Safeguarding end‑to‑end encryption in the EU

Question for written answer E-005255/2020
to the Commission
Rule 138
Eva Kaili (S&D)

According to news sources, the Commission is planning to introduce a plan that would make it possible for law enforcement authorities to access end‑to‑end‑encrypted communications. According to this plan, end‑to‑end encryption would be compromised in favour of advancing investigations and prosecuting criminals. But even if an official order to access encrypted electronic communication was proportionate and targeted at specific individuals or groups in the context of the investigation of a specific crime, there would be many privacy issues at stake, such as the fact that once it is possible to break encryption, a precedent will have been set and it will be possible to readily employ the method for many other uses.

• 1.How is the Commission planning to balance its proposals with the strict privacy right laws in many Member States?
• 2.How does it plan to reduce the risk that such a proposal could lead to future abuses of encryption compromising app users?
• 3.Is it true that if a phone number is being targeted, there is already evidence leading to a suspect, so other options like device tracking could be equally useful and would ensure that end‑to‑end encryption is not sacrificed?