OS Credential Dumping: NTDS
Other sub-techniques of OS Credential Dumping (8)
Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in %SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit of a domain controller.[1]
In addition to looking NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, attackers may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.[2]
The following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.
- Volume Shadow Copy
- secretsdump.py
- Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe
- Invoke-NinjaCopy
Procedure Examples
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| Dragonfly 2.0 |
Dragonfly 2.0 dropped and executed SecretsDump to dump password hashes. They also obtained ntds.dit from domain controllers. [7][8][9] |
| esentutl |
esentutl can use Volume Shadow Copy to copy locked files such as ntds.dit.[3][4] |
| FIN6 |
FIN6 has used Metasploit’s PsExec NTDSGRAB module to obtain a copy of the victim's Active Directory database.[10][11] |
| Impacket |
SecretsDump and Mimikatz modules within Impacket can perform credential dumping to obtain account and password information from NTDS.dit.[5] |
| Koadic |
Koadic can gather hashed passwords by gathering domain controller hashes from NTDS.[6] |
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|
| Encrypt Sensitive Information |
Ensure Domain Controller backups are properly secured.[2] |
| Password Policies |
Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. |
| Privileged Account Management |
Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. |
| User Training |
Limit credential overlap across accounts and systems by training users and administrators not to use the same password for multiple accounts. |
Detection
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping, especially attempts to access or copy the NTDS.dit.
References
- Wikipedia. (2018, March 10). Active Directory. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
- Metcalf, S. (2015, January 19). Attackers Can Now Use Mimikatz to Implant Skeleton Key on Domain Controllers & BackDoor Your Active Directory Forest. Retrieved February 3, 2015.
- LOLBAS. (n.d.). Esentutl.exe. Retrieved September 3, 2019.
- Cary, M.. (2018, December 6). Locked File Access Using ESENTUTL.exe. Retrieved September 5, 2019.
- SecureAuth. (n.d.). Retrieved January 15, 2019.
- Magius, J., et al. (2017, July 19). Koadic. Retrieved June 18, 2018.
- US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.
- US-CERT. (2017, October 20). Alert (TA17-293A): Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved November 2, 2017.
- Core Security. (n.d.). Impacket. Retrieved November 2, 2017.
- FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2016, April). Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6. Retrieved June 1, 2016.
- McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.