MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the fifth anniversary of the Peace Agreement in Colombia

B9‑0232/2021

European Parliament resolution on the fifth anniversary of the Peace Agreement in Colombia

(2021/2643(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2016 in support of the peace process in Colombia[1],

– having regard to the Final Agreement of 24 November 2016 to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army),

– having regard to the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the Andean Community,

– having regard the 2016 and 2020 International Narcotics Control, Drug and Chemical Control Strategy Report of the Office of International Narcotics Affairs and Law Enforcement of the United States Department of State,

– having regard the Communication sent on 14 April 2021 by the Colombian Foreign Minister Claudia Blum to the UN Secretary-General and the President of the UN Security Council on the situation at the border due to the support that Venezuela gives to organised armed narco-terrorist groups,

– having regard to the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 28 April 2021 on the fifth anniversary of the Peace Agreement in Colombia,

– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas in November 2016, after many failed attempts, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group and Colombia’s government signed a second, revised peace deal, ending more than five decades of violent conflict, and Latin America’s longest-running armed conflict, which killed more than 220 000 people;

B. whereas the United Nations agreed to monitor the implementation of the peace deal and the disarmament of FARC guerrillas;

C. whereas the FARC have transformed into a political party, and participated in the March 2018 parliamentary elections, where it failed to win any seats, which shows lack of public support;

D. whereas the situation in Colombia has recently become more fragile again, not only because the peace process is suffering setbacks, but also because of the fallout of the Venezuelan refugee crisis, with more than 1.8 million Venezuelan refugees now living in Colombia where they were offered temporary protection status, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic;

E. whereas the FARC-EP have systematically breached the peace agreement:

F. whereas the FARC dissidents, led by former guerrilla negotiators, who have recently expressed their willingness to militarily support the Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro, have more than 2 500 men in arms and structures in 20 of the 32 departments of the country, control drug trafficking and 93.5 % of coca crops, and are responsible for at least 14 % of the murders of social movement leaders in Colombia;

G. whereas in a video recently published by RCN media, the 28th front of the so-called FARC-EP dissidents, which operates in the departments of Arauca, Casanare and Boyacá, have recorded a declaration of unconditional support for the Venezuelan dictator Maduro, flaunting its terrorist appearance, and reiterating the group’s ‘anti-imperialist’ commitment;

H. whereas the Colombian government, through Foreign Minister Claudia Blum, issued a statement addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations denouncing the serious situation on the border due to the support that the illegitimate Venezuelan regime gives to organised armed narco-terrorist groups;

I. whereas the Venezuelan regime led by Chávez donated USD 300 million to the FARC in 2007, as revealed by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) after analysing the files recovered from the computer of former FARC chief Raúl Reyes;

J. whereas the FARC have obtained war equipment thanks to supplies from Russia and China, seeking to create hybrid border armies with the support of Russian military forces and mercenaries sent by the Russians in order to train, and provide support and technology;

K. whereas the 10th and 28th fronts of the FARC control the drug trafficking routes on the border with Venezuela; whereas the Cartel de los Soles is a corrupt structure involved in drug trafficking and part of the government plans of the Maduro regime, with a substantial proportion of army generals involved;

L. whereas the FARC have been developing relations with governments, regimes and strategic forces in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru for decades;

M. whereas in its International Narcotics Control, Drug and Chemical Control Strategy Report of March 2020, the Office of International Narcotics Affairs and Law Enforcement of the US Department of State states that illicit drugs that transited Venezuela in 2019 went largely to the Caribbean, Central America, the United States, West Africa and Europe, and that Colombian drug trafficking organisations, including dissident factions of the FARC, ELN and other criminal groups, facilitate the shipment of illicit drugs through Venezuela;

N. whereas the United States Department of the Treasury has imposed sanctions on at least 22 people, which include past and present officials of the Maduro regime, among others, General Hugo Carvajal, General Henry Rangel Silva and Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, Major General Cliver Alcalá Cordones, former Vice-President Tareck El Aissami and figurehead/front man Samarak López, Pedro Luís Martín and two of his associates; whereas the Maduro regime has not taken action against these or other government and military officials with known ties to the FARC;

O. whereas Ecuador and Bolivia continue to be important transit countries for drug shipments in which transnational criminal organisations are involved such as the Mexican cartels Los Zetas, and the Sinaloa and Golfo cartels; whereas the FARC use more and more private planes and clandestine runways to transport money to Ecuador and cocaine to Mexico and Central America;

P. whereas in many drug trafficking operations, planes were identified as landing without authorisation at the Mariscal Sucre Airport in Quito; whereas these planes used the presidential hangar, which is evidence of the continued penetration of drug trafficking in the institutions and the government of Rafael Correa; whereas these planes also use Chimoré airport in Chapare, Cochabamba department, Bolivia;

Q. whereas according to the United States Department of State in 2018 a dissident FARC drug trafficking organisation, the Frente Oliver Sinisterra, carried out attacks along Ecuador’s northern border with Colombia; whereas the FARC transit and operation in Ecuador were a constant during the mandate of Rafael Correa;

R. whereas this entire network formed by drug traffickers, the FARC and several political regimes, represents a multilateral threat that constitutes a new challenge for the hemisphere and a threat to peace;

S. whereas the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) has been involved in unacceptable irregularities for any transitional justice institution, and has been called into question for its politicisation, including the presence of magistrates accused of defending the FARC in the past, of manipulating evidence, and of relations to political parties such as ‘Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (FARC)’, ideologically aligned with and founded by ex-FARC guerrillas who should be tried by the JEP;

T. whereas the JEP was created three years ago, but to date no FARC member has been convicted for their actions, and whereas the FARC enjoy amnesties, state agents who have not been convicted are obliged to remain in preventive detention;

U. whereas the seven macro-cases opened by the JEP do not satisfy the rights of the victims, exclude serious events such as the FARC besieging and blowing up villages, sexual crimes and forced abortions, forced displacements, and the search for sources of financing of the FARC; whereas drug trafficking is considered by the JEP as a crime similar to political crimes, which has allowed drug traffickers not related to the FARC to buy their impunity;

V. whereas FARC victims number in the millions, while the JEP has only been credited with around 300 000 of them; whereas the victims are forced to re-victimise themselves to be accredited in the JEP, even when they are already recognised as victims by other authorities and jurisdictions in Colombia;

W. whereas the JEP negligently granted freedom to Jesús Santrich, a former guerrilla fighter commander of the FARC and member of the negotiating team for the Peace Accords, accused of drug trafficking after the signature of the Peace Agreement, despite the fact that the DEA and the Colombian Prosecutor’s Office contributed twelve audio recordings that proved criminal acts committed after December 1, 2016.; whereas this decision prevented his extradition to the United States and contributed to his escape; whereas since then, according to intelligence sources, Santrich leads FARC dissidents from Venezuelan territory;

X. whereas the EU Trust Fund for Colombia has mobilised EUR 128 million from the EU budget, 21 Member States, Chile and the UK; whereas its fifth strategic committee defined its future strategic lines on 22 January 2021;

1. Highlights the commitment of the Government of Colombia to the implementation of the Final Agreement, especially in the context of the new challenges imposed by the increasing migratory flows from Venezuela, and the health, social and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic;

2. Commends Colombia on its progress in implementing the Agreement, especially in rural development, highlighting the importance of the Territorially Focused Development Plans (PDET) in 170 municipalities most affected by neglect, poverty and violence, and highlighting the participation of the private sector in the Works for Taxes program;

3. Questions nevertheless the viability of the Peace Agreement when one of the parties involved is not willing to fulfil any of the agreed commitments, and therefore urges the parties to commit to the full and complete implementation of the Peace Agreement;

4. Considers the remedying of the JEP’s shortcomings and reparations for victims of the armed conflict as key priorities;

5. Asks the Commission to pursue coordinated cooperation with other donors, and to continue to give priority to rural areas, which have been disproportionately affected by the conflict, in the operation of the EU Trust Fund for Colombia;

6. Reiterates its full support to the Colombian authorities in their defence of law and order throughout Colombian territory;

7. Declares its solidarity with Colombia in the face of the continuing violations of its borders by narco-terrorist forces operating from Venezuela, and reiterates its solidarity with the Government of President Duque in the face of the Venezuelan regime’s threats;

8. Fully supports measures to fight drug trafficking, which is the main source of financing for all terrorist and criminal networks, and supports resuming fumigation flights to end the illicit cultivation, production, processing and trafficking of drugs;

9  Applauds president Duque’s measures for the integration in Colombia of the nearly two million Venezuelan immigrants who flee from repression, hunger and the situation of violence and terror under the Maduro regime;

10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Government of Colombia.