

TSCookie

TSCookie has been executed via malicious links embedded in e-mails spoofing the Ministries of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan.[4]

Turla

Turla has used spearphishing via a link to get users to download and run their malware.[9]

Windshift

Windshift has used links embedded in e-mails to lure victims into executing malicious code.[41]

Mitigations

Mitigation Description
Network Intrusion Prevention

If a link is being visited by a user, network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity.

Restrict Web-Based Content

If a link is being visited by a user, block unknown or unused files in transit by default that should not be downloaded or by policy from suspicious sites as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some download scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious files.

User Training

Use user training as a way to bring awareness to common phishing and spearphishing techniques and how to raise suspicion for potentially malicious events.

Detection

Inspect network traffic for indications that a user visited a malicious site, such as links included in phishing campaigns directed at your organization.

Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded from a link and executed on the user's computer.

References

  1. Salvio, J.. (2014, June 27). New Banking Malware Uses Network Sniffing for Data Theft. Retrieved March 25, 2019.
  2. Lee, S.. (2019, April 24). Emotet Using WMI to Launch PowerShell Encoded Code. Retrieved May 24, 2019.
  3. Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.
  4. Tomonaga, S.. (2018, March 6). Malware “TSCookie”. Retrieved May 6, 2020.
  5. hasherezade. (2016, April 11). No money, but Pony! From a mail to a trojan horse. Retrieved May 21, 2020.
  6. Hinchliffe, A. and Falcone, R. (2020, May 11). Updated BackConfig Malware Targeting Government and Military Organizations in South Asia. Retrieved June 17, 2020.
  7. O'Leary, J., et al. (2017, September 20). Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage: APT33 Targets Aerospace and Energy Sectors and has Ties to Destructive Malware. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
  8. Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.
  9. ESET, et al. (2018, January). Diplomats in Eastern Europe bitten by a Turla mosquito. Retrieved July 3, 2018.
  10. McAfee® Foundstone® Professional Services and McAfee Labs™. (2011, February 10). Global Energy Cyberattacks: “Night Dragon”. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
  11. Hawley et al. (2019, January 29). APT39: An Iranian Cyber Espionage Group Focused on Personal Information. Retrieved February 19, 2019.
  12. Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018.
  13. Unit 42. (2018, October 25). New Techniques to Uncover and Attribute Financial actors Commodity Builders and Infrastructure Revealed. Retrieved December 11, 2018.
  14. US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.
  15. US-CERT. (2017, October 20). Alert (TA17-293A): Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved November 2, 2017.
  16. O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
  17. Clayton, M.. (2012, September 14). Stealing US business secrets: Experts ID two huge cyber 'gangs' in China. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
  18. Vengerik, B. et al.. (2014, December 5). Hacking the Street? FIN4 Likely Playing the Market. Retrieved December 17, 2018.
  19. Vengerik, B. & Dennesen, K.. (2014, December 5). Hacking the Street? FIN4 Likely Playing the Market. Retrieved January 15, 2019.
  20. Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild: Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February 12, 2018.
  21. Kizhakkinan, D. et al.. (2016, May 11). Threat Actor Leverages Windows Zero-day Exploit in Payment Card Data Attacks. Retrieved February 12, 2018.
  22. Elovitz, S. & Ahl, I. (2016, August 18). Know Your Enemy: New Financially-Motivated & Spear-Phishing Group. Retrieved February 26, 2018.
  1. Axel F, Pierre T. (2017, October 16). Leviathan: Espionage actor spearphishes maritime and defense targets. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
  2. The Cylance Threat Research Team. (2017, March 22). El Machete's Malware Attacks Cut Through LATAM. Retrieved September 13, 2019.
  3. Kaspersky Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 20). El Machete. Retrieved September 13, 2019.
  4. ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019.
  5. Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, February 23). OopsIE! OilRig Uses ThreeDollars to Deliver New Trojan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.
  6. Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018.
  7. Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018.
  8. Proofpoint Staff. (2017, September 27). Threat Actor Profile: TA505, From Dridex to GlobeImposter. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
  9. Proofpoint Staff. (2018, June 8). TA505 shifts with the times. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
  10. Schwarz, D. and Proofpoint Staff. (2019, January 9). ServHelper and FlawedGrace - New malware introduced by TA505. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
  11. Salem, E. (2019, April 25). Threat Actor TA505 Targets Financial Enterprises Using LOLBins and a New Backdoor Malware. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
  12. Proofpoint Staff. (2018, July 19). TA505 Abusing SettingContent-ms within PDF files to Distribute FlawedAmmyy RAT. Retrieved April 19, 2019.
  13. Proofpoint Staff. (2018, March 7). Leaked Ammyy Admin Source Code Turned into Malware. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
  14. Hiroaki, H. and Lu, L. (2019, June 12). Shifting Tactics: Breaking Down TA505 Group’s Use of HTML, RATs and Other Techniques in Latest Campaigns. Retrieved May 29, 2020.
  15. Schwarz, D. et al. (2019, October 16). TA505 Distributes New SDBbot Remote Access Trojan with Get2 Downloader. Retrieved May 29, 2020.
  16. Yonathan Klijnsma. (2016, May 17). Mofang: A politically motivated information stealing adversary. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
  17. GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.
  18. Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018.
  19. Karim, T. (2018, August). TRAILS OF WINDSHIFT. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
  20. Hamada, J.. (2016, July 25). Patchwork cyberespionage group expands targets from governments to wide range of industries. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
  21. Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018.
  22. Meltzer, M, et al. (2018, June 07). Patchwork APT Group Targets US Think Tanks. Retrieved July 16, 2018.