[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 77 (Tuesday, April 21, 2020)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 22099-22118]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-07629]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 64
[WC Docket Nos. 17-97, 20-67; FCC 20-42; FRS 16632]
Call Authentication Trust Anchor; Implementation of TRACED Act--
Knowledge of Customers by Entities with Access to Numbering Resources
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Commission seeks comment on proposals to
further efforts to promote caller ID authentication and implement
Section 4 of the Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal
Enforcement and Deterrence (TRACED) Act. In addition, the Commission
also seeks comment in this document on implementing section 6(a) of the
TRACED Act, which concerns access to numbering resources. The
Commission concurrently adopted a Report and Order mandating that all
originating and terminating voice service providers implement the STIR/
SHAKEN caller ID authentication framework in the internet Protocol (IP)
portions of their networks by June 30, 2021.
DATES: Comments are due on or before May 15, 2020. Reply Comments are
due on or before May 29, 2020.
ADDRESSES: Comments and reply comments may be filed using the
Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). See Electronic
Filing of Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998).
Interested parties may file comments or reply comments, identified by
WC Docket Nos. 17-97, 20-67, by any of the following methods:
Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically
using the internet by accessing the ECFS: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/
Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must
file an original and one copy of each filing.
Filings can be sent by commercial overnight courier, or by first-
class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All filings must be
addressed to the Commission's Secretary, Office of the Secretary,
Federal Communications Commission.
Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive,
Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.
U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority
mail must be
[[Page 22100]]
addressed to 445 12th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20554.
Effective March 19, 2020, and until further notice, the Commission
no longer accepts any hand or messenger delivered filings. This is a
temporary measure taken to help protect the health and safety of
individuals, and to mitigate the transmission of COVID-19. See FCC
Announces Closure of FCC Headquarters Open Window and Change in Hand-
Delivery Policy, Public Notice, DA 20-304 (March 19, 2020). https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-closes-headquarters-open-window-and-changes-hand-delivery-policy.
During the time the Commission's building is closed to the general
public and until further notice, if more than one docket or rulemaking
number appears in the caption of a proceeding, paper filers need not
submit two additional copies for each additional docket or rulemaking
number; an original and one copy are sufficient.
In addition to filing comments with the Secretary, a copy of any
comments on the Paperwork Reduction Act information collection
requirements contained herein should be submitted to the Federal
Communications Commission via email to [email protected] and to Nicholas A.
Fraser, Office of Management and Budget, via email to
[email protected] or via fax at 202-395-5167.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, please
contact Mason Shefa, Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition
Bureau, at [email protected]. For additional information concerning
the Paperwork Reduction Act information collection requirements
contained in this document, send an email to [email protected] or contact
Nicole Ongele at (202) 418-2991.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WC Docket Nos. 17-97, 20-67;
FCC 20-42, adopted and released on March 31, 2020. The full text of
this document is available for public inspection during regular
business hours, when FCC Headquarters is open to the public, in the FCC
Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW, Room CY-
A257, Washington, DC 20554 or at the following internet address:
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-20-42A1.pdf. The Report and
Order that was adopted concurrently with this Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking is published elsewhere in the Federal Register. To
request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities
(e.g., braille, large print, electronic files, audio format, etc.) or
to request reasonable accommodations (e.g., accessible format
documents, sign language interpreters, CART, etc.), send an email to
[email protected] or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at
(202) 418-0530 (voice) or (202) 418-0432 (TTY).
Synopsis
I. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
1. Building on the important steps we take in the concurrently
adopted Report and Order, we offer proposals and seek comment on
further efforts to promote caller ID authentication and implement
section 4 of the TRACED Act. We also seek comment on implementing
section 6(a) of the TRACED Act, which concerns access to numbering
resources.
A. Caller ID Authentication Requirements Definitions and Scope
2. In the accompanying Report and Order, we adopted a definition of
``STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework'' that aligns with the statutory
language of the TRACED Act. We believe the definition we adopted of the
``STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework'' is sufficient for our
implementation of the TRACED Act. We seek comment on this view.
3. We also adopted a definition of ``voice service'' in the Report
and Order that aligns with the statutory language of the TRACED Act. In
section 4(a)(2) of the TRACED Act, Congress provided a definition of
``voice service'' that is similar, but not identical, to the
preexisting definition found in section 64.1600(r) of our rules, which
adopts the definition Congress provided in Section 503 of the RAY
BAUM'S Act. Both provisions define voice service as ``any service that
is interconnected with the public switched telephone network and that
furnishes voice communications to an end user using resources from the
North American Numbering Plan or any successor to the North American
Numbering Plan adopted by the Commission under section 251(e)(1) of the
[Act].'' In the TRACED Act, Congress included a similar definition but
added a provision that ``without limitation, any service that enables
real-time, two-way voice communications, including any service that
requires [I]nternet [P]rotocol-compatible customer premises equipment
(commonly known as `CPE') and permits out-bound calling, whether or not
the service is one-way or two-way voice over [I]nternet [P]rotocol.''
We seek comment on how, if at all, the scope of the TRACED Act
definition varies from the section 64.1600(r) definition on the basis
of the foregoing language. Should we provide further guidance on the
meaning of the ``without limitation'' language in the TRACED Act, or is
it clear as written? Looking at the two definitions as a whole, we seek
comment on whether Congress intended to create two distinct definitions
with different scopes or whether the similarity between the definitions
means that we should harmonize our interpretations of the two
definitions. Additionally, we seek comment on whether the TRACED Act's
definition of ``voice service'' should cause us to revisit our decision
in the accompanying Report and Order to exempt from our rules providers
that lack control of the network infrastructure necessary to implement
STIR/SHAKEN.
4. Congress directed many of the requirements in the TRACED Act to
``providers of voice service.'' On one reading, an entity is a provider
of voice service only with respect to calls that meet the definition of
``voice service,'' i.e., ``provider'' is defined on a call-by-call
basis. On another reading, an entity that provides any voice service is
always a ``provider of voice service,'' i.e., ``provider'' is defined
on an entity-by-entity basis. We propose adopting the former
interpretation. Based on this interpretation, a provider is not subject
to the TRACED Act for all services simply because some fall under the
TRACED Act definition of ``voice service''; instead, only those
services that meet the TRACED Act definition of ``voice service'' are
subject to TRACED Act obligations. We propose this interpretation
because it gives meaning to Congress's inclusion of a definition for
``voice service'' and appears to best comport with the TRACED Act's
allocation of duties on the basis of call technology, e.g.,
differentiating duties between calls over IP and non-IP networks.
Further, we have previously used a call-by-call understanding of
intermediate providers in our rules. We seek comment on this
interpretation. Should we instead read the TRACED Act to establish a
status-based approach, thus capturing a provider's entire network if
some parts of its network meet the statutory definition?
B. Extending the STIR/SHAKEN Implementation Mandate to Intermediate
Providers
5. To further help ensure that caller ID authentication information
reaches call recipients, we propose extending our STIR/SHAKEN mandate
to intermediate providers. We seek comment on this proposal, in
general, and on the specific
[[Page 22101]]
implementing measures we propose below for authenticated and
unauthenticated calls that intermediate providers receive. In each
case, we propose applying the obligations we establish for IP calls
both to calls that an intermediate provider passes to a terminating
voice service provider and to calls that it passes to a subsequent
intermediate provider. We seek comment on this proposed scope. We
further propose adopting these rules pursuant to our authority under
the Communications Act. We seek comment on this proposal, as well as
whether we have independent authority under either the TRACED Act or
the Truth in Caller ID Act.
6. Authenticated Calls. We propose to require intermediate
providers to pass any Identity header they receive to the subsequent
intermediate or voice service provider in the call path. Technically,
this proposal would require that the Identity header be forwarded
downstream in the SIP INVITE transmitted by the intermediate provider.
This proposal is consistent with the NANC's recommendation ``that all
carriers that route calls between originating and terminating carriers,
such as long-distance providers and least-cost routers, maintain the
integrity of the required SHAKEN/STIR signaling.'' We anticipate that
imposing such a mandate on intermediate providers is necessary to
ensure that calls transmitted in IP retain authentication information
across the entire call path. If any of the intermediate providers in
the call path are unable or unwilling to transmit the Identity header
through their network, the terminating voice service provider will be
unable to verify the caller ID information. If fully implemented, the
STIR/SHAKEN framework creates an ``end-to end'' system for
authenticating the identity of the calling party. The component SHAKEN
standard specifically addresses the reality that call paths often
involve voice service providers that do not connect directly with each
other, but rather connect indirectly through one or more third party
networks. Indeed, a framework like STIR/SHAKEN that identifies the true
origination of calls is expressly required because voice service
providers do not have direct peering relationships with all other voice
service providers. We therefore anticipate that adopting our proposal
will be essential to preventing gaps that would undermine the value of
STIR/SHAKEN implementation by voice service providers that originate
and terminate calls that may transit over intermediate provider
networks. We seek comment on this preliminary view. What are the
benefits or drawbacks to imposing this obligation on intermediate
providers? What, if any, are the technical barriers preventing
intermediate providers from complying with this obligation? Are market
forces alone sufficient to drive intermediate providers to implement
STIR/SHAKEN, making regulatory action unnecessary? If we were to adopt
our proposal, should we create any limitations or exceptions? In
addition to this proposed requirement, should we require intermediate
providers to append to the SIP INVITE their own additional Identity
header to more accurately and easily support traceback to each provider
in the call path? Are there any other actions reasonably necessary for
implementation of STIR/SHAKEN that we should require of intermediate
providers?
7. Additionally, we propose to require intermediate providers to
pass the Identity header unaltered, thereby prohibiting the
manipulation of STIR/SHAKEN Identity header information by intermediate
providers when transmitting this information along with a SIP call.
This prohibition would prevent a downstream provider from altering or
stripping the caller ID authentication information in the Identity
header and ensure such providers do not tamper with authenticated calls
after they leave the originating voice service provider's network.
Based on comments filed earlier in this proceeding, we anticipate that
such a prohibition would be beneficial because it would better ensure
the integrity of authentication information that reaches the
terminating voice service provider and call recipient. We seek comment
on our proposal. Are there legitimate reasons, technical or otherwise,
for an intermediate provider to alter or strip STIR/SHAKEN header
information? Would establishing this prohibition impact the ability of
intermediate providers to complete calls if, for instance, a
terminating voice service provider is unable to accept the STIR/SHAKEN
header information for a technical reason? If so, how can we
distinguish between malicious or negligent manipulation and
manipulation done for legitimate technical reasons? In the absence of a
Commission prohibition, could the practice of malicious or negligent
manipulation of the Identity header be adequately policed by
participating providers or the industry through the STI-GA? We do not
propose prohibiting a terminating voice service provider from altering
or stripping the Identity header for a call that it receives before
attempting to verify it. We regard this scenario as unlikely since
terminating voice service providers need to verify the Identity header
information in order for their subscribers to receive the benefits of
STIR/SHAKEN, and we do not believe our rules need to address it. Do
commenters agree? Is there any reason we should extend this prohibition
to terminating voice service providers?
8. Unauthenticated Calls. We propose that when an intermediate
provider receives an unauthenticated call that it will exchange with
another intermediate or voice service provider as a SIP call, it must
authenticate such a call with a ``gateway'' or ``C'' attestation. Such
attestation conveys that the provider has no relationship with the
initiator of the call, but it records the entry point of the call into
its IP network. This action is already contemplated in the industry
standards. We propose requiring it because, although this attestation
level lacks any assertion of the calling party's identity, we
understand from the record developed thus far that it would provide a
useful data point to inform analytics and allow for traceback of the
call to the gateway source. We seek comment on this proposal. What are
the benefits of or drawbacks to imposing this obligation on
intermediate providers? Would the widespread use of ``C'' attestation
negatively impact the utility of attestation information to terminating
voice service providers and their subscribers? What, if any, are the
technical barriers preventing intermediate providers from complying
with this obligation? Should we create any limitations or exceptions to
a rule requiring gateway attestation? Are there any circumstances where
an originating voice service provider would need to be subject to this
requirement? Multiple commenters support imposing STIR/SHAKEN
requirements on gateway providers as a way to identify robocalls that
originate abroad and to identify which provider served as the entry
point for these calls to U.S. networks. Is this an effective way to use
STIR/SHAKEN to combat illegal calls originating outside the United
States? ATIS has been working on technical standards intended as
potential mechanisms for implementing STIR/SHAKEN for internationals
calls. The first technical report addresses how calls authenticated in
one country can be verified in a second country through bilateral
arrangements between the two countries. A second draft technical report
under current consideration
[[Page 22102]]
addresses how the SHAKEN trust environment could be extended to full
international deployment in the absence of bilateral arrangements. Both
approaches are intended to support caller ID authentication and
traceback for cross-border calls. Are there other rules involving STIR/
SHAKEN that we should consider regarding intermediate providers to
further combat illegal calls originating abroad? In response to our
questions in the 2019 Robocall Declaratory Ruling and Further Notice
regarding the use of STIR/SHAKEN to combat illegally spoofed calls
originating abroad, Verizon suggests that we impose an obligation to
use STIR/SHAKEN on any provider, regardless of its geographic location,
if it intends to allow its customers to use U.S. telephone numbers.
Verizon suggests, however, that the STIR/SHAKEN rules need only apply
to calls to U.S. consumers that involve the use of numbers from the
U.S. portion of the NANP. According to Verizon, U.S.-inbound
international calls originating from foreign carriers only with numbers
from their countries' numbering plans do not materially contribute to
the robocall problem. And USTelecom suggests that we consider
obligating gateway providers to pass international traffic only to
downstream providers that have implemented STIR/SHAKEN. USTelecom notes
that the Commission implemented a similar framework with respect to
intermediate providers in the rural call completion context and argues
that a similar approach adopted in the SHAKEN context would ensure a
heightened degree of transparency and accountability. They argue that
such an obligation would help ensure that any gateway attestation is
not stripped out downstream by a provider's network that does not have
STIR/SHAKEN capability and consequently frustrate efforts to trace
calls originating abroad back to the gateway provider. Should we
consider adopting either of these ideas instead of, or in addition to,
our proposed rules? Beyond imposing obligations on gateway and
intermediate providers, are there other actions we could take to
promote caller ID authentication implementation to combat robocalls
originating abroad?
9. Limiting Intermediate Provider Requirements to IP Networks. As
with the rules adopted in the Report and Order, we propose to limit the
application of these obligations to calls that an intermediate provider
receives in SIP and will exchange with another intermediate or voice
service provider in SIP. We preliminarily believe this is an
appropriate scope given that STIR/SHAKEN is limited to SIP calls. We
seek comment on this proposal. Is there any reason to require
intermediate providers to implement caller ID authentication solutions
in the non-IP portions of their networks? In this regard, we
specifically invite comment on whether out-of-band STIR, a potential
STIR/SHAKEN solution for non-IP networks, will include a role for
intermediate providers as it develops.
10. We further seek comment on how to prevent the use of non-IP
intermediate providers as a way to circumvent our rules. How can we
prevent a gateway or originating voice service provider from concealing
its identity as the source of a call by purposefully routing that call
through an intermediate provider that uses non-IP technology? By doing
so, the provider could both fool terminating providers--who otherwise
may have seen that the caller ID verification failed--and stymie
traceback efforts. We also seek comment on the seriousness of this
threat. Are there technical or economic reasons why this is not likely
to occur? Would call pattern analysis minimize the effectiveness of
this conduct? And would the ability to trace a call back to the gateway
provider allow sufficient traceback to identify the originating
provider? Or is this threat credible such that we should take action to
prevent it? If so, what action should we take?
11. Definition of Intermediate Provider. We propose using the
definition of ``intermediate provider'' found in section 64.1600(i) of
our rules. This section provides that an ``intermediate provider'' is
``any entity that carries or processes traffic that traverses or will
traverse the [PSTN] at any point insofar as that entity neither
originates nor terminates that traffic.'' The broad scope of this
definition seems well-suited to further the goal of widespread
implementation of the STIR/SHAKEN framework. We seek comment on this
proposal. Are there alternative formulations to the definition of
``intermediate provider'' that more accurately capture its role and
characteristics for the purpose of STIR/SHAKEN implementation? In the
context of rural call completion, the Commission's rules use a slightly
narrower definition to exclude from their scope intermediate providers
that may only incidentally transmit voice traffic, such as internet
Service Providers. Is this narrower definition a better fit for STIR/
SHAKEN, or does the broader definition we propose better support the
goal of ubiquitous deployment?
12. Legal Authority. We propose relying on our authority under
section 251(e) of the Act to apply these rules to intermediate
providers. We concluded in the Report and Order that our exclusive
jurisdiction over numbering policy provides authority to require voice
service providers to implement STIR/SHAKEN in order to prevent the
fraudulent abuse of NANP resources. We preliminarily believe that this
same analysis extends to intermediate providers. Just as with calls
displaying a falsified or spoofed caller ID on an originating or
terminating voice service provider's network, calls with illegally
spoofed caller ID that transit intermediate providers' networks are
exploiting numbering resources to further illegal schemes. By imposing
these requirements on intermediate providers, we would protect
consumers and prevent bad actors from abusing NANP resources. We seek
comment on this proposal. Consistent with our conclusion in this
document's Report and Order, we propose concluding that the section
251(e)(2) requirements do not apply in the context of our establishing
STIR/SHAKEN requirements. Alternatively, even if section 251(e)(2) does
apply, we propose that competitive neutrality is satisfied in this
instance because each carrier is responsible for bearing its own
implementation costs. We seek comment on these proposals.
13. We also seek comment on two potential additional sources of
authority. First, we seek comment on whether the TRACED Act provides us
with authority to impose the obligations we propose for intermediate
providers. In the TRACED Act, Congress directs the Commission to
require voice service providers to implement STIR/SHAKEN in the IP
portions of their networks. Section 4(a)(2) defines ``voice service''
in part as any service that ``that furnishes voice communications to an
end user using resources from the North American Numbering Plan.'' We
do not preliminarily read this definition to include intermediate
providers. Is this a correct interpretation, or can we rely on the
TRACED Act to reach intermediate providers? At the same time, we
propose concluding that we are not foreclosed by the limited definition
of ``voice service'' from imposing STIR/SHAKEN requirements on
intermediate providers. We propose reaching this conclusion for two
independent reasons. First, section 4(d) of the TRACED Act states that
``[n]othing in this section shall preclude the Commission from
initiating a rulemaking pursuant to its existing statutory authority.''
Second, the STIR/SHAKEN framework creates a chain of
[[Page 22103]]
trust between the originating and terminating voice service providers.
Each intermediate provider operating between the originating and
terminating voice service provider in the call path must transmit the
call's Identity header unaltered in order to successfully provide end-
to-end caller ID authentication. We believe that in directing us to
require providers of voice service to implement the ``STIR/SHAKEN
authentication framework'' as defined in the TRACED Act, Congress
intended to refer to the standards created by the information and
communications technology industry. These standards are designed to
enable caller ID authentication through an end-to-end chain of trust.
Intermediate providers play a critical role in ensuring the success of
such a system. We believe Congress intended for the STIR/SHAKEN
framework, as mandated in section 4 of the TRACED Act, to be an
effective means of battling unlawful robocalls, and we therefore
propose concluding that Congress took this aspect of STIR/SHAKEN into
account in enacting the TRACED Act and allowed us latitude to impose
requirements on intermediate providers in support of its direction to
require voice service providers to implement the STIR/SHAKEN
authentication framework. We also believe that our proposals lie within
the Commission's statutory authority to adopt rules ``necessary in the
execution of its functions.'' We seek comment on this proposed
analysis.
14. Second, we seek comment on whether our authority under the
Truth in Caller ID Act allows us to impose the rules described above.
In the Truth in Caller ID Act, Congress charged us with prescribing
rules to make unlawful the spoofing of caller ID information ``in
connection with any telecommunications service or IP-enabled voice
service . . . with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully
obtain anything of value.'' Does imposing STIR/SHAKEN implementation
obligations on intermediate providers fit within this directive? We
also seek comment on what other sources of authority we have to apply
STIR/SHAKEN obligations on intermediate providers.
15. Alternatives. To the extent that commenters believe we cannot
or should not apply such obligations to intermediate providers, we seek
comment on alternative measures we could take to ensure that STIR/
SHAKEN information traverses the entire call path. In the Second Rural
Call Completion Report and Order, the Commission required larger
originating long-distance providers to monitor the performance of
downstream intermediate providers with regard to call completion.
Should we impose a comparable requirement here? For instance, should we
require originating voice service providers to ensure, by contract and/
or through periodic monitoring, that all intermediate providers in the
call path transmit STIR/SHAKEN information? Should we require
originating voice service providers to take remedial measures where
necessary because of intermediate provider failures, as in the rural
call completion context? What are the benefits and drawbacks of this
approach compared to our proposal? We expect that the same sources of
authority that we rely on in the Report and Order to impose direct
STIR/SHAKEN obligations on originating voice service providers would
allow us to impose a monitoring duty on them as well. We seek comment
on this view and, in general, on sources of authority we may have for
any alternatives that commenters propose.
C. Assessment of Burdens or Barriers to Implementation
16. The TRACED Act directs the Commission, not later than December
30, 2020 ``and as appropriate thereafter,'' to assess any burdens and
barriers to (1) voice service providers that use time-division
multiplexing network technology (TDM), a non-IP network technology; (2)
small voice service providers; and (3) rural voice service providers.
It further directs us to assess burdens and barriers created by the
``inability to purchase or upgrade equipment to support the call
authentication frameworks . . . or lack of availability of such
equipment.''
17. To this end, we seek comment on the burdens and barriers to
implementation for the classes of providers identified, particularly
the burdens presented by equipment availability and cost. In comments
previously filed, parties contended that small and rural providers, and
operators of TDM networks, may incur substantial costs upgrading their
networks, and updating or replacing service agreements. Do commenters
agree with this position? What are other burdens and barriers to
implementation for such voice service providers? Does cost and/or the
availability of necessary equipment and equipment updates pose barriers
to implementation for voice service providers that are not small,
rural, or operators of TDM networks?
18. We also seek comment on how we should interpret the TRACED
Act's direction to assess burdens and barriers to implementation ``as
appropriate thereafter.'' Should we coordinate this assessment with our
revision of any granted extensions in compliance? Or should we do so on
a specific schedule or as-needed basis, separate from our extension
review process?
D. Extension of Implementation Deadline
19. The TRACED Act includes two provisions for extension of the
June 30, 2021 implementation date for caller ID authentication
frameworks. First, in connection with an assessment of burdens or
barriers to implementation, the Commission ``may, upon a public finding
of undue hardship, delay required compliance'' with the June 30, 2021
date for caller ID authentication framework implementation. Second, we
``shall grant a delay of required compliance'' with the June 30, 2021
implementation date ``to the extent that . . . a provider or class of
providers of voice services, or type of voice calls, materially relies
on a non-[IP] network for the provision of such service or calls.''
Under either provision, an extension may be provider-specific or apply
to a ``class of providers of voice service, or type of voice calls.''
We must annually reevaluate any granted extension for compliance. When
granting an extension of the implementation deadline under either
provision, we must require that provider to ``implement an appropriate
robocall mitigation program to prevent unlawful robocalls from
originating on the network of the provider.'' Based on these
directives, we propose granting a one-year implementation extension to
small, including small rural, voice service providers due to undue
hardship; and propose granting an extension for the parts of a voice
service provider's network that rely on technology that cannot
initiate, maintain, and terminate SIP calls. We seek comment on these
proposals, whether to grant additional extensions, and related issues
below.
20. Extensions for Undue Hardship by Category of Provider. The
TRACED Act grants us the discretion to delay a provider's obligation to
comply with the June 30, 2021 call authentication framework
implementation date upon a public finding of hardship. It states that
the extension may be ``for a reasonable period of time . . . as
necessary . . . to address the identified burdens and barriers.''
21. The first category of voice service providers identified by the
TRACED Act for a potential extension due to undue hardship is voice
service providers that use TDM network technology. Because the TRACED
Act includes a separate
[[Page 22104]]
extension for voice service providers that ``material[ly] rely'' on
non-IP technology, we propose to grant the same extension to voice
service providers that use TDM technology under the undue hardship
standard as we grant to providers that materially rely on non-IP
technology. We believe that such a solution minimizes complexity and
aligns the compliance requirements for similarly-situated voice service
providers. We seek comment on this proposal. To give meaning to each
provision from Congress, should we instead distinguish an undue
hardship extension on the basis of TDM technology from the extension
for providers that materially rely on non-IP technology, and if so how?
22. The second category of voice service providers identified by
the TRACED Act for a potential extension due to undue hardship is small
voice service providers. We propose granting a one-year implementation
extension for such providers and we seek comment on this proposal.
According to NTCA, small voice service providers face numerous burdens
and barriers to implementation, including the inability to ``procure
ready-to-install solutions on the same timeframe as the nation's
largest carriers.'' It contends that a delayed compliance date would
allow small voice service providers to ``obtain solutions from
vendors,'' and benefit from the competition among vendors which, over
time, will likely ``drive down prices and improve the quality of
SHAKEN/STIR offerings for smaller providers.'' We tentatively conclude
that granting such an extension to small voice service providers
addresses the concerns in the record, such as vendor availability, and
grants sufficient time for them to implement STIR/SHAKEN on their IP
networks. Do commenters agree? Alternatively, would granting such an
extension to small voice service providers compromise the efficacy of
the STIR/SHAKEN framework unduly? Given the TRACED Act's implementation
deadline of June 30, 2021, is it necessary to grant small voice service
providers an implementation extension? Or does this deadline already
provide small voice service providers with sufficient time to implement
STIR/SHAKEN on their IP networks? Some commenters claim that a
``hosted'' solution to implement STIR/SHAKEN currently exists and
suggest that providers to whom this solution is available would not
need an extension to comply with the implementation mandate.
23. We propose to define ``small providers of voice service'' for
the purposes of our assessment of burdens and barriers and of our
implementation extension as those that have 100,000 or fewer voice
subscriber lines (counting the total of all business and residential
fixed subscriber lines and mobile phones and aggregated over all of a
provider's affiliates). In the First Rural Call Completion Order, the
Commission determined that the 100,000-subscriber-line threshold
ensured that many subscribers would continue to benefit from our rules
while also limiting the burden on smaller voice service providers. We
seek comment on this proposal. What are the benefits and drawbacks of
establishing an 100,000 subscriber-line threshold? Is there an
alternative measure the Commission should use to define ``small
providers of voice service''? How should we distinguish small providers
that must overcome significant technical challenges to implement STIR/
SHAKEN from those that are able to implement it without hardship? Do
commenters agree that a class-based extension for small providers is
appropriate, or should we review each small provider seeking an
implementation extension on a case-by-case basis?
24. The third category of voice service providers identified by the
TRACED Act for a potential extension due to undue hardship is rural
voice service providers. We believe it is unnecessary to grant a
separate implementation extension for rural voice service providers as
the challenges faced by these providers are already addressed by either
the small voice service provider extension or the extension for voice
service providers that materially rely on a non-IP network. We seek
comment on this view. Alternatively, by using the separate terms
``small'' and ``rural,'' did Congress intend to create two distinct
extensions for rural and small voice service providers? Are there rural
voice service providers that face unique challenges not addressed by
either proposed extension and, if so, what definition of ``rural''
should we adopt to appropriately capture those entities?
25. We seek comment on whether we should grant an implementation
extension for any other voice service providers or classes of voice
service providers, or types of voice calls. We specifically seek
comment on Congress's direction to consider whether to grant an
extension on the basis of ``the inability to purchase or upgrade
equipment to support the call authentication frameworks under this
section, or lack of availability of such equipment.'' Are there
entities, or a class of entities, that should receive an extension on
this basis? Are there voice service providers other than small voice
service providers who face a burden due to the inability to purchase or
unavailability of equipment necessary to participate in caller ID
authentication? Are there other specific voice service providers or
classes of voice service providers, or types of voice calls, for which
we should grant an extension of the implementation deadline? On what
basis would we grant such an extension? What would constitute a
sufficient burden or barrier to justify a finding of undue hardship?
What type of evidence should the voice service provider or class of
voice service providers be required to present to demonstrate undue
hardship? And what is a reasonable length of time to extend the
deadline for such voice service providers and why?
26. We also seek comment on whether we should grant an extension
for undue hardship for enterprise calls. If we were to grant such an
extension, should it apply to all enterprise calling cases or only to
those that are most challenging? What types of enterprise calling cases
should be considered particularly challenging for purposes of any
extension? Would granting an extension for enterprise calls unduly
limit the benefits offered by widespread implementation of STIR/SHAKEN?
Additionally, would granting this extension decrease incentives for
voice service providers to solve existing issues with enterprise
calling quickly? Even assuming for the sake of argument that achieving
``A'' attestation may remain a challenge in some circumstances, why
would it be preferable to allow enterprise calls to go unauthenticated
rather than potentially receiving ``B'' (partial) or ``C'' (gateway)
attestation?
27. We do not interpret the TRACED Act's extension provisions to
extend to intermediate providers, because its definition of ``voice
service'' refers to ``furnish[ing] voice communications to an end
user.'' Should we nonetheless choose to provide an extension based on
undue hardship for intermediate providers? On what basis would we grant
such an extension, to whom should we grant it, and how long should any
such extension last? Would granting an extension for some intermediate
providers have unique negative impacts on the operation of STIR/SHAKEN
across the voice network?
28. Furthermore, should we adopt an extension for voice service
providers that have legal obligations to maintain extensive networks in
high cost areas, such as eligible telecommunications carriers and
carriers of last resort that bear particularly extensive obligations?
An eligible telecommunications carrier
[[Page 22105]]
must, throughout the service area for which the designation is
received, ``offer the services that are supported by Federal universal
service support mechanisms . . . either using its own facilities or a
combination of its own facilities and resale of another carrier's
services (including the services offered by another eligible
telecommunications carrier).'' 47 U.S.C. 214(e)(1)(A). Carriers of last
resort are ``required to fulfill all reasonable requests for service
within [their] territory.'' See, e.g., CA PUC 275.6. Or would we
adequately address the burdens and barriers faced by such voice service
providers by the other extensions we propose, including the extension
for non-IP network technology?
29. Extension for Undue Hardship Due to Challenges in
Interconnecting in IP. The record developed in response to the 2019
Further Notice reflects that, for certain voice service providers, a
barrier to the exchange of authenticated calls occurs at the
interconnection point. Specifically, voice service providers reported
that even if they were able to authenticate calls on their own network,
they could not exchange authenticated calls with another voice service
provider in certain instances because the interconnection point was not
IP-enabled, even if the receiving voice service provider itself
operates on an IP network. We seek comment on whether we should provide
an implementation extension pursuant to TRACED Act section
4(b)(5)(A)(ii) to voice service providers that will not be able to
carry authentication information to the next intermediate or voice
service provider in the call path due to an inability to interconnect
in IP. To what extent should a terminating or originating voice service
provider's implementation extension on this basis depend on the actions
of the intermediate or voice service provider with which it is seeking
IP interconnection in order to exchange authenticated calls? Although
the accompanying Report and Order requires transmission of
authenticated calls by originating voice service providers only where
technically feasible, it requires authentication of all SIP calls.
Under what circumstances would challenges in interconnecting in IP
constitute an ``undue hardship'' such that the voice service provider
should be excused from authentication? Would it be appropriate to limit
any such extension to rural local exchange carriers or some other
subset of small and/or rural voice service providers? Is such an
extension an appropriate way to avoid requiring voice service providers
to invest in network upgrades that they cannot make use of? Or would
such an extension discourage voice service providers from coming to a
negotiated resolution and transitioning to IP? We also seek comment on
ways to address this issue and to encourage the voluntary adoption of
IP interconnection agreements between voice service providers. We also
seek comment on barriers to end-to-end STIR/SHAKEN transmission,
including the degree to which barriers to IP interconnection hinder
end-to-end caller ID authentication.
30. Extension for Certain Non-IP Networks. The TRACED Act
specifically directs that ``the Commission shall grant a delay'' ``for
any provider or class of providers of voice service, or type of voice
calls, only to the extent that such a provider or class of providers of
voice service, or type of voice calls, materially relies on a non-
[I]nternet [P]rotocol network for the provision of such service or
calls . . . until a call authentication protocol has been developed for
calls delivered over non-[IP] networks and is reasonably available.''
We propose to grant such an extension only for those portions of a
voice service provider's network that rely on technology that cannot
initiate, maintain, and terminate SIP calls. Do commenters agree with
this approach? Under this reading of the statute, we would interpret
``material[]'' to mean ``important or having an important effect'';
and, consistent with our call-by-call interpretation of the TRACED Act,
we would read ``reli[ance]'' with reference to the particular portion
of the network in question. Altogether, under this reading, we would
treat reliance on a non-internet Protocol network as material if that
portion of the network is incapable of using SIP. We seek comment on
whether, within the framework we propose, we should adopt a different
interpretation of ``non-[I]nternet [P]rotocol network.''
31. We also seek comment on other approaches to this statutory
provision. For instance, should we grant an extension for a voice
service provider's entire network if that voice service provider
materially relies on non-IP technology? On this view, how should we
interpret ``materially relies''? Would we find that a voice service
provider ``materially relies on a [non-IP] network'' if its network
substantially relies on non-IP technology, and on that reading what
portion of a network must be non-IP for reliance to be substantial?
Would we measure that percentage by a technical measure, such as the
percentage of non-IP switches in the network? Alternatively, should we
consider gauging substantial reliance by the percentage of a voice
service provider's subscriber base served by non-IP network technology?
32. Additionally, we seek comment on how the Commission should
determine if a caller ID authentication protocol developed for calls
delivered over non-IP networks is ``reasonably available'' under
section 4(b)(5)(B) such that this extension period would end. For
example, should we conclude that reasonable availability varies by
voice service provider, e.g., based on size and cost, and if so, how?
Should we conclude that reasonable availability depends on whether an
effective protocol can be purchased or otherwise obtained by a certain
percentage of providers with non-IP networks? While some commenters
have referred to out-of-band STIR as a framework that could potentially
allow non-IP voice service providers to participate in STIR/SHAKEN, it
is our understanding that this framework is still in its infancy and is
not readily available to be implemented. We seek comment on this
understanding. Are there other available technologies to enable legacy
networks to participate in caller ID authentication for which we should
consider encouraging development and, ultimately, mandate
implementation? If so, what are they, how do they operate, and how
might they best be implemented? What efforts, if any, are currently
underway to develop such technologies, and how near are they to
viability?
33. The TRACED Act further provides that we should limit or
terminate an extension of compliance if we determine in a future
assessment that a voice service provider ``is not making reasonable
efforts to develop the call authentication protocol'' for non-IP
networks. We propose to interpret the ``reasonable efforts''
requirement as being satisfied so long as a voice service provider is
actively working to develop a caller ID authentication protocol for
non-IP networks. We also propose that a voice service provider
satisfies this obligation if it is able to provide the Bureau upon
request documented proof that it is participating, either on its own or
through a representative, as a member of a working group or consortium
that is working to develop a non-IP solution, or actively testing such
a solution. We propose that the Bureau would have authority to
determine whether the provider is meeting the standard we establish. We
seek comment on this approach. Should we impose a different standard on
larger voice service providers that have more resources available to
invest in technology development and network upgrades?
[[Page 22106]]
Should we impose a stricter standard for the steps voice service
providers must take to develop a non-IP solution? If so, what should we
require as part of this more stringent standard? Should we adopt our
proposed standard initially but shift to a more stringent standard if
we find that the voice service provider in question, or industry as a
whole, is not making sufficient progress toward implementation of
caller ID authentication on non-IP networks?
34. Extensions Based on Type of Voice Call. We seek comment on
Congress's direction that extensions may be voice service provider-
specific or apply to a class of voice service providers or type of
voice calls. Are there any interpretive issues we should consider with
respect to this provision? Would it be practical to grant an extension
based on a type of voice call, or would that be unnecessarily
complicated for voice service providers?
35. Reevaluating Granted Extensions. We propose directing the
Bureau to reevaluate any extensions annually after the first extension
is granted, as required by the TRACED Act, and revise or extend them as
necessary. We seek comment on this proposal. Should we direct the
Bureau to consider any specific criteria beyond the statutory criteria?
We propose directing the Bureau to issue a Public Notice seeking
comment on its annual review and consider the comments it receives
before issuing a Public Notice of its decision. Are there other
specific administrative steps that we should direct the Bureau to
include in the reevaluation process? Should the Bureau be able to
expand or only contract the scope of entities that are entitled to a
class-based or other extension?
36. Robocall Mitigation During Extension Period. The TRACED Act
directs us to require any voice service provider that has been granted
an extension to, during the time of an extension, ``implement an
appropriate robocall mitigation program to prevent unlawful robocalls
from originating on the network of the provider.'' We propose
interpreting this requirement to apply to both voice service providers
that receive an extension on the basis of undue hardship and voice
service providers that materially rely on a non-internet Protocol
network, and we seek comment on this proposal. The TRACED Act states
that extensions for material reliance on a non-IP network are
``grant[ed] . . . under subparagraph (A)(ii),'' and that the robocall
mitigation program applies ``during the time of a delay of compliance
granted under subparagraph (A)(ii).'' TRACED Act 4(b)(5)(B),
4(b)(5)(C)(i). Further, the TRACED Act states that extensions for
material reliance on a non-IP network are ``[s]ubject to subparagraphs
(C) through (F),'' and paragraph (C)(i) sets forth the robocall
mitigation program requirement. TRACED Act 4(b)(5)(B), 4(b)(5)(C)(i).
We seek comment on the requirements we should adopt for a robocall
mitigation program. Should we prescribe specific robocall mitigation
practices for these voice service providers? If so, what practices
should we prescribe and why? Should we implement a system, proposed by
Verizon, where a voice service provider that originates traffic but
does not participate in STIR/SHAKEN certifies that ``it takes
appropriate measures to ensure that it is not contributing to the
robocall problem''? Similar to Verizon, USTelecom proposes that ``[t]he
Commission should require every provider of voice service to register
with the Commission and certify that all of its traffic is either (i)
signed with STIR/SHAKEN or (ii) subject to a robocall mitigation
program.'' It adds that the Commission should ``establish a public
database identifying every 499 filer that has issued its certification,
along with appropriate rules requiring transit service providers to
confirm that their customers have such certifications on file and are
in good standing.'' We seek comment on USTelecom's proposal. Would
adopting a public certification requirement meet the TRACED Act
robocall mitigation program requirement? According to USTelecom's
proposal, the certification should be ``non-prescriptive'' and,
instead, the Commission ``should require the service provider to
confirm that it (i) takes reasonable steps to avoid originating illegal
robocall traffic and (ii) that it is committed to cooperating with law
enforcement and the industry traceback consortium in investigating and
stopping any illegal robocallers that it learns are using its service
to originate calls.'' What are the benefits or drawbacks to this
approach? Is this an appropriate means to allow for some voice service
provider discretion to create a program that is workable while ensuring
an effective robocall mitigation program? Conversely, does this form of
certification allow too much discretion for voice service providers to
determine the scope of the robocall mitigation program? If we require a
certification, should we specify minimum standards that a certifying
voice service provider must meet, and should we require the
certification to be made in a public registry? Further, should call
analytics be part of any robocall mitigation program? How could voice
service providers with non-IP networks make use of analytics when
caller ID authentication is not available?
37. Alternative Methodologies During an Extension. The TRACED Act
directs us to ``identify, in consultation with small providers of voice
service, and those in rural areas, alternative effective alternative
effective methodologies to protect consumers from unauthenticated calls
during any delay of compliance.'' Accordingly, we ask such voice
service providers to share the most effective alternative
methodologies. Have small and rural voice service providers already
developed any effective methods to protect their subscribers from
illegal robocalls on their networks? Or are any small or rural voice
service providers in the process of developing such methodologies? If
so, at what stage in development are these potential solutions and when
could they be deployed? What are the specific challenges to such
development? Is there any other information on this issue that small
and rural voice service providers would like to share? How can the
Commission and other voice service providers support the efforts of
small and rural voice service providers to develop alternative
effective methodologies to protect their subscribers from
unauthenticated calls? For instance, would it be helpful for us to
convene small and rural voice service providers to identify potential
solutions? Alternatively, should voice service providers that receive
an extension be required to participate in industry-led traceback
efforts?
38. Preventing Abuse of Extension Process. We also seek comment on
ways to combat potential evasion of our caller ID authentication rules
using the extension process. For instance, how can we prevent a voice
service provider from avoiding participating in STIR/SHAKEN by
purposefully using non-IP network technology to avoid our mandate for
the duration of the extension granted to voice service providers that
materially rely on non-IP network technology? We seek comment on the
seriousness of this threat. Are there economic or technological reasons
why this is unlikely to occur? Does the TRACED Act's requirement that
the Commission limit an extension if it determines a voice service
provider ``is not making reasonable efforts to develop'' a non-IP
caller ID authentication protocol give us leverage to prevent such
conduct? Should we take specific further action to prevent this
behavior? If so, what action should we take? And how can we distinguish
between a voice service provider with
[[Page 22107]]
genuine reasons to use non-IP technology and a voice service provider
doing so to avoid participating in STIR/SHAKEN?
39. Full Participation. Section 4(b)(5)(D) of the TRACED Act
requires us to ``take reasonable measures'' to address any issues
observed in our assessment of the burdens and barriers to the
implementation of caller ID authentication frameworks, and to ``enable
as promptly as reasonable full participation of all classes of
providers of voice service and types of voice calls to receive the
highest level of trust.'' According to the legislation, such measures
``shall include, without limitation, as appropriate, limiting or
terminating a delay of compliance granted to a provider'' under section
4(b)(5)(B) of the TRACED Act if we determine in our assessment that the
voice service provider is not making reasonable efforts to develop the
required caller ID authentication protocol for non-IP networks. We seek
comment on this requirement and how best to fulfill the ``full
participation'' element of this provision beyond the existing proposals
contained herein. Are there further steps we might take, beyond those
already proposed, to enable full participation of all classes of voice
service providers in a caller ID authentication framework? If so, what
are they and how would any such steps be implemented?
E. Caller ID Authentication in Non-IP Networks
40. Because STIR/SHAKEN is a SIP-based solution, those portions of
a voice service provider's network that are not capable of initiating,
maintaining, and terminating SIP calls cannot authenticate or verify
calls under that framework. The TRACED Act directs us, not later than
June 30, 2021, to require voice service providers to take ``reasonable
measures'' to implement an effective caller ID authentication framework
in the non-IP portions of their networks. We propose to interpret the
TRACED Act's requirement that a voice service provider take
``reasonable measures'' to implement an effective caller ID
authentication framework in the non-IP portions of its network as being
satisfied only if the voice service provider is actively working to
implement a caller ID authentication framework on those portions of its
network, either by upgrading its non-IP networks to IP so that the
STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework may be implemented, or by working
to develop a non-IP authentication solution. Consistent with our
proposed approach to assessing whether a provider is making
``reasonable efforts'' to develop a call authentication protocol in the
context of determining whether to limit or terminate an extension of
compliance granted under section 4(b)(5)(B) for non-IP networks, we
propose that a provider satisfies the ``reasonable measures''
requirement under section 4(b)(1)(B) if it is able to provide the
Commission upon request documented proof that it is participating,
either on its own or through a representative, as a member of a working
group or consortium that is working to develop a non-IP solution, or
actively testing such a solution.
41. Although some commenters have referred to out-of-band STIR as a
framework that could potentially allow non-IP voice service providers
to participate in STIR/SHAKEN, our preliminary view is that out-of-band
STIR is still in its infancy and is not sufficiently widespread or
readily available to be implemented. Indeed, the TRACED Act itself
acknowledges that no viable non-IP solution currently exists insofar as
it directs us to grant an extension for voice service providers that
``materially rel[y] on a non-[I]nternet [P]rotocol network . . . until
a call authentication protocol has been developed for calls delivered
over non-[I]nternet [P]rotocol networks and is reasonably available.''
Given this, we believe the best approach is to continue to promote the
transition to IP while simultaneously encouraging voice service
providers to develop a non-IP solution that may benefit those legacy
networks that are not yet in transition
42. We seek comment on this approach. Is our proposed approach an
appropriate interpretation of the TRACED Act's ``reasonable measures''
requirement? Should we implement a different standard? If we adopt the
standard we propose, do commenters agree with our proposals on how to
evaluate whether a company is ``actively working'' toward developing an
authentication framework? Should the standard be the same for all voice
service providers, or should this standard vary according to the size
or resources of a voice service provider? If commenters believe this
standard should be variable, how should it vary across different types
or classes of voice service providers? How should voice service
providers be separated out under such a variable standard--according to
size, resources, cost, or some other metric? How should the obligations
of this requirement vary between the different classes of voice service
providers?
43. We also seek comment on our preliminary view that out-of-band
STIR is not yet sufficiently developed or widespread to form the basis
of a specific implementation requirement at present. Do commenters
anticipate that it will be technologically possible for voice service
providers to have the capability to implement this framework on a
widespread basis by June 30, 2021? Are there reasons we should or
should not encourage its development and, in turn, implementation?
44. We encourage voice service providers to transition their
networks to IP, and one of the many benefits of the IP transition is
the ability to implement STIR/SHAKEN. We wish to ensure that the
framework we develop in this proceeding is consistent with our efforts
in other proceedings to promote the transition to IP. We believe that
our proposed approach balances encouraging the transition to IP with
Congress's goal of promoting an effective caller ID authentication
solution for non-IP networks. Do commenters agree with this assessment?
Does our proposed approach appropriately account for the technological
limits of legacy networks and the challenges of upgrading those
networks while simultaneously encouraging the transition to IP? Is
there an alternative approach or additional steps we should take to
better promote the IP transition in this case? If so, what alternative
approach or steps should we take?
45. We further propose to revisit our approach to the TRACED Act's
``reasonable measures'' requirement for non-IP networks and the
extension for non-IP networks if industry fails to make sufficient
progress in overcoming this barrier to the ubiquitous implementation of
caller ID authentication through either transitioning to IP or
implementing a non-IP authentication solution. We seek comment on this
proposal. At what point should we reconsider this issue? If the
Commission finds, at a later date, that insufficient progress in
developing a non-IP solution has been made, should we impose a more
stringent requirement as to the steps that voice service providers must
take to develop and implement such a solution? What kinds of stricter
requirements should we impose? Should we require voice service
providers to either deploy a non-IP solution or upgrade their network
technology to participate in STIR/SHAKEN?
F. Voluntary STIR/SHAKEN Implementation Exemption
46. Although the TRACED Act directs us to require each voice
service provider to implement STIR/SHAKEN in its IP
[[Page 22108]]
network, section 4(b)(2) of the TRACED Act frees a voice service
provider from this requirement if we determine, by December 30, 2020,
that ``such provider of voice service'': (A) ``in [I]nternet [P]rotocol
networks''--(i) ``has adopted the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework
for calls on the [I]nternet [P]rotocol networks of the provider of
voice service; (ii) has agreed voluntarily to participate with other
providers of voice service in the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework;
(iii) has begun to implement the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework;
and (iv) will be capable of fully implementing the STIR/SHAKEN
authentication framework'' not later than June 30, 2021; and (B) ``in
non-[I]nternet [P]rotocol networks''--(i) ``has taken reasonable
measures to implement an effective call authentication framework; and
(ii) will be capable of fully implementing an effective call
authentication framework'' not later than June 30, 2021. We seek
comment on the substantive standards and appropriate processes by which
to implement this forward-looking exemption.
47. Relationship of IP Network and Non-IP Networks Provisions. We
propose to read section 4(b)(2) of the TRACED Act as creating two
exemptions: One for IP calls and one for non-IP calls. Thus, in our
proposal, a provider may seek the exemption for its ``IP networks'' if
it meets all four criteria for all calls it originates or terminates in
SIP, and a provider may seek the exemption for its ``non-IP networks''
if it meets both of the criteria for all non-SIP calls it originates or
terminates. We seek comment on this proposal and any alternative
approaches.
48. We believe that our proposal best implements Congress' policy
and is consistent with principles of statutory construction when
considering the statute as a whole. First, we believe our reading
better limits the portion of the exemption that is at risk of being a
nullity. Given the presence of the word ``and'' between the IP and non-
IP networks criteria, we recognize that the exemption could potentially
be read as applying only if the provider meets both the IP and non-IP
networks criteria. Yet, practically speaking, such a reading would
render the exemption an empty set or nearly so. As we have discussed,
we believe that non-IP caller ID authentication solutions are not
likely to be ready for widespread deployment in the near future. We
therefore anticipate that few, if any, voice service providers will be
able to claim that they will be capable of ``fully implementing'' an
effective non-IP caller ID authentication framework by June 30, 2021.
If we require any party seeking the exemption to attest to this
requirement, we risk rendering the exemption in its entirety a near-
nullity. We believe our proposed reading cabins the nullity risk more
narrowly, thus better effectuating Congress's goal of creating a
meaningful exemption. We seek comment on this interpretation, and again
invite comment on the likely state of development of non-IP caller ID
authentication solutions in the next year and a half. Must ``and'' be
read as creating only one exemption, or are we correct in assuming that
such a reading would essentially nullify the exemption, thus reading it
out of the statute and negating Congress's intent?
49. Second, we believe our proposal encourages prompt deployment of
STIR/SHAKEN. The statutory exemption rewards early progress in
deployment. Therefore, by giving providers a path to exemption solely
for their IP networks, we anticipate that we would encourage faster
progress in STIR/SHAKEN deployment. We seek comment on this view.
50. Third, our proposal here would align our interpretation of the
exemption with our proposal to read requirements in the TRACED Act
applying to voice service providers as applying on a call-by-call
basis. Because networks are often mixed and capable of transmitting
both in IP and non-IP, we preliminarily believe that reading the word
``networks'' in the statute to refer to the transmission technology of
a particular call is the best interpretation of the statute. We thus
preliminarily believe we could distinguish the duty that applies to
``such provider of voice service in [I]nternet [P]rotocol networks''
and ``such provider of voice service in non-[I]nternet [P]rotocol
networks'' on the basis of the call in question. We seek comment on
this proposal and of our proposed reading of section 4(b)(2) as
creating two distinct exemptions.
51. Threshold for IP Networks Exemption. To ensure that the
exemption only applies where warranted and to provide parties with
adequate guidance, we propose expanding on each of the four substantive
prongs that a voice service provider must meet to obtain an exemption.
With respect to prong (A)(i), we propose interpreting the phrase ``has
adopted the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework for calls on the
[I]nternet [P]rotocol networks of the provider of voice service'' to
mean that the voice service provider has publicly committed, via a
certification, to complete implementation of STIR/SHAKEN by June 30,
2021. Because the exemption in section 4(b)(2)(A) requires a voice
service provider to have ``adopted'' STIR/SHAKEN for calls on the IP
portions of their networks prior to obtaining an exemption, but does
not require full implementation of STIR/SHAKEN until not later than
June 30, 2021, we believe that the best approach is to interpret
section 4(b)(2)(A) as requiring a provider, prior to obtaining an
exemption, to make a public commitment to completely implement STIR/
SHAKEN by June 30, 2021. We seek comment on this proposed
interpretation. What are the potential benefits and drawbacks to this
approach? Does our proposed interpretation align with the language and
intended purpose of the statute? Are there any plausible alternative
interpretations of this subsection of the TRACED Act that would account
for both the stated requirement that a voice service provider ``has
adopted'' STIR/SHAKEN for calls on the IP portions of its network prior
to receiving an exemption, with the later ``capable of fully
implementing'' date? For example, should we consider prong (A)(i) to be
satisfied to the extent a provider has undertaken network preparations
necessary to operationalize the STIR/SHAKEN protocols on its network,
including, but not limited to, by participating in test beds and lab
testing or completing the commensurate network adjustments to enable
the authentication and validation of calls on its network consistent
with the STIR/SHAKEN framework?
52. We propose reading the phrase ``has agreed voluntarily to
participate with other providers of voice service in the STIR/SHAKEN
authentication framework'' in prong (A)(ii) to mean that the voice
service provider has written, signed agreements with at least two other
voice service providers to exchange calls with authenticated caller ID
information. We seek comment on this approach. What are the potential
benefits and drawbacks attendant in this interpretation? Does our
proposed interpretation align with the language and intended purpose of
the statute? Should we mandate that a voice service provider seeking to
qualify for the exemption have agreements with more than two other
voice service providers? If so, how many agreements should we require
before a voice service provider may qualify for the exemption under
section 4(b)(2)(A)? Should the ``other providers of voice service'' be
unaffiliated with the provider seeking the exemption? Should voice
service providers be required to establish such
[[Page 22109]]
agreements only with those voice service providers with which they
interconnect directly? Must these agreements include specific terms?
Should we go further and require voice service providers to have
reached agreements with all others with which they directly
interconnect? We preliminarily are disinclined to adopt such a
stringent requirement because, pursuant to the statute, voice service
providers will have time between December 30, 2020, and June 30, 2021,
to complete full implementation. Are there consortia or industry groups
that would allow voice service providers to reach agreements with
numerous other voice service providers at once and, if so, should
meeting prong (A)(ii) require participation in such an entity? Should
we impose specific recordkeeping requirements so that we can verify
that such agreements are in place? Should voice service providers be
required to provide proof of such agreements directly to the Commission
upon request? Are there any plausible alternatives to our proposed
interpretation of prong (A)(ii)? For example, should we consider prong
(A)(ii) to be satisfied if a service provider has registered with and
been approved by the Policy Administrator? Why or why not?
53. We propose interpreting the phrase ``has begun to implement the
STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework'' in prong (A)(iii) to mean that
the voice service provider has completed the necessary network upgrades
to at least one network element (e.g., a single switch or session
border controller) to enable the authentication and verification of
caller ID information consistent with the STIR/SHAKEN standards. This
proposal would require a voice service provider to make meaningful
progress on implementation by the time of certification, while taking
into account that voice service providers will have limited time
between adoption of a Report and Order and the December 30, 2020
deadline for exemption determinations. We seek comment on this proposed
interpretation and on potential alternatives. Is this proposed standard
too lenient and, if so, what standard should we adopt? We recognize
that the standard we propose may be more challenging for smaller voice
service providers than larger voice service providers. Should we vary
our expectations by voice service provider size and, if so, how?
Alternatively, should we consider prong (A)(iii) to be satisfied if a
provider has established the capability to authenticate originated
traffic and/or validate such traffic terminating on its network?
54. Lastly, we propose interpreting the phrase ``will be capable of
fully implementing the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework'' in prong
(A)(iv) to mean that the voice service provider reasonably foresees
that it will have completed all necessary network upgrades to its
network infrastructure to be able to authenticate and verify caller ID
information for all SIP calls exchanged with STIR/SHAKEN-enabled
partners, by June 30, 2021. We seek comment on this proposed
interpretation. Are there any plausible alternatives to our proposed
interpretation of this prong of the section 4(b)(2)(A) exemption? For
example, should we interpret this prong to require only that a provider
reasonably foresees that it will have the capability to fully implement
STIR/SHAKEN by June 30, 2021? How would such a reading align with
Congress's goal of broad STIR/SHAKEN deployment? Would a standard other
than reasonable foreseeability be appropriate and, if so, how can we
account for the statute's requirement that voice service providers must
make a prediction about the future? Alternatively, should we consider
prong (A)(iv) to be satisfied if a provider certifies only that its
consumer VoIP and Voice over LTE networks are capable of authentication
and verification, or will be so capable by June 30, 2021? What would be
the benefits and drawbacks of such a narrower requirement, and one that
does not require exchange of authenticated traffic? We encourage
commenters to support any alternative interpretation of the
implementation requirements in section 4(b)(2)(A) with reference not
only to the statutory language of each provision, but specific
technological and marketplace realities of how voice service providers
can expect to foreseeably meet the qualifications that Congress has
established.
55. Threshold for Non-IP Networks Exemption. A voice service
provider is excused from the requirement to take reasonable measures to
implement an effective caller ID authentication framework in the non-IP
portions of its network if we find that it has: (1) Taken reasonable
measures to implement an effective caller ID authentication framework
in the non-IP portions of its network; and (2) will be capable of fully
implementing an effective caller ID authentication framework in the
non-IP portions of its network not later than June 30, 2021. As we have
stated, we anticipate that in the non-IP context, few if any voice
service providers will seek to take advantage of this exemption because
of the difficulties in ``fully implementing'' an effective caller ID
authentication framework. We seek comment on this view and whether
there is an acceptable interpretation of the ``fully implementing''
prong that would make it more achievable for voice service providers to
qualify for the exemption. What constitutes an ``effective'' call
authentication framework? Must such a framework be comparable to STIR/
SHAKEN? We also seek comment on how to interpret ``reasonable
measures'' under prong (B)(i). How do ``reasonable measures'' under
this prong differ from the ``reasonable measures'' required under
section 4(b)(1)(B)?
56. Compliance Certifications. We propose to implement the TRACED
Act exemption provision using a certification process. Specifically, we
propose requiring a voice service provider that wishes to receive an
exemption to submit a certification that it meets the criteria for the
IP networks exemption that we propose to establish pursuant section
4(b)(2)(A); the criteria for the non-IP networks exemption that we
propose to establish pursuant section 4(b)(2)(B); or both. Under this
proposal, each voice service provider who wishes to qualify for the
section 4(b)(2)(A) and/or (B) exemption must have an officer, as an
agent of the voice service provider, sign a compliance certificate
stating that the officer has personal knowledge that the company meets
each of the stated criteria. We also propose requiring the voice
service provider to submit an accompanying statement explaining, in
detail, how the company is working to accomplish the four prongs of the
exemption. We believe a certification process is necessary to allow us
to meet Congress's deadline for completion of exemption determinations
by December 30, 2020.
57. We propose requiring these certifications to be filed no later
than December 1, 2020. We propose requiring all certifications and
supporting statements to be filed electronically in a new docket
established specifically for such filings in the Commission's
Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). We propose directing the
Bureau to provide additional directions and filing information
regarding the certifications in the Public Notice announcing OMB
approval. And we propose directing the Bureau to review the
certifications and accompanying documents for completeness and to
determine whether the certifying party has met the standard we
establish. We further propose directing the Bureau to
[[Page 22110]]
issue a list of parties that have filed compliant certifications and
thus receive the exemption(s) on or before December 30, 2020. Because
of the limited time for review of certifications, we propose that any
voice service providers that file inadequate certifications will not
receive an opportunity to cure and will, instead, be subject to the
general duty we establish in the Report and Order to implement STIR/
SHAKEN by June 30, 2021. We preliminarily view this consequence as
reasonable and appropriate because the purpose of the certification is
merely to determine which voice service providers would, in the absence
of the STIR/SHAKEN obligation, nonetheless be able to implement STIR/
SHAKEN in a timely manner.
58. We seek comment on this proposed certification process. Are
there ways that we can streamline the process without sacrificing
certainty that an exemption is warranted? For instance, should we allow
a less senior company official to sign the certification and, if so,
who should be allowed to sign? Should we impose any additional
requirements? Is there an additional or different way for voice service
providers to demonstrate that they have met the implementation
requirements in section 4(b)(2)(A) and/or (B) of the TRACED Act that
would allow us to reach the determinations required by the statute by
December 30, 2020? If so, how should we structure and implement any
such process? Should we treat any of the information that voice service
providers submit in their accompanying statement as presumptively
confidential?
59. Retrospective Review. The section 4(b)(2)(A) and (B) exemptions
are, by their nature, based on a voice service provider's prediction of
its future ability to implement STIR/SHAKEN by June 30, 2021. We
preliminarily believe that Congress intended for us to verify, after
the fact, that voice service providers claiming the exemption completed
full implementation in accordance with their commitments. We believe
that such a review is consistent with the TRACED Act both because the
broad structure of section 4 aims toward full implementation of caller
ID authentication and because section 4(b)(2)(A)(iv) and (B)(ii) each
state that a voice service provider may receive the exemption only if
it ``will'' be capable of ``fully'' implementing a call authentication
framework (STIR/SHAKEN or ``an effective call authentication
framework,'' respectively). We seek comment on this view. We are
concerned that, absent a look back at whether voice service providers
that receive the exemption later fulfill their expectations, voice
service providers may receive the exemption but later not implement
STIR/SHAKEN or a non-IP call authentication framework completely in a
timely manner. This would harm the public because it would create
pockets of unauthenticated calls and give the voice service providers
that claimed the exemption but fall short a significant loophole--a
circumstance that would invite bad actors to claim the exemption
without any intent of completing the obligation. We seek comment on
this view and whether there are alternatives to looking back at voice
service providers claiming the exemption after the compliance deadline
that would address the risk of gaps and abusive claims of the
exemption.
60. We specifically propose requiring a voice service provider that
receives an exemption to file a second certification after June 30,
2021, stating whether it in fact achieved the implementation goal to
which it committed. We propose requiring the certification to be filed
in ECFS subject to the same allowance for confidentiality and
requirements for sworn signatures and detailed support as the initial
certifications. We propose directing the Bureau to issue a Public
Notice setting a specific deadline no later than three months after
June 30, 2021 and providing detailed filing requirements. We propose
directing the Bureau to seek public comment on each certification and,
following review of the certifications, supporting materials, and
responsive comments, to issue a Public Notice identifying which voice
service providers remain subject to the exemption. We seek comment on
these proposals and on possible alternatives.
61. If a voice service provider cannot certify to full
implementation upon retrospective review but demonstrates to the Bureau
that it filed its initial certification in good faith and made good
faith efforts to complete implementation, we propose that the
consequence for such a shortcoming would be loss of the exemption and
application of the general rule requiring full STIR/SHAKEN
implementation, effective immediately. We believe an immediate
effective date would be important to ensure that certain voice service
providers do not receive an extension not granted to similarly situated
providers simply because they filed a certification they later failed
to meet. If the Bureau finds that a voice service provider filed its
initial certification in bad faith or failed to take good faith steps
toward implementation, we propose to require full implementation
immediately and further to direct the Bureau to refer the voice service
provider to the Enforcement Bureau for possible enforcement action
based on filing a false certification and/or other possible violations.
We believe we have legal authority to adopt the foregoing proposals
under the TRACED Act, and that we have independent authority to do so
under section 251(e). We seek comment on these proposals and on other
possible alternatives.
62. Providers Eligible for Exemption. We preliminarily do not
interpret the TRACED Act's exemption process to include intermediate
providers, because its definition of ``voice service'' refers to
``furnish[ing] voice communications to an end user.'' We seek comment
on whether and how we should extend the exemption process to
intermediate providers, in addition to originating and terminating
voice service providers. What would be the benefits and drawbacks of
such an approach?
G. Prohibiting Line Item Charges for Caller ID Authentication
63. The TRACED Act explicitly directs us to ``prohibit providers of
voice service from adding any additional line item charges to consumer
or small business customer subscribers for the effective call
authentication technology'' mandated by that Act. Accordingly, we
propose prohibiting voice service providers from imposing additional
line item charges on consumer or small business subscribers for caller
ID authentication. We believe this proposal is a straightforward
implementation of Congress's clear direction. We propose to interpret
``consumer'' as used in the TRACED Act to refer to residential mass-
market subscribers, and we propose to interpret ``small business'' to
refer to business entities that meet the Small Business Administration
(SBA) definition of ``small business.'' We note that the record
developed in response to the 2019 Robocall Declaratory Ruling and
Further Notice reflects support for such a prohibition. We seek comment
on our proposal and proposed interpretation of this section of the
TRACED Act. Should we adopt different definitions? For instance, should
we define ``small business'' with respect to line count, and if so,
what line count limitation is appropriate? We recognize that a line
count-based definition would be easier for providers to administer, but
would it leave out small businesses that Congress intended to protect
from line item charges?
64. To provide additional clarity regarding the prohibition on line
item charges, we specifically propose to
[[Page 22111]]
prohibit voice service providers from imposing a line-item charge on
consumers or small businesses for the cost of upgrading network
elements as necessary to implement STIR/SHAKEN, for any recurring costs
associated with the authentication and verification of calls, or for
any display of STIR/SHAKEN verification information on their
subscribers' phones. ITTA argues that ``SHAKEN/STIR implementation
costs should be fully recoverable via . . . any line item that recovers
government-mandated charges . . . .'' We disagree and propose to reject
this suggestion with respect to consumer and small business
subscribers, on the basis that Congress directly addressed this issue
in the TRACED Act. We seek comment on whether we should extend our
prohibition to other types of subscribers. We additionally seek comment
on our proposal and whether it has the correct scope. Are there other
caller ID authentication-related costs or services we should
specifically address in our prohibition? Should we list all categories
of prohibited charges, or should our list merely provide examples of
the types of charges barred by the general prohibition on line-item
charges? Should we address whether voice service providers may recover
caller ID authentication costs from consumers and small businesses
through rate increases, and if so how and on what legal basis?
H. Call Labeling
65. We seek comment on whether and how to address any risks of
consumer confusion or competitive issues stemming from call labeling.
Some commenters have expressed concern that terminating voice service
providers that have implemented STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication
may display caller ID authentication information on their subscribers'
phones in a manner detrimental to callers whose originating voice
service provider has not yet implemented STIR/SHAKEN or is unable to
provide the caller with ``full'' or ``A'' level attestation. These
commenters assert that displaying when caller ID information has been
successfully verified on a subscriber's device may lead subscribers to
believe that calls which lack such a display are illegal calls, and
that such a result is especially problematic before widespread
implementation of STIR/SHAKEN. These commenters similarly identify the
lack of a standard approach to displaying caller ID verification
results--including whether to treat all attestation levels similarly or
provide special treatment for ``A'' level attestation--as creating the
potential for discriminatory or anticompetitive labeling. Commenters
also express concern about mislabeling. While we decline in the
accompanying Report and Order to mandate at this time any
specifications that voice service providers must use if they choose to
display STIR/SHAKEN verification results, we now seek comment on
whether and how to address these concerns related to call labeling.
What authority do we possess to regulate call labeling? Would section
10 of the TRACED Act, which establishes redress mechanisms for
blocking, provide us authority as one commenter suggests? One group of
commenters suggests we should require a voice service provider to
provide notice to the caller when it places a ``derogatory'' label on
the caller's number; require that a voice service provider offer an
effective and prompt redress mechanism for callers whose calls have
been mislabeled by the provider; obligate a voice service provider to
share information about mislabeled numbers with other providers; and
require voice service providers to track and report to us how many
lawful calls they are mistakenly mislabeling. Should we adopt any or
all of these suggestions? What constitutes a derogatory label? Do
commenters have alternative proposals? Further, is existing antitrust
law sufficient to address any competitive issues, and if not why?
I. Benefits and Costs
66. The proposals in this Further Notice generally reflect mandates
from the TRACED Act, and we have no discretion to ignore such
congressional direction. To the extent that we are seeking comment on
multiple possible options to implement any given mandate, we urge
commenters, where possible, to include an assessment of relative costs
and benefits for competing options. We found in the accompanying Report
and Order that widespread deployment of STIR/SHAKEN will increase the
effectiveness of the framework for both voice service providers and
their subscribers. Among the considerable and varied benefits
identified in the Report and Order are the reduction in nuisance calls,
protection from illegally spoofed calls, and restoration of confidence
in incoming calls. The proposals in this Further Notice are intended
to, consistent with the TRACED Act, encourage further deployment of
this technology and thus expand these benefits. We thus propose to
reaffirm our finding of considerable benefit to widespread caller ID
authentication implementation, and we propose to conclude that
implementation of the TRACED Act provisions and other proposals
discussed above will make considerable progress in unlocking those
benefits, and that those benefits far exceed the costs. We seek comment
on this proposal. We further seek detailed comments on the costs of the
proposals in this Further Notice. What are the upfront and recurring
costs associated with each? Will these costs vary according to the size
of the voice service provider? What costs would specifically burden
intermediate providers? We preliminarily believe that intermediate
providers would be faced with similar upfront costs as originating and
terminating voice service providers, but will not have the recurring
costs related to STIR/SHAKEN authentication and verification service.
Is this view accurate? Do the benefits of our proposals outweigh the
costs in each case?
J. Access to Numbering Resources
67. Section 6(a) of the TRACED Act directs us to examine whether
and how our policies regarding access to both toll free and non-toll
free numbering resources can be modified to help reduce access to
numbers by potential perpetrators of illegal robocalls, and it directs
us to prescribe regulations to implement any such policy modifications.
In addition, section 6(b) provides a forfeiture penalty, pursuant to
section 503(b) of the Act, for a knowing violation of any regulation we
prescribe pursuant to section 6(a). Our obligation to examine and
implement policy modifications does not extend to the forfeiture
provision of section 6(b). In light of this distinction, as well as the
forfeiture procedures that the Commission already has in place, see 47
CFR 1.80, we do not consider it necessary to seek comment on how
section 6(b) of the TRACED Act would be implemented.
68. Background. Currently, voice service providers that are
telecommunications carriers access non-toll free numbers through the
NANP Administrator (NANPA) and the Pooling Administrator (collectively,
the ``Numbering Administrators''). Applicants for numbering resources
must comply with Commission rules and with guidelines from the Alliance
for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS) Industry Numbering
Committee (INC) and the Numbering Administrators. We require the
Numbering Administrators to follow ATIS INC guidelines, which, in turn,
provides additional requirements for voice service providers accessing
numbering resources. See 47 CFR
[[Page 22112]]
52.13(b)(3). These rules and guidelines require such voice service
providers to provide contact information, provide Operating Company
Number information, disclose the primary type of business for which the
numbers will be used, file a NANP Numbering Resource Utilization/
Forecast (NRUF) Report with the NANPA, and disclose the states for
which they will request numbering resources. Applicants for initial
numbering resources must also include evidence that the applicant is
capable of providing service within 60 days of the numbering resources
activation date (facilities readiness requirement). Voice service
providers must also maintain internal records of numbering resources
for reporting purposes.
69. While traditionally only telecommunications carriers were
permitted to request and receive numbers from the Numbering
Administrators, in 2015 the Commission adopted rules establishing a
process for interconnected VoIP providers to request numbers directly
from the Numbering Administrators. Direct access to telephone numbers
by interconnected VoIP providers is restricted to only those
interconnected VoIP providers that can demonstrate that they are
authorized to provide service by a state-level certification in a given
area for which they are requesting numbers or by a Commission-level
authorization. To apply for Commission authorization for direct access
to numbers, applicants for direct access authorization must submit
applications through the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System,
interconnected VoIP providers must provide contact information; agree
to comply with Commission rules, numbering authority delegated to the
states, and industry guidelines and practices regarding numbering as
applicable to telecommunications carriers; provide 30-day notice to
relevant state commission(s) before requesting numbering resources from
Numbering Administrators; provide proof of facilities readiness; and
certify that the applicant possesses the requisite expertise to provide
reliable service, that key personnel are not being nor have been
investigated for failure to comply with any law, rule, or order, that
the applicant complies with its Universal Service Fund (USF),
Telecommunications Relay Services, NANP and local number portability
administration contribution obligations, its regulatory fee
obligations, and its 911 obligations, and that no party to the
application is subject to denial of Federal benefits pursuant to
section 5301 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. All voice service providers,
including interconnected VoIP providers, must comply with a number of
obligations in order to maintain their authorization to access numbers,
including USF reporting and contributions, 911 service obligations, and
maintaining sufficient and auditable data to demonstrate compliance
with applicable guidelines, among other obligations in the Commission's
rules and industry guidelines.
70. A Responsible Organization (RespOrg) obtains toll free numbers,
on a toll free subscriber's behalf, by reserving and assigning a number
from the SMS/800 Toll Free Number Registry (TFN Registry). The
Commission-designated Toll Free Numbering Administrator (TFNA) manages
the TFN Registry and certifies RespOrgs. To access the TFN Registry,
RespOrgs must complete a Service Establishment Application; obtain a
logon identification code from the TFNA requiring the disclosure of
information including general contact information, type of access
sought, and the interexchange carrier providing the connection;
demonstrate that one or more employees possess adequate TFN Registry
training; and pass a TFN Registry certification test. RespOrgs must
also follow the ATIS Toll Free Guidelines, adhere to agreements
established through the ATIS industry forum process, and acknowledge
that the RespOrg is bound by the terms and conditions contained in TFN
Registry Functions Tariff. RespOrgs have sole responsibility for the
accuracy of subscriber records and information in the TFN Registry.
Toll free numbers must be available to RespOrgs and subscribers on an
equitable basis, and typically are assigned first-come, first-served.
The Commission may use competitive bidding and/or other alternative
assignment methodologies for toll free numbers. In 2019, the TFNA held
an auction of toll-free numbers in the 833 code for which there were
two or more requests for assignment. Individual bidders and RespOrgs
bid on specific numbers through a competitive bidding process and,
unlike other toll free numbers, are able to sell those numbers won at
auction in a secondary market.
71. Discussion. We seek comment on whether and how we should modify
our policies regarding access to toll free and non-toll free numbering
resources to help reduce illegal robocallers' access to numbering
resources. Specifically, we seek comment on whether any new or modified
registration and compliance obligations would be appropriate to help
reduce illegal robocallers' access to numbering resources. We ask
commenters to identify specific modifications to our rules and
Numbering Administrator policies. For example, should we require
applicants for numbering resources to provide a certification that they
``know their customers'' through some sort of customer identity
verification, perhaps explaining the steps that they take to do so?
Should we require voice service providers to provide information about
their customers to the Numbering Administrators? Should we modify our
NRUF reporting requirements concerning carriers that assign numbering
resources to intermediate providers, and if so, in what way? Should we
impose U.S. residency requirements for access to U.S. telephone
numbers? Would imposing U.S. residency requirements reduce the
likelihood of bad actors generating large-scale robocall campaigns
beyond the reach of U.S. law enforcement? Further, would U.S. residency
requirements increase accuracy and efficiency regarding attestation
levels under the STIR/SHAKEN protocols? If we did impose U.S. residency
requirements, would it reduce the number of voice service providers in
the international voice market, thus reducing downward competitive
pressure on international voice calling rates? Would imposing residency
requirements harm domestic voice communications? Should we require
minimal state contacts to obtain numbering resources in a particular
state? Should we delegate enforcement of any modifications to our
policies to the states, at least in the first instance? We invite
parties to comment on these or other potential policy modifications
that might limit illegal robocalling.
72. We seek comment on the potential costs that would be imposed by
any changes that commenters recommend to our policies regarding access
to numbering resources. What costs do specific changes impose on
entities that use numbers, Numbering Administrators, and consumers?
Would any modifications to our policies unreasonably increase the
difficulty for consumers and businesses (and their voice service
providers) that are not perpetrators of illegal robocalling to obtain
U.S. telephone numbers? We seek specific comment on the burdens of
imposing potential certification requirements on applicants for
numbering resources, particularly on small businesses. Additionally, we
seek comment on how we can ensure that
[[Page 22113]]
any ``know your customer'' requirements do not harm consumer privacy.
73. We also seek comment on the effects that any proposed
modifications to our policies for access to numbering resourcing could
have on competition and innovation in the voice marketplace. Could any
market-distorting differential effects on voice service providers
result? We seek comment on whether any suggested modifications could
provide an unreasonable advantage to one type of technology or business
model over another. For example, would modifications such as ``in-
person presentation of documents or identity verification tend to favor
non-internet-based companies or those with physical lines over those
who do business via the internet or use newer technologies?'' How could
we minimize any negative ramifications for competition in the voice
services market?
74. We recognize that any potential modifications to our rules and
policies may need to be uniquely tailored to particular industry
segments in order to reduce access to numbers by bad actors while
avoiding undesirable consequences. How could modifications be tailored
to providers of toll free service, voice service providers that are
telecommunications carriers, and interconnected VoIP providers in order
to effectively prevent bad actors from accessing numbering resources
while avoiding undesirable consequences? For example, would adding a
``know your customer'' certification to the application for numbering
resources work better for one industry than another (such as, for
example, non-toll-free versus toll-free service)? Should we require
that subscriber information be included in the TFN Registry, as opposed
to RespOrg information alone? Should rules for any future Commission
auctions of toll-free numbers also include these requirements? Further,
are there specific policy modifications that we can adopt in the voice
services wholesale market that will achieve the Commission's goal to
reduce access to numbers by potential perpetrators of illegal
robocalls?
II. Procedural Matters
75. Paperwork Reduction Act. This document contains proposed new or
modified information collection requirements. The Commission, as part
of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, will invite the
general public and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to comment
on the information collection requirements contained in this document,
as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13.
In addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of
2002, Public Law 107-198, we seek specific comment on how we might
further reduce the information collection burden for small business
concerns with fewer than 25 employees.
76. Ex Parte Rules. This proceeding shall be treated as a ``permit-
but-disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte
rules. Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any
written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation
within two business days after the presentation (unless a different
deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making
oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the
presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise
participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was
made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during
the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of
the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the
presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the
proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or
arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings
(specifying the relevant page or paragraph numbers where such data or
arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum.
Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings
are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed
consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f)
or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic
filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral
ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed
through the electronic comment filing system available for that
proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml,
.ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding should
familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
77. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. As required by the
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), the Commission
has prepared this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the
possible significant economic impact on small entities by the policies
and rules proposed in this Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(Further Notice). The Commission requests written public comments on
this IRFA. Comments must be identified as responses to the IRFA and
must be filed by the deadlines for comments provided on the first page
of the Further Notice. The Commission will send a copy of the Further
Notice, including this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
Small Business Administration (SBA).
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules
78. The Further Notice continues the Commission's efforts to combat
illegal spoofed robocalls. Specifically, the Further Notice proposes to
require intermediate providers to pass unaltered any STIR/SHAKEN
Identity header they receive to the subsequent provider in the call
path., and authenticate caller ID information for all SIP calls it
receives for which the caller ID information has not been authenticated
and which it will exchange with another provider as a SIP call. The
Further Notice also proposes implementing provisions of section 4 of
the Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and
Deterrence (TRACED) Act as follows: Prohibiting providers from imposing
additional line item charges on consumer and small business subscribers
for caller ID authentication technology; granting an exemption from our
implementation mandate for providers which have certified that they
have reached certain implementation goals; granting an extension in
compliance with our implementation mandate for small providers; and
requiring providers to take ``reasonable measures'' to implement an
effective caller ID authentication framework in their non-IP networks
by either upgrading non-IP networks to IP or by actively working to
develop a non-IP authentication solution. The Further Notice seeks
comment on all of these proposals, and on how we should implement
section 6(a) of the TRACED Act. The proposals in the Further Notice
will help promote effective caller ID authentication and fulfill our
obligations under the TRACED Act.
B. Legal Basis
79. The Further Notice proposes to find authority for these
proposed rules under section 251(e) of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended (the Act), and section 4 of the TRACED Act. Section 251(e)
gives us exclusive jurisdiction over numbering policy and the TRACED
Act directs us to make rules to ensure the implementation of caller ID
authentication frameworks by all voice
[[Page 22114]]
service providers. We propose that section 251(e) grants us the
authority to require intermediate providers to pass STIR/SHAKEN
information unaltered because such an action would prevent the
fraudulent abuse of North American Numbering Plan resources by callers
making calls which transit intermediate providers' networks. We propose
that the TRACED Act authorizes the remaining proposed rules because
they implement the TRACED Act's language. We solicit comment on these
proposals, and whether section 227(e) of the Act, as amended by the
Truth in Caller ID Act, or the TRACED Act, would provide additional
authority for our proposal to extend our mandate to intermediate
providers.
C. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which
the Proposed Rules Will Apply
80. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where
feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be
affected by the proposed rules and by the rule revisions on which the
Notice seeks comment, if adopted. The RFA generally defines the term
``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same
meaning as the term ``small-business concern'' under the Small Business
Act. A ``small-business concern'' is one which: (1) Is independently
owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and
(3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA.
1. Wireline Carriers
81. Wired Telecommunications Carriers. The U.S. Census Bureau
defines this industry as ``establishments primarily engaged in
operating and/or providing access to transmission facilities and
infrastructure that they own and/or lease for the transmission of
voice, data, text, sound, and video using wired communications
networks. Transmission facilities may be based on a single technology
or a combination of technologies. Establishments in this industry use
the wired telecommunications network facilities that they operate to
provide a variety of services, such as wired telephony services,
including VoIP services, wired (cable) audio and video programming
distribution, and wired broadband internet services. By exception,
establishments providing satellite television distribution services
using facilities and infrastructure that they operate are included in
this industry.'' The SBA has developed a small business size standard
for Wired Telecommunications Carriers, which consists of all such
companies having 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for
2012 show that there were 3,117 firms that operated that year. Of this
total, 3,083 operated with fewer than 1,000 employees. Thus, under this
size standard, the majority of firms in this industry can be considered
small.
82. Local Exchange Carriers (LECs). Neither the Commission nor the
SBA has developed a size standard for small businesses specifically
applicable to local exchange services. The closest applicable NAICS
Code category is Wired Telecommunications Carriers. Under the
applicable SBA size standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500
or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2012 show that there
were 3,117 firms that operated for the entire year. Of that total,
3,083 operated with fewer than 1,000 employees. Thus under this
category and the associated size standard, the Commission estimates
that the majority of local exchange carriers are small entities.
83. Incumbent LECs. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has
developed a small business size standard specifically for incumbent
local exchange services. The closest applicable NAICS Code category is
Wired Telecommunications Carriers. Under the applicable SBA size
standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees.
U.S. Census Bureau data for 2012 indicate that 3,117 firms operated the
entire year. Of this total, 3,083 operated with fewer than 1,000
employees. Consequently, the Commission estimates that most providers
of incumbent local exchange service are small businesses that may be
affected by our actions. According to Commission data, one thousand
three hundred and seven (1,307) Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers
reported that they were incumbent local exchange service providers. Of
this total, an estimated 1,006 have 1,500 or fewer employees. Thus,
using the SBA's size standard the majority of incumbent LECs can be
considered small entities.
84. Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (Competitive LECs),
Competitive Access Providers (CAPs), Shared-Tenant Service Providers,
and Other Local Service Providers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA
has developed a small business size standard specifically for these
service providers. The appropriate NAICS Code category is Wired
Telecommunications Carriers and under that size standard, such a
business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census
Bureau data for 2012 indicate that 3,117 firms operated during that
year. Of that number, 3,083 operated with fewer than 1,000 employees.
Based on these data, the Commission concludes that the majority of
Competitive LECS, CAPs, Shared-Tenant Service Providers, and Other
Local Service Providers, are small entities. According to Commission
data, 1,442 carriers reported that they were engaged in the provision
of either competitive local exchange services or competitive access
provider services. Of these 1,442 carriers, an estimated 1,256 have
1,500 or fewer employees. In addition, 17 carriers have reported that
they are Shared-Tenant Service Providers, and all 17 are estimated to
have 1,500 or fewer employees. Also, 72 carriers have reported that
they are Other Local Service Providers. Of this total, 70 have 1,500 or
fewer employees. Consequently, based on internally researched FCC data,
the Commission estimates that most providers of competitive local
exchange service, competitive access providers, Shared-Tenant Service
Providers, and Other Local Service Providers are small entities.
85. We have included small incumbent LECs in this present RFA
analysis. As noted above, a ``small business'' under the RFA is one
that, inter alia, meets the pertinent small-business size standard
(e.g., a telephone communications business having 1,500 or fewer
employees) and ``is not dominant in its field of operation.'' The SBA's
Office of Advocacy contends that, for RFA purposes, small incumbent
LECs are not dominant in their field of operation because any such
dominance is not ``national'' in scope. We have therefore included
small incumbent LECs in this RFA analysis, although we emphasize that
this RFA action has no effect on Commission analyses and determinations
in other, non-RFA contexts.
86. Interexchange Carriers (IXCs). Neither the Commission nor the
SBA has developed a small business size standard specifically for
Interexchange Carriers. The closest applicable NAICS Code category is
Wired Telecommunications Carriers. The applicable size standard under
SBA rules is that such a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer
employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2012 indicate that 3,117 firms
operated for the entire year. Of that number, 3,083 operated with fewer
than 1,000 employees. According to internally developed Commission
data, 359 companies reported that their primary telecommunications
service activity was the provision of interexchange services.
[[Page 22115]]
Of this total, an estimated 317 have 1,500 or fewer employees.
Consequently, the Commission estimates that the majority of
interexchange service providers are small entities.
87. Cable System Operators (Telecom Act Standard). The
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, also contains a size standard
for small cable system operators, which is ``a cable operator that,
directly or through an affiliate, serves in the aggregate fewer than
one percent of all subscribers in the United States and is not
affiliated with any entity or entities whose gross annual revenues in
the aggregate exceed $250,000,000.'' As of 2018, there were
approximately 50,504,624 cable video subscribers in the United States.
Accordingly, an operator serving fewer than 505,046 subscribers shall
be deemed a small operator if its annual revenues, when combined with
the total annual revenues of all its affiliates, do not exceed $250
million in the aggregate. We note that the Commission neither requests
nor collects information on whether cable system operators are
affiliated with entities whose gross annual revenues exceed $250
million. Therefore we are unable at this time to estimate with greater
precision the number of cable system operators that would qualify as
small cable operators under the definition in the Communications Act.
2. Wireless Carriers
88. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite). This
industry comprises establishments engaged in operating and maintaining
switching and transmission facilities to provide communications via the
airwaves. Establishments in this industry have spectrum licenses and
provide services using that spectrum, such as cellular services, paging
services, wireless internet access, and wireless video services. The
appropriate size standard under SBA rules is that such a business is
small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. For this industry, U.S.
Census Bureau data for 2012 show that there were 967 firms that
operated for the entire year. Of this total, 955 firms employed fewer
than 1,000 employees and 12 firms employed of 1,000 employees or more.
Thus under this category and the associated size standard, the
Commission estimates that the majority of wireless telecommunications
carriers (except satellite) are small entities.
89. The Commission's own data--available in its Universal Licensing
System--indicate that, as of August 31, 2018 there are 265 Cellular
licensees that will be affected by our actions. The Commission does not
know how many of these licensees are small, as the Commission does not
collect that information for these types of entities. Similarly,
according to internally developed Commission data, 413 carriers
reported that they were engaged in the provision of wireless telephony,
including cellular service, Personal Communications Service (PCS), and
Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) Telephony services. Of this total, an
estimated 261 have 1,500 or fewer employees, and 152 have more than
1,500 employees. Thus, using available data, we estimate that the
majority of wireless firms can be considered small.
90. Satellite Telecommunications. This category comprises firms
``primarily engaged in providing telecommunications services to other
establishments in the telecommunications and broadcasting industries by
forwarding and receiving communications signals via a system of
satellites or reselling satellite telecommunications.'' Satellite
telecommunications service providers include satellite and earth
station operators. The category has a small business size standard of
$35 million or less in average annual receipts, under SBA rules. For
this category, U.S. Census Bureau data for 2012 show that there were a
total of 333 firms that operated for the entire year. Of this total,
299 firms had annual receipts of less than $25 million. Consequently,
we estimate that the majority of satellite telecommunications providers
are small entities.
3. Resellers
91. Local Resellers. The SBA has not developed a small business
size standard specifically for Local Resellers. The SBA category of
Telecommunications Resellers is the closest NAICs code category for
local resellers. The Telecommunications Resellers industry comprises
establishments engaged in purchasing access and network capacity from
owners and operators of telecommunications networks and reselling wired
and wireless telecommunications services (except satellite) to
businesses and households. Establishments in this industry resell
telecommunications; they do not operate transmission facilities and
infrastructure. Mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) are included
in this industry. Under the SBA's size standard, such a business is
small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data from
2012 show that 1,341 firms provided resale services during that year.
Of that number, all operated with fewer than 1,000 employees. Thus,
under this category and the associated small business size standard,
the majority of these resellers can be considered small entities.
According to Commission data, 213 carriers have reported that they are
engaged in the provision of local resale services. Of these, an
estimated 211 have 1,500 or fewer employees and two have more than
1,500 employees. Consequently, the Commission estimates that the
majority of local resellers are small entities.
92. Toll Resellers. The Commission has not developed a definition
for Toll Resellers. The closest NAICS Code Category is
Telecommunications Resellers. The Telecommunications Resellers industry
comprises establishments engaged in purchasing access and network
capacity from owners and operators of telecommunications networks and
reselling wired and wireless telecommunications services (except
satellite) to businesses and households. Establishments in this
industry resell telecommunications; they do not operate transmission
facilities and infrastructure. MVNOs are included in this industry. The
SBA has developed a small business size standard for the category of
Telecommunications Resellers. Under that size standard, such a business
is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. 2012 Census Bureau data
show that 1,341 firms provided resale services during that year. Of
that number, 1,341 operated with fewer than 1,000 employees. Thus,
under this category and the associated small business size standard,
the majority of these resellers can be considered small entities.
According to Commission data, 881 carriers have reported that they are
engaged in the provision of toll resale services. Of this total, an
estimated 857 have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, the
Commission estimates that the majority of toll resellers are small
entities.
93. Prepaid Calling Card Providers. Neither the Commission nor the
SBA has developed a small business definition specifically for prepaid
calling card providers. The most appropriate NAICS code-based category
for defining prepaid calling card providers is Telecommunications
Resellers. This industry comprises establishments engaged in purchasing
access and network capacity from owners and operators of
telecommunications networks and reselling wired and wireless
telecommunications services (except satellite) to businesses and
households.
[[Page 22116]]
Establishments in this industry resell telecommunications; they do not
operate transmission facilities and infrastructure. Mobile virtual
networks operators (MVNOs) are included in this industry. Under the
applicable SBA size standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500
or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2012 show that 1,341
firms provided resale services during that year. Of that number, 1,341
operated with fewer than 1,000 employees. Thus, under this category and
the associated small business size standard, the majority of these
prepaid calling card providers can be considered small entities.
According to Commission data, 193 carriers have reported that they are
engaged in the provision of prepaid calling cards. All 193 carriers
have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, the Commission estimates
that the majority of prepaid calling card providers are small entities
that may be affected by these rules.
4. Other Entities
94. All Other Telecommunications. The ``All Other
Telecommunications'' category is comprised of establishments primarily
engaged in providing specialized telecommunications services, such as
satellite tracking, communications telemetry, and radar station
operation. This industry also includes establishments primarily engaged
in providing satellite terminal stations and associated facilities
connected with one or more terrestrial systems and capable of
transmitting telecommunications to, and receiving telecommunications
from, satellite systems. Establishments providing internet services or
voice over internet protocol (VoIP) services via client-supplied
telecommunications connections are also included in this industry. The
SBA has developed a small business size standard for ``All Other
Telecommunications'', which consists of all such firms with annual
receipts of $35 million or less. For this category, U.S. Census Bureau
data for 2012 show that there were 1,442 firms that operated for the
entire year. Of those firms, a total of 1,400 had annual receipts less
than $25 million and 15 firms had annual receipts of $25 million to
$49,999,999. Thus, the Commission estimates that the majority of ``All
Other Telecommunications'' firms potentially affected by our action can
be considered small.
D. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities
95. The Further Notice seeks comment on a proposed requirement
that, in order to receive a voluntary exemption from our implementation
mandate, a provider must file a certification reflecting that it is in
a reasonably foreseeable position to meet certain implementation goals;
and that, in order to maintain that exemption, a provider must make a
later filing reflecting its achievement of those goals it stated it was
in a reasonably foreseeable position to meet. If the Commission were to
move forward with this proposal, providers would have new reporting,
recordkeeping, and other compliance requirements with regard to these
certifications. Specifically, we propose that each voice service
provider that wishes to qualify for the exemption must have an officer,
as an agent of the voice service provider, sign a compliance
certificate stating that the officer has personal knowledge that the
company meets each of the stated criteria. We also propose requiring
the voice service provider to submit an accompanying statement
explaining, in detail, how the company is working to accomplish the
four prongs of the exemption. We also propose requiring these
certifications to be filed no later than December 1, 2020. Finally, we
propose requiring all certifications and supporting statements to be
filed electronically in a new docket established specifically for such
filings in the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). We
seek comment on these proposed requirements.
E. Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered
96. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant
alternatives that it has considered in reaching its proposed approach,
which may include the following four alternatives (among others): (1)
The establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or
timetables that take into account the resources available to small
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of
compliance and reporting requirements under the rules for such small
entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design standards; and
(4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for
such small entities.
97. We seek comment on our proposal in the Further Notice to extend
the STIR/SHAKEN implementation deadline for small voice service
providers to June 30, 2022 and on other ways our proposed rules would
impact such voice service providers; and on proposals to lessen that
impact. We expect to take into account the economic impact on small
entities, as identified in comments filed in response to the Further
Notice and this IRFA, in reaching our final conclusions and
promulgating rules in this proceeding.
F. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Proposed Rules
98. None.
III. Ordering Clauses
99. It is ordered, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j), 227(e), 227b,
227b-1, 251(e), and 303(r), of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 154(i), 154(j),
227(e), 227b, 227(b)-1, 251(e), and 303(r), that that this Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is adopted.
100. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, SHALL SEND a
copy of this Report and Order, including the Final Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (FRFA), and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
including the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA), to the
Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.
List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 64
Carrier equipment, Communications common carriers, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Telecommunications, Telephone.
Federal Communications Commission.
Cecilia Sigmund,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Office of the Secretary.
Proposed Rules
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal
Communications Commission proposes to amend 47 CFR part 64 as follows:
PART 64--MISCELLANEOUS RULES RELATING TO COMMON CARRIERS
0
1. The authority citation for part 64 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 201, 202, 217, 218, 220, 222, 225,
226, 227, 227b, 228, 251(a), 251(e), 254(k), 262, 403(b)(2)(B), (c),
616, 620, 1401-1473, unless otherwise noted; Pub. L. 115-141, Div.
P, sec. 503, 132 Stat. 348, 1091.
0
2. Amend Sec. 64.6300 by redesignating paragraphs (b) through (g) as
paragraphs (c) through (h) and adding new paragraph (b) to read as
follows:
Sec. 64.6300 Definitions.
* * * * *
(b) Caller identification authentication information. The term
``caller identification authentication information'' refers to the
information
[[Page 22117]]
transmitted along with a call that represents the originating voice
service provider's attestation to the accuracy of the caller
identification information.
* * * * *
0
3. Amend Sec. 64.6301 by revising the introductory text of paragraph
(a) and adding paragraphs (b) through (f) to read as follows:
Sec. 64.6301 Caller ID authentication.
(a) STIR/SHAKEN implementation by voice service providers. Except
as provided in paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section, not later than
June 30, 2021, a voice service provider shall fully implement the STIR/
SHAKEN authentication framework in its internet Protocol networks. To
fulfill this obligation, a voice service provider shall:
* * * * *
(b) STIR/SHAKEN implementation by intermediate providers. Not later
than June 30, 2021, an intermediate provider shall fully implement the
STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework in its internet Protocol networks.
To fulfill this obligation, a voice service provider:
(1) Shall pass unaltered to subsequent providers in the call path
any caller identification authentication information it receives with a
SIP call; and
(2) Shall authenticate caller identification information for all
SIP calls it receives for which the caller identification information
has not been authenticated and which it will exchange with another
provider as a SIP call.
(c) Call authentication in non-IP networks. Except as provided in
paragraph (e) of this section, not later than June 30, 2021, a voice
service provider shall either:
(1) Upgrade its entire network to allow for the initiation,
maintenance, and termination of SIP calls and fully implement the STIR/
SHAKEN framework as required in paragraph (a) of this section
throughout its network; or
(2) Maintain and be ready to provide the Commission on request
documented proof that it is participating, either on its own or through
a representative, as a member of a working group or consortium that is
working to develop a non-IP call authentication solution, or actively
testing such a solution.
(d) Extension of implementation deadline. (1) Small providers are
exempt from the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section until
June 30, 2022.
(i) For purposes of this paragraph, ``small provider'' means a
provider that has 100,000 or fewer voice service subscriber lines
(counting the total of all business and residential fixed subscriber
lines and mobile phones and aggregated over all of the provider's
affiliates).
(ii) Reserved.
(2) The Wireline Competition Bureau may, upon a public finding of
undue hardship, provide an extension for compliance with paragraph (a)
of this section, for a reasonable period of time, for a voice service
provider or class of voice service providers, or type of voice calls,
as necessary for that voice service provider or class of voice service
providers or type of calls to address identified burdens and barriers
to implementation of caller ID authentication technology.
(3) The Wireline Competition Bureau shall annually review the scope
of any extension and, after notice and an opportunity for comment, may
extend it or terminate it and may expand or contract the scope of
entities subject to the extension.
(4) During the period of extension, any provider subject to such
extension shall implement an appropriate robocall mitigation program to
prevent unlawful robocalls from originating on the network of the
provider.
(e) Exemption. (1) A voice service provider may seek an exemption
from the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section by, before
December 1, 2020, certifying that for those portions of its network
served by technology that allows for the transmission of SIP calls, it:
(i) Has adopted the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework for calls
on the internet Protocol networks of the voice service provider, by
publicly committing to complete implementation of the STIR/SHAKEN
authentication framework by June 30, 2021;
(ii) Has agreed voluntarily to participate with other voice service
providers in the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework, by having
written, signed agreements with at least two other voice service
provides to exchange SIP calls with authenticated caller ID
information;
(iii) Has begun to implement the STIR/SHAKEN authentication
framework, by completing the necessary network upgrades to at least one
network element to enable the authentication and verification of caller
ID information for SIP calls; and
(iv) Will be capable of fully implementing the STIR/SHAKEN
authentication framework not later than June 30, 2021, because it
reasonably foresees that it will have completed all necessary network
upgrades to its network infrastructure to enable the authentication and
verification of caller ID information and authenticate and verify all
SIP calls exchanged with STIR/SHAKEN-enabled partners by June 30, 2021.
(2) A voice service provider may seek an exemption from the
requirements of paragraph (c) of this section by, before December 1,
2020, certifying that for those portions of its network that do not
allow for the transmission of SIP calls, it:
(i) Has taken reasonable measures to implement an effective call
authentication framework; and
(ii) Will be capable of fully implementing an effective call
authentication framework not later than June 30, 2021.
(3) All certifications shall be filed in ECFS in WC Docket No. 20-
68, shall be signed by an officer in conformity with section 1.16 of
the Commission's rules, and shall be accompanied by detailed support as
to the assertions in the certification.
(4) The Wireline Competition Bureau shall determine whether to
grant or deny timely requests for exemption on or before December 30,
2020.
(5) All voice service providers granted an exemption under
paragraph (e)(1) of this section shall file an additional certification
on or before a date specified by the Wireline Competition Bureau, and
consistent with the requirements of paragraph (e)(3) of this section,
attesting to whether the voice service provider fully implemented the
STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework not later than June 30, 2021. The
Wireline Competition Bureau, after notice and an opportunity for
comment on the certifications, will determine whether to revoke the
exemption for each certifying voice service provider based on whether
it completed implementation.
(f) Line-item charges. Providers of voice service are prohibited
from adding any additional line item charges to consumer customer
subscribers or small business customer subscribers for the effective
call authentication technology required by paragraphs (a) and (c) of
this section.
(1) For purposes of this paragraph, ``consumer customer
subscribers'' means residential mass-market subscribers.
(2) For purposes of this paragraph, ``small business customer
subscribers'' means subscribers that are business entities that meet
the size standards established in 13 CFR part 121, subpart
[[Page 22118]]
A, as they currently exist or may hereafter be amended.
[FR Doc. 2020-07629 Filed 4-20-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P