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Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
Other sub-techniques of Supply Chain Compromise (3)
| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1195.001 | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools |
| T1195.002 | Compromise Software Supply Chain |
| T1195.003 | Compromise Hardware Supply Chain |
Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.
Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.[1] [2]
Procedure Examples
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| APT41 |
APT41 gained access to production environments where they could inject malicious code into legitimate, signed files and widely distribute them to end users.[3] |
| CCBkdr |
CCBkdr was added to a legitimate, signed version 5.33 of the CCleaner software and distributed on CCleaner's distribution site.[4][5][1] |
| Dragonfly |
Dragonfly has placed trojanized installers on legitimate vendor app stores.[6] |
| GOLD SOUTHFIELD |
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has distributed ransomware by backdooring software installers via a strategic web compromise of the site hosting Italian WinRAR.[7][8][9] |
| GoldenSpy |
GoldenSpy has been packaged with a legitimate tax preparation software.[10] |
| Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team has distributed NotPetya by compromising the legitimate Ukrainian accounting software M.E.Doc and replacing a legitimate software update with a malicious one.[11][12] |
| Sunspot |
Sunspot malware was designed and used to insert Sunburst into software builds of the SolarWinds Orion IT management product.[13] |
| UNC2452 |
UNC2452 gained initial network access via a trojanized update of SolarWinds Orion software.[14] |
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|
| Update Software |
A patch management process should be implemented to check unused applications, unmaintained and/or previously vulnerable software, unnecessary features, components, files, and documentation. |
| Vulnerability Scanning |
Continuous monitoring of vulnerability sources and the use of automatic and manual code review tools should also be implemented as well.[15] |
Detection
Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity.
References
- Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
- Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018.
- Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019.
- Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018.
- Rosenberg, J. (2017, September 20). Evidence Aurora Operation Still Active: Supply Chain Attack Through CCleaner. Retrieved February 13, 2018.
- Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Resurgent Iron Liberty Targeting Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020.
- Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, September 24). REvil/Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020.
- Secureworks . (2019, September 24). REvil: The GandCrab Connection. Retrieved August 4, 2020.
- Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD SOUTHFIELD. Retrieved October 6, 2020.
- Trustwave SpiderLabs. (2020, June 25). The Golden Tax Department and Emergence of GoldenSpy Malware. Retrieved July 23, 2020.
- Counter Threat Research Team. (2017, June 28). NotPetya Campaign: What We Know About the Latest Global Ransomware Attack. Retrieved June 11, 2020.
- Cherepanov, A.. (2017, June 30). TeleBots are back: Supply chain attacks against Ukraine. Retrieved June 11, 2020.
- CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021.
- FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021.
- OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved April 3, 2018.