Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features
Other sub-techniques of Event Triggered Execution (15)
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.
Two common accessibility programs are C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as "sticky keys", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. [1]
Depending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways. Common methods used by adversaries include replacing accessibility feature binaries or pointers/references to these binaries in the Registry. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in %systemdir%\, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP). [2] The Image File Execution Options Injection debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced.
For simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe) may be replaced with "cmd.exe" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. [3]
Other accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: [2][4]
- On-Screen Keyboard:
C:\Windows\System32\osk.exe - Magnifier:
C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe - Narrator:
C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe - Display Switcher:
C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe - App Switcher:
C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe
Procedure Examples
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| APT29 |
APT29 used sticky-keys to obtain unauthenticated, privileged console access.[15][16] |
| APT3 |
APT3 replaces the Sticky Keys binary |
| APT41 | |
| Axiom |
Axiom actors have been known to use the Sticky Keys replacement within RDP sessions to obtain persistence.[18] |
| Deep Panda |
Deep Panda has used the sticky-keys technique to bypass the RDP login screen on remote systems during intrusions.[17] |
| Empire |
Empire can leverage WMI debugging to remotely replace binaries like sethc.exe, Utilman.exe, and Magnify.exe with cmd.exe.[13] |
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|
| Execution Prevention |
Adversaries can replace accessibility features binaries with alternate binaries to execute this technique. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through accessibility features functionality by using application control [7] tools, like Windows Defender Application Control[8], AppLocker, [9] [10] or Software Restriction Policies [11] where appropriate. [12] |
| Limit Access to Resource Over Network |
If possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network.[6] |
| Operating System Configuration |
To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It is enabled by default on Windows Vista and later.[5] |
Detection
Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options.
References
- Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016.
- Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
- Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
- Comi, G. (2019, October 19). Abusing Windows 10 Narrator's 'Feedback-Hub' URI for Fileless Persistence. Retrieved April 28, 2020.
- Microsoft. (n.d.). Configure Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services Connections. Retrieved June 6, 2016.
- Microsoft. (n.d.). Overview of Remote Desktop Gateway. Retrieved June 6, 2016.
- Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
- Gorzelany, A., Hall, J., Poggemeyer, L.. (2019, January 7). Windows Defender Application Control. Retrieved July 16, 2019.
- Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
- NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
- Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
- Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.
- Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
- valsmith. (2012, September 21). More on APTSim. Retrieved September 28, 2017.
- Dunwoody, M. and Carr, N.. (2016, September 27). No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016. Retrieved October 4, 2016.
- Dunwoody, M. (2017, March 27). APT29 Domain Fronting With TOR. Retrieved March 27, 2017.
- RSA Incident Response. (2014, January). RSA Incident Response Emerging Threat Profile: Shell Crew. Retrieved January 14, 2016.
- Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
- Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019.