Web Service: Bidirectional Communication
Other sub-techniques of Web Service (3)
| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1102.001 | Dead Drop Resolver |
| T1102.002 | Bidirectional Communication |
| T1102.003 | One-Way Communication |
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.
Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Procedure Examples
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| APT12 |
APT12 has used blogs and WordPress for C2 infrastructure.[33] |
| APT37 |
APT37 leverages social networking sites and cloud platforms (AOL, Twitter, Yandex, Mediafire, pCloud, Dropbox, and Box) for C2.[7][31] |
| APT39 |
APT39 has communicated with C2 through files uploaded to DropBox.[34] |
| BADNEWS |
BADNEWS can use multiple C2 channels, including RSS feeds, Github, forums, and blogs.[21][22][23] |
| BLACKCOFFEE |
BLACKCOFFEE has also obfuscated its C2 traffic as normal traffic to sites such as Github.[24][25] |
| CALENDAR |
The CALENDAR malware communicates through the use of events in Google Calendar.[5][15] |
| Carbanak |
Carbanak has used a VBScript named "ggldr" that uses Google Apps Script, Sheets, and Forms services for C2.[29] |
| CloudDuke |
One variant of CloudDuke uses a Microsoft OneDrive account to exchange commands and stolen data with its operators.[17] |
| Comnie |
Comnie uses blogs and third-party sites (GitHub, tumbler, and BlogSpot) to avoid DNS-based blocking of their communication to the command and control server.[2] |
| ComRAT |
ComRAT has the ability to use the Gmail web UI to receive commands and exfiltrate information.[26] |
| CozyCar |
CozyCar uses Twitter as a backup C2 channel to Twitter accounts specified in its configuration file.[4] |
| DOGCALL |
DOGCALL is capable of leveraging cloud storage APIs such as Cloud, Box, Dropbox, and Yandex for C2.[7][10] |
| Empire | |
| FIN7 |
FIN7 used legitimate services like Google Docs, Google Scripts, and Pastebin for C2.[30] |
| GLOOXMAIL |
GLOOXMAIL communicates to servers operated by Google using the Jabber/XMPP protocol.[5][6] |
| KARAE |
KARAE can use public cloud-based storage providers for command and control.[7] |
| Kazuar |
Kazuar has used compromised WordPress blogs as C2 servers.[3] |
| LOWBALL |
LOWBALL uses the Dropbox cloud storage service for command and control.[11] |
| Magic Hound |
Magic Hound malware can use a SOAP Web service to communicate with its C2 server.[32] |
| Orz |
Orz has used Technet and Pastebin web pages for command and control.[16] |
| POORAIM | |
| PowerStallion |
PowerStallion uses Microsoft OneDrive as a C2 server via a network drive mapped with |
| Revenge RAT |
Revenge RAT used blogpost.com as its primary command and control server during a campaign.[19] |
| RogueRobin |
RogueRobin has used Google Drive as a Command and Control channel. [18] |
| ROKRAT |
ROKRAT leverages legitimate social networking sites and cloud platforms (Twitter, Yandex, and Mediafire) for C2 communications.[8][9] |
| Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team has used the Telegram Bot API from Telegram Messenger to send and receive commands to its Python backdoor. Sandworm Team also used legitimate M.E.Doc software update check requests for sending and receiving commands and hosted malicious payloads on putdrive.com.[35][36] |
| SLOWDRIFT | |
| Turla |
A Turla JavaScript backdoor has used Google Apps Script as its C2 server.[27][28] |
| Twitoor | |
| UBoatRAT |
UBoatRAT has used GitHub and a public blog service in Hong Kong for C2 communications.[13] |
| yty |
yty communicates to the C2 server by retrieving a Google Doc.[14] |
Mitigations
| Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|
| Network Intrusion Prevention |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
| Restrict Web-Based Content |
Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy that prevents use of unauthorized external services. |
Detection
Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.[37]
References
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- Levene, B, et al. (2017, May 03). Kazuar: Multiplatform Espionage Backdoor with API Access. Retrieved July 17, 2018.
- F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
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- F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
- Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2019, January 18). DarkHydrus delivers new Trojan that can use Google Drive for C2 communications. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
- Gannon, M. (2019, February 11). With Upgrades in Delivery and Support Infrastructure, Revenge RAT Malware is a Bigger Threat. Retrieved May 1, 2019.
- Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.
- Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016.
- Levene, B. et al.. (2018, March 7). Patchwork Continues to Deliver BADNEWS to the Indian Subcontinent. Retrieved March 31, 2018.
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- FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
- Faou, M. (2020, May). From Agent.btz to ComRAT v4: A ten-year journey. Retrieved June 15, 2020.
- ESET, et al. (2018, January). Diplomats in Eastern Europe bitten by a Turla mosquito. Retrieved July 3, 2018.
- ESET Research. (2018, May 22). Turla Mosquito: A shift towards more generic tools. Retrieved July 3, 2018.
- Griffin, N. (2017, January 17). CARBANAK GROUP USES GOOGLE FOR MALWARE COMMAND-AND-CONTROL. Retrieved February 15, 2017.
- Carr, N., et al. (2018, August 01). On the Hunt for FIN7: Pursuing an Enigmatic and Evasive Global Criminal Operation. Retrieved August 23, 2018.
- Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018.
- Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017.
- Meyers, A. (2013, March 29). Whois Numbered Panda. Retrieved January 14, 2016.
- Rusu, B. (2020, May 21). Iranian Chafer APT Targeted Air Transportation and Government in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Retrieved May 22, 2020.
- Cherepanov, A.. (2016, December 13). The rise of TeleBots: Analyzing disruptive KillDisk attacks. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
- Cherepanov, A.. (2017, June 30). TeleBots are back: Supply chain attacks against Ukraine. Retrieved June 11, 2020.
- Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.