[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 250 (Tuesday, December 31, 2019)]
[Notices]
[Pages 72424-72430]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2019-28231]
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[Public Notice: 10976]
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act Annual Report
SUMMARY: This notice contains the text of the report required by the
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, as submitted by the
Secretary of State pursuant to Executive Order 13818.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bob Viglietta, Email:
[email protected], Phone: (202) 647-6526
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December 10, 2019, the Secretary of State
approved the following report pursuant to Executive Order 13818 of
December 20, 2017, ``Executive Order Blocking the Property of Persons
Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption'' (E.O. 13818),
which builds on and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act (Pub. L. 114-328, Title XII, Subtitle F) (``the
Act''). The text of the report follows:
Pursuant to Section 1264 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act of 2016 (Pub. L. 114-328, Title XII, Subtitle F),
and in accordance with E.O. 13818, ``Executive Order Blocking the
Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights
[[Page 72425]]
Abuse or Corruption'' the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury, submits this report to detail the
Administration's implementation of the Act in 2019.
In 2019, the United States took significant action under the Global
Magnitsky sanctions program (``Global Magnitsky''). As of December 10,
2019, the United States has designated 198 foreign persons (individuals
and entities) under E.O. 13818. This sanctions program, which targets
human rights abusers, corrupt actors, and their enablers, represents
the best of the United States' values by taking impactful steps to
protect and promote human rights and combat corruption around the
world. Through the Act and E.O. 13818, the United States has sought to
disrupt and deter serious human rights abuse and corruption abroad;
promote accountability for those who act with impunity; and protect,
promote, and enforce longstanding international norms alongside our
partners and allies.
As the President outlined in his National Security Strategy (NSS),
liberty, free enterprise, equal justice under the law and the dignity
of every human life are values that represent who we are as a people.
Further, the NSS states we support with our words and actions those who
live under oppressive regimes and seek freedom, individual dignity, and
the rule of law. Through Global Magnitsky, the Administration is taking
action to execute the President's vision as described in the NSS.
Actions taken in 2019 demonstrated the reach, flexibility, and
broad scope of Global Magnitsky. The United States responded to corrupt
actors in South Sudan involved in draining the country of critical
resources; targeted members of a significant corruption network
responsible for bribery and misappropriation of assets in South Africa;
imposed consequences on a former Ugandan Police Inspector General for
corruption and leading an organization engaged in human rights abuses;
promoted accountability for serious human rights abuse and corruption
among Iraqi militia and former governors; addressed actions of a former
Mexican governor accepting bribes from narcotics trafficking
organizations; and clearly demonstrated the resolve of the
Administration to leverage this important tool, when appropriate, to
target individuals and entities engaging in specified conduct.
When considering financial sanctions under Global Magnitsky, the
United States prioritizes actions that are expected to produce a
tangible and significant impact on the sanctioned persons and their
affiliates, to prompt changes in behavior or disrupt the activities of
malign actors. Persons sanctioned pursuant to this authority appear on
the Office of Foreign Assets Control's (OFAC) List of Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List). As a result of
these actions, any property or interests in property of the sanctioned
persons within or transiting U.S. jurisdiction is blocked.
Additionally, U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in
transactions with blocked persons, including entities 50 percent or
more owned by designated persons. The Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General,
imposed financial sanctions on the following persons pursuant to Global
Magnitsky:
1. Roberto Sandoval Castaneda: Sandoval Castaneda was designated on
May 17, 2019, for engaging in an array of corruption activities, such
as the misappropriation of state assets and the receipt of bribes from
Mexican drug trafficking organizations, including the Cartel de Jalisco
Nueva Generacion (CJNG). Sandoval Castaneda has held numerous public
offices in his home state of Nayarit, Mexico. During this time,
Sandoval Castaneda misappropriated state assets and received bribes
from narcotics trafficking organizations, including CJNG, in exchange
for information and protection. In a related action, OFAC designated
three of Sandoval Castaneda's complicit family members who have acted
or purported to act on his behalf by holding his ill-gotten assets in
their names: Ana Lilia Lopez Torres (wife), Lidy Alejandra Sandoval
Lopez (adult daughter), and Pablo Roberto Sandoval Lopez (adult son).
Four Mexican entities were also designated for being owned or
controlled by Sandoval or a designated family member: Bodecarne, S.A.
de C.V. (butcher business), Iyari (clothing and accessories store), L-
Inmo, S.A. de C.V. (real estate holding company), and Valor y Principio
de Dar, A. C. (land-holding foundation).
2. Rayan al-Kildani: Al-Kildani was designated on July 18, 2019,
for being responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or
indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse as the leader of the
50th Brigade, a militia operating in Iraq's Ninewa Plain. In May 2018,
a video circulated among Iraqi human rights civil society organizations
in which al-Kildani cut off the ear of a handcuffed detainee. The 50th
Brigade is reportedly the primary impediment to the return of
internally displaced persons to the Ninewa Plain. The 50th Brigade has
systematically looted homes in Batnaya, which is struggling to recover
from ISIS's brutal rule. The 50th Brigade has reportedly illegally
seized and sold agricultural land, and the local population has accused
the group of intimidation, extortion, and harassment of women.
3. Waad Qado: Qado, the leader of the 30th Brigade, a militia
operating in Iraq's Ninewa Plain, was designated on July 18, 2019, for
being a leader or official of an entity that has engaged in, or whose
members have engaged in, serious human rights abuse relating to his
tenure. The 30th Brigade has extracted money from the population around
Bartalla through extortion, illegal arrests, and kidnappings. The 30th
Brigade has frequently detained people without warrants, or with
fraudulent warrants, and has charged arbitrary customs fees at its
checkpoints. Members of the local population allege that the 30th
Brigade has been responsible for egregious offenses including physical
intimidation, extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and rape.
4. Nawfal Hammadi al-Sultan: Al-Sultan, a former governor of Ninewa
Province, Iraq, was designated on July 18, 2019, for being a current or
former government official, or a person acting for or on behalf of such
an official, who is responsible for or complicit in, or who has
directly or indirectly engaged in, corruption. Following a ferry
accident in Ninewa's capital, Mosul, that killed nearly 100 people,
Iraq's parliament removed al-Sultan from office. Iraqi authorities have
issued an arrest warrant for the former governor, who fled shortly
after the accident. In a letter to Members of Parliament after the
ferry accident, Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi accused al-Sultan of
negligence and dereliction of duty and said there was evidence the
former governor was misusing funds and abusing his power.
5. Ahmed al-Jubouri: Al-Jubouri is a former governor of Salah al-
Din, Iraq, and current Member of Parliament who was designated on July
18, 2019 for being a current or former government official, or a person
acting for or on behalf of such an official, who is responsible for or
complicit in, or who has directly or indirectly engaged in, corruption.
Al-Jubouri was removed as governor and sentenced to prison in July 2017
upon conviction for misusing authority and federal funds and
appropriating land for personal use. Al-Jubouri has since been
released. Al-Jubouri has been known to protect his personal interests
by accommodating
[[Page 72426]]
Iran-backed proxies that operate outside of state control.
6. Kale Kayihura: Kayihura, the former Inspector General of Police
(IGP) of the Ugandan Police Force (UPF), was designated on September
13, 2019, for having been a leader or official of an entity that has
engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, serious human rights
abuse against Ugandan citizens, as well as for his involvement in
corruption. As the IGP for the UPF, Kayihura led individuals from the
UPF's Flying Squad Unit, which has engaged in the inhumane treatment of
detainees. Detainees also reported that after being subjected to the
abuse they were offered significant sums of money if they confessed to
their involvement in a crime. In addition, Kayihura has engaged in
numerous acts of corruption, including using bribery to strengthen his
political position within the Government of Uganda, stealing funds
intended for official Ugandan government business, and using another
government employee to smuggle illicit goods, including drugs, gold,
and wildlife, out of Uganda.
7. Ajay, Atul, and Rajesh Gupta; Salim Essa: The Guptas and Essa
were designated on October 10, 2019, for their involvement in
corruption in South Africa. The members of this network leveraged
overpayments on government contracts, bribery, and other corrupt acts
to fund political contributions and influence government actions. Ajay
was designated for being the leader of an entity that has engaged in,
or whose members have engaged in, corruption. Ajay is the family
patriarch who formulated the family's corrupt business strategies and
controlled its finances.
Atul has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, technological support for, or goods or services to or in
support of, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have
engaged in, corruption. Atul is widely known to have overseen the Gupta
family's outreach to corrupt government officials.
Rajesh has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, technological support for, or goods or services to or in
support of, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have
engaged in, corruption. Rajesh cultivated important relationships with
the sons of powerful South African politicians and led efforts to
pursue business and relationships in a South African province where
corruption was rampant. Rajesh attempted to use at least one of those
relationships to seek undue influence with additional members of a
South African political party.
Essa, a business associate of the Gupta family, has materially
assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, technological
support for, or goods or services to or in support of, an entity that
has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, corruption.
8. Ashraf Seed Ahmed Al-Cardinal: Al-Cardinal was designated on
October 11, 2019, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or
provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or
services to or in support of, corruption, largely operating within
South Sudan. Five companies owned or controlled by Al-Cardinal were
also designated: Alcardinal General Trading Limited, Alcardinal General
Trading LLC, Al Cardinal Investments Co. LTD, Alcardinal Petroleum
Company limited, and NILETEL.
Sudanese businessman Al-Cardinal has been used by a senior South
Sudanese government official as an intermediary to deposit and hold a
large amount of funds in a country outside of South Sudan. Further, in
early 2019, the South Sudanese government made millions of dollars in
payments to a company owned by Al-Cardinal; while the official reason
was for the payment for food, the money instead went to senior South
Sudanese government officials. Other South Sudanese government
officials have expressed dissatisfaction with the massive corruption in
the South Sudanese government, noting that although large amounts of
money were paid to Al-Cardinal for supplies and provisions, government
forces never seemed to be adequately supplied. Separately, a company
partially owned by Al-Cardinal has been publicly implicated in the
importation of amphibious armored vehicles into South Sudan that gave
the Government of South Sudan the ability to extend offensives that
included violent attacks on innocent civilians.
9. Kur Ajing Ater: Ajing was designated on October 11, 2019, for
having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material,
technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, an
entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in,
corruption, largely operating within South Sudan. One company owned or
controlled by Ajing was also designated: Lou Trading and Investment
Company Limited. Ajing is a South Sudanese businessman who has bribed
key officials in the Government of South Sudan in order to maintain
influence and access to the South Sudanese oil market. Ajing used these
bribes to both curry favor with a senior gatekeeper within the
Government of South Sudan and to ensure the silence and compliance of a
key government officials. According to public media reports, Ajing
received millions of dollars in contracts for the South Sudanese
military, including one contract that alone exceeds the total amount
budgeted for the military's goods and services for the year by a factor
of ten.
10. Qais al-Khazali: Al-Khazali was designated on December 6, 2019,
for being a foreign person who is a leader or official of an entity,
including any government entity, that has engaged in, or whose members
have engaged in serious human rights abuse relating to his tenure. Al-
Khazali is Secretary General of the Iran-backed Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)
militia in Iraq. During the late 2019 protests in many cities in Iraq,
AAH has opened fire on and killed protestors. Additionally, Qais and
Laith al-Khazali had leading roles in a January 2007 attack on an Iraqi
government compound in Karbala. The attack killed five U.S. soldiers
and wounded three.
11. Laith al-Khazali: Al-Khazali was designated on December 6,
2019, for being a foreign person who is responsible for, complicit in,
or has directly or indirectly engaged in serious human rights abuse.
Al-Khazali is a leader of AAH. In late 2015, al-Khazali controlled
efforts to remove Sunnis from areas of Diyala Province, including
killings to drive Sunnis from the area. Additionally, Qais and Laith
al-Khazali had leading roles in a January 2007 attack on an Iraqi
government compound in Karbala. The attack killed five U.S. soldiers
and wounded three.
12. Husayn Falih `Aziz al-Lami: Al-Lami was designated on December
6, 2019, for being a foreign person who is responsible for, complicit
in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in serious human rights
abuse. Al-Lami is an Iran-backed militia leader, tasked by other senior
militia commanders with suppressing the late 2019 protests in Iraq. Al-
Lami directed militia fighters who shot protesters in early October
2019, a time when dozens of protesters were killed.
13. Khamis Farhan Al-Khanjar Al-Issawi: Al-Khanjar was designated
on December 6, 2019, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or
provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or
services to or in support of corruption, including the misappropriation
of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gain,
corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural
resources, or bribery. Al-Khanjar is an Iraqi businessman and
[[Page 72427]]
millionaire who enjoys significant power on a regional and
international level. According to a former senior Iraqi government
official, al-Khanjar's influence has been mostly due to his willingness
and ability to use his wealth to bribe others. Al-Khanjar has
reportedly planned to spend millions of dollars in payments to Iraqi
political figures in order to secure their support.
14. Aivars Lembergs: Lembergs was designated on December 9, 2019,
for being a foreign person who is a current or foreign government
official responsible for or complicit in, or directly or indirectly
engaged in, corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets,
the expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption
related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources,
or bribery. Lembergs has served as the Mayor of Ventspils, Latvia since
1988. From that time, he has been repeatedly accused of money
laundering, bribery, and abuse of office. Lembergs controls entities
through political parties and corrupt politicians, and systematically
exploits those entities and individuals for his own economic gain.
Lembergs has used his influence over leadership of political parties to
shape government personnel and place certain government officials in
positions, as well as to obstruct other government officials from
obtaining leadership positions. Additionally, Lembergs has leveraged
and corrupted law enforcement officials to protect his interests and
subvert politicians whom he otherwise was unable to control.
Additionally, four Latvia-based entities were designated on
December 9, 2019, for being owned or controlled by Lembergs: Ventspils
Freeport Authority, Ventspils Attistibas Agentura (also known as
Ventspils Development Agency), Biznesa Attistibas Asociacija (also
known as Business Development Association), and Latvijas Tranzita
Biznesa Asociacija (also known as Latvian Transit Business
Association).
15. Try Pheap: Pheap was designated on December 9, 2019, for being
a foreign person who is a current or former government official who is
responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged
in corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets, the
expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption related
to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, or
bribery. Pheap used his vast network inside Cambodia to build a
largescale illegal logging consortium that relies on the collusion of
Cambodian officials, to include purchasing protection from the
government, including military protection, for the movement of his
illegal products. The support of these officials makes it difficult for
local authorities to take legal action against Pheap.
Additionally, 11 Cambodia-registered entities were designated on
December 9, 2019, for being owned or controlled by Pheap: Try Pheap
Group CO., Ltd.; M.D.S. Import Export Co., Ltd.; Try Pheap Dry Port
Co., Ltd.; Try Pheap Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd.; Try Pheap
Grand Royal Co., Ltd.; Try Pheap Import Export Co., Ltd.; Papa
Petroleum Co., Ltd.; Try Pheap Property Co. Ltd.; Try Pheap Travel &
Tours Co., Ltd.; M D S Thmorda S E Z Co., Ltd.; and Try Pheap Oyadav S
E Z Co., Ltd.
16. Kun Kim: Kim was designated on December 9, 2019, for being a
foreign person who is a current or former government official who is
responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged
in corruption, including the misappropriation of state assets, the
expropriation of private assets for personal gain, corruption related
to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, or
bribery. Kim was a senior General in the Royal Cambodian Air Force
(RCAF) and was instrumental in a development in Koh Kong province and
had reaped significant financial benefit from his relationships with a
People's Republic of China (PRC) state-owned entity. Kim used RCAF
soldiers to intimidate, demolish, and clear-out land sought by the PRC-
owned entity. Cambodian elites, like Kim, use their familial networks
to create shadow structures to shield ill-gotten assets. In addition to
Kim, three members of Kim's family were designated for acting or
purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Kim.
17. King Chandy: Chandy was designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Kun Kim. Additionally, one entity, K D Rubber Plantation
Co., Ltd., is registered in Cambodia and is designated for being owned
or controlled by Chandy.
18. Kim Sophary: Sophary was designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Kun Kim.
Additionally, two entities, Cambo Elite Security Force Co., Ltd.
and 7 Makara Phary Co., Ltd., are registered in Cambodia, and are
designated for being owned or controlled by Sophary.
19. Kim Phara: Phara was designated on December 9, 2019, for acting
or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Kun
Kim.
Additionally, two entities, Romdoul Capital Pawn Co., Ltd. and
Romdoul Development Co., Ltd., are registered in Cambodia and are
designated for being owned or controlled by Phara.
20. Goran Andric: Andric was designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Slobodan Tesic. Andric is one of Tesic's closest associates
and has represented Tesic in various international sales, including
conducting contract negotiations on Tesic's behalf while Tesic was on
the United Nations travel ban list and unable to travel. In working for
Tesic, Andric was involved in facilitating arms deals, including an
occasion when Andric signed a contract on behalf of the designated
entity, Partizan Tech.
In a related action, one entity, Serbia-based Velcom Trade D.O.O.
Beograd was designated on December 9, 2019, for being owned or
controlled by Andric.
21. Esad Kapidzic: Kapidzic was designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Tesic. Kapidzic is a director and secretary of Cyprus-based
Finrost Limited, as well as a director and representative of Serbia-
based Falcon Strategic Solutions D.O.O., two entities concurrently
designated for being owned or controlled by, or for acting or
purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tesic.
Finrost Limited received and moved money on behalf of Tesic, and was
used by Tesic for a weapons contract with a foreign government in
Africa.
Additionally, Falcon Strategic Solutions D.O.O. was established by
Tesic immediately following his December 21, 2017 designation to avoid
sanctions.
22. Nebojsa Sarenac: Sarenac was designated on December 9, 2019,
for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Tesic. Sarenac is a managing director of designated
entities, Technoglobal and Partizan Tech. Additionally, Sarenac is
Tesic's nephew and one of his closest associates.
Additionally, one entity, Melvale Corporation D.O.O. Beograd, which
is based in Serbia, was designated on December 9, 2019, for being owned
or controlled by Sarenac who is the owner and representative.
23. Zoran Petrovic: Petrovic was designated on December 9, 2019,
for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Tesic. Petrovic is a managing director and principal of
Partizan Tech, an entity designated in December 2017. Petrovic
[[Page 72428]]
has negotiated with foreign entities on Tesic's behalf.
24. Nikola Brkic: Brkic was designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Tesic. Brkic is a principal and legal representative of
Partizan Tech.
25. Milan Subotic: Subotic was designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Tesic. Subotic is the owner, managing director, and
representative of Serbia-based Vectura Trans DOO, an entity
concurrently designated for being owned or controlled by, or for acting
or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly,
Tesic. Tesic utilized Vectura Trans to receive an approved license for
exports, to complete arms deals, and to finalize weapons contracts with
a foreign government. Subotic was also listed as the point of contact
for export permits related to designated entity Partizan Tech.
26. Zelimir Petrovic: Petrovic was designated on December 9, 2019,
for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Tesic. Petrovic is the owner, managing director, and
representative of Serbia-based Araneks DOO, an entity concurrently
designated for being owned or controlled by, or for acting or
purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tesic.
Araneks was used by Tesic to finalize weapons contracts with a foreign
government in Africa, and in dealings with another foreign government.
27. Sreten Cvjetkovic: Cvjetkovic was designated on December 9,
2019, for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Tesic. Cvjetkovic is a 50 percent owner and legal
representative of Falcon Strategic Solutions D.O.O.
28. Ljobo Maricic: Maricic was designated on December 9, 2019, for
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Tesic. Maricic is the director of Technoglobal and a former
representative of Partizan Arms, the predecessor to Tesic's Partizan
Tech.
29. Moonstorm Enterprises LTD: Cyprus-based Moonstorm Enterprises
LTD was designated on December 9, 2019, for being owned or controlled
by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Slobodan Tesic, a person designated pursuant E.O. 13818.
30. Tardigrade Limited: Tardigrade was designated on December 9,
2019, for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act
for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Slobodan Tesic, a person
designated pursuant E.O. 13818. Tesic used Cyprus-based Tardigrade to
conduct business in third party countries, particularly Arab and
African countries. Tesic has also used his Serbian companies to sign
contracts with Tardigrade before selling the goods to a final buyer.
31. Business Diversity Limited: Business Diversity Limited was
designated on December 9, 2019, for being owned or controlled by, or
acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, Slobodan Tesic, a person designated pursuant E.O. 13818.
Tesic established Hong Kong-based Business Diversity Limited in order
to conduct business with a European country. Tesic has used Business
Diversity Limited in Euro denominated contracts to evade U.S.
sanctions.
32. Min Aung Hlaing: Min Aung Hlaing was designated on December 10,
2019, for his role as the Commander-in-Chief of the Burmese security
forces, an entity that has engaged in or whose members have engaged in
serious human rights abuse under his command. Min Aung Hlaing's
military forces were responsible for the brutal security operation that
began in August 2017 in Rahkine State and ultimately caused more than
500,000 people to flee to Bangladesh. During this time, members of
ethnic minority groups were killed or injured by gunshot, often while
fleeing, or by soldiers using large-bladed weapons; others were burned
to death in their own houses. There are credible claims of mass-scale
rape and other forms of sexual violence committed by soldiers under Min
Aung Hlaing's command.
33. Soe Win: Soe Win was designated on December 10, 2019, for his
role as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Burmese military forces,
an entity that has engaged in or whose members have engaged in serious
human rights abuse during his tenure. Soe Win has been heavily involved
in directing major operations that occurred in 2017, including the
decision to deploy combat divisions to Rakhine State and other regions
where serious human rights abuses occurred. Burmese military units
responsible for some of the most serious violence, including many
instances of sexual violence, reported directly to Soe Win.
34. Than Oo: Than Oo was designated on December 10, 2019, for being
a leader of the 99th Light Infantry Division (LID), an entity that has
engaged in or whose members have engaged in serious human rights abuse
under his command. In 2017, the 99th LID deployed to Rakhine State and,
while there, participated in serious human rights abuses alongside the
33rd LID and other security forces. In one operation in Tula Toli,
hundreds of men, women, and children were reportedly forced to the
nearby riverbank where the 99th LID opened fire, executing many of the
men, and forced women and girls to nearby houses where they were
sexually assaulted. A number of these women and children were later
stabbed and beaten, with the houses set fire while they were inside.
The 99th LID was designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 on August 17, 2018,
for engaging in serious human rights abuse.
35. Aung Aung: Aung Aung was designated on December 10, 2019, for
being a leader of the 33rd LID, an entity that has engaged in or whose
members have engaged in serious human rights abuse under his command.
The 33rd LID participated in abuses in Rakhine State, including the
August 27, 2017 operation in Chut Pyin village. This operation included
extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and sexual violence, as
well as firing on fleeing villagers. More than 100 people were
reportedly killed in this one operation alone. The 33rd LID was
designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 on August 17, 2018 for engaging in
serious human rights abuse.
36. Rao Anwar Khan: Anwar was designated on December 10, 2019, for
being a foreign person who is responsible for or complicit in, or
having directly or indirectly engaged in serious human rights abuse.
During his tenure as the Senior Superintendent of Police in District
Malir, Pakistan, Rao Anwar was reportedly responsible for staging
numerous fake police encounters in which individuals were killed by
police, and was involved in over 190 police encounters that resulted in
the deaths of over 400 people, including the brutal murder of
Naqeebullah Mehsood. Anwar helped lead a network of police and criminal
thugs that were allegedly responsible for extortion, land grabbing,
narcotics, and murder.
37. Mahmud al-Warfalli: Al-Warfalli was designated on December 10,
2019, for being a foreign person who is responsible for or complicit
in, or having directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights
abuse. Al-Warfalli served as commander of a militia known as the al-
Saiqa Brigade. Since 2016, al-Warfalli has carried out or ordered the
killings of 43 unarmed detainees in eight separate incidents. Many of
these killings were filmed and published on social media. On January
[[Page 72429]]
24, 2018, al-Warfalli was filmed carrying out a mass execution of ten
unarmed detainees in Benghazi. After al-Warfalli shot each detainee in
the head one by one, al-Warfalli fired freely at the group of ten
executed detainees. On July 17, 2017, al-Warfalli ordered the
methodical killings of 20 kneeling and unarmed detainees. In several of
the incidents, al-Warfalli continued to shoot at the detainees after
they were executed.
38. Marian Kocner: Kocner was designated on December 10, 2019, for
being a foreign person responsible for or complicit in, or having
directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse. Kocner
threatened Jan Kuciak, a reporter who was investigating Kocner's
corrupt dealings. Kuciak's investigative journalism focused on Kocner's
ability, through a complicated series of financial transactions, to
earn millions of Euros through fraudulent tax returns from Slovakia.
Kuciak was also responsible for several expos[eacute]s on Kocner's
corrupt dealings, highlighting Kocner's connections to the police and
prosecutors. Kocner also hired former Slovak Intelligence Service
members to surveil Kuciak ahead of his eventual murder. Slovak
authorities charged Kocner with hiring a hitman who murdered Kuciak and
his fianc[eacute]e, Martina Kusnirova.
Additionally, six entities were designated on December 10, 2019 for
being owned or controlled by Kocner: Hotel Holding, S.R.O.;
International Investment Development Holding A.S.; International
Investment Hotels Holding A.S.; Sprava A Inkaso Pohladavok, S.R.O.;
Sprava A Inkaso Zmeniek, S.R.O.; and Tranz-Tel, A.S.
39. Musa Baluku: Baluku was designated on December 10, 2019, for
being a foreign person who is the leader of the Allied Defense Forces
(ADF), an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in,
serious human rights abuse.
40. Amigo Kibirige: Kibirige was designated on December 10, 2019,
for materially assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material,
or technological support for, or goods and services to or in support
of, the ADF, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have
engaged in, serious human rights abuse.
41. Muhammed Lumisa: Lumisa was designated on December 10, 2019,
for materially assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material,
or technological support for, or goods and services to or in support
of, the ADF, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have
engaged in, serious human rights abuse.
42. Elias Segujja: Segujja was designated on December 10, 2019, for
materially assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or
technological support for, or goods and services to or in support of,
the ADF, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged
in, serious human rights abuse.
43. Kayiira Muhammad: Muhammad was designated on December 10, 2019,
for materially assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material,
or technological support for, or goods and services to or in support
of, the ADF, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have
engaged in, serious human rights abuse.
44. Amisi Kasadha: Kasadha was designated on December 10, 2019, for
materially assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or
technological support for, or goods and services to or in support of,
the ADF, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged
in, serious human rights abuse.
45. Abud Stephen Thiongkol: Thiongkol was designated on December
10, 2019, for being a foreign person that is or has been the leader of
an entity that has engaged in, serious human rights abuse. Thiongkol
has been identified as the commander of the detention facilities where
Aggrey Idri (Aggrey), a member of the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement--In Opposition (SPLM-IO), and Dong Samuel Luak (Dong), a South
Sudanese human rights lawyer, were held prior to their killings.
46. Malual Dhal Muorwel: Muorwel was designated on December 10,
2019, for being a foreign person that is responsible for or complicit
in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights
abuse. In addition to Muorwel's participation in the killings of Dong
and Aggrey, he has been identified as being the commander of forces who
detained and assaulted three international monitors in December of
2018.
47. Michael Kuajien: Kuajien was designated on December 10, 2019,
for being a foreign person that is responsible for or complicit in, or
has directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse.
Kuajien is one of two people publicly identified as being present in
Kenya during, and in having a hand in, the kidnapping of Dong and
Aggrey.
48. John Top Lam: Lam was designated on December 10, 2019, for
being a foreign person that is responsible for or complicit in, or has
directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse. Lam is
one of two people publicly identified as being present in Kenya during,
and in having a hand in, the kidnapping of Dong and Aggrey. Further,
Lam is reported to have called a member of Dong's family in order to
provide information on Dong's whereabouts in return for a substantial
cash payment.
49. Angelo Kuot Garang: Garang was designated on December 10, 2019,
for being a foreign person that is responsible for or complicit in, or
has directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse.
Garang has been identified as being involved in the killing of Dong and
Aggrey, as well as of other individuals.
Visa Restrictions Imposed
Although no visa restrictions were imposed under the Act during
2019, persons designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 shall be subject to the
visa restrictions articulated in section 2, unless an exception
applies. Section 2 provides that the entry of persons designated under
section 1 of the order is suspended pursuant to Presidential
Proclamation 8693. In 2019, the State Department also applied, when
appropriate, visa restrictions on foreign persons involved in
significant corruption or gross violation of human rights under other
authorities, reported to Congress through other means. As appropriate,
the Department of State will take additional action to impose visa
restrictions on those responsible for certain human rights violations
and corruption pursuant to other authorities, including Presidential
Proclamations 7750 and 8697, and Section 7031(c) of the FY2019
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, as
carried forward by the FY2020 Continuing Appropriations Act, 2020. In
addition, section 212(a)(3)(E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
renders aliens ineligible for visas if a consular officer has reason to
believe that they participated in acts of genocide, torture or
extrajudicial killings.
Efforts To Encourage Governments of Other Countries To Impose Sanctions
Similar to Those Authorized by the Act
In 2019, the Administration continued to build on the successful
outreach campaign to international partners regarding the expansion of
domestic and multilateral anticorruption and human rights sanctions
regimes. Following successful outreach in 2018, the United Kingdom and
the European Union are progressing in the development of their own
human rights sanction's authorities. Canada enacted its authority in
October 2017
[[Page 72430]]
and since that time, the Administration has worked closely with the
Canadian government in pursuing coordinated actions against human
rights abusers and corrupt actors. The Administration sought out new
partners with which to create truly global authorities to promote
accountability for those that abuse human rights and engage in
corruption. Throughout this outreach, the Administration has identified
champions, partners, and potential spoilers of the objectives
established by Congress within the Act. The Departments of State and
Treasury have, over the last year, shared information, coordinated
messaging, and provided technical assistance to this end.
David Hale,
Under Secretary for Political Affairs, United States Department of
State.
[FR Doc. 2019-28231 Filed 12-30-19; 8:45 am]
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