Amendment 1 Özlem Demirel on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group

Report

Hannah Neumann

Arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2020/2003 (INI))

Motion for a resolution Recital A

Motion for a resolution

A. whereas the latest SIPRI figures²⁶ show that arms exports from the EU-28 amounted to some 26 % of the global total over the period 2015 to 2019, making the EU-28 collectively the second largest arms supplier in the world, after the US (36 %) and followed by Russia (21 %); *questions the validity of this comparison because under Article 346 TEU the production of or trade in arms remain with Member States and therefore the aggregated figures cannot be compared to those for unitary states like the US or Russia;* A9-0137/2020

Amendment

A. whereas the latest SIPRI figures²⁶ show that arms exports from the EU-28 amounted to some 26 % of the global total over the period 2015 to 2019, *again* making the EU-28 collectively the second largest arms supplier in the world, after the US (36 %) and followed by Russia (21 %);

Or. en

²⁶ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), fact sheet of March 2020 entitled 'Trends in international arms transfers, 2019'

²⁶ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), fact sheet of March 2020 entitled 'Trends in international arms transfers, 2019'

Amendment 2 Manuel Bompard on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group

Report Hannah Neumann Arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2020/2003 (INI))

Motion for a resolution Recital F a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Fa. whereas arms exports and transfers have an undeniable impact on human rights, socio-economic development and democracy; whereas arms exports also contribute to migratory phenomena, fuelling conflicts and wars that force people into exile;

Or. en

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Amendment 3 Özlem Demirel on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group

Report Hannah Neumann Arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2020/2003 (INI))

Motion for a resolution Recital G

Motion for a resolution

G. whereas the global crisis created by the COVID-19 pandemic could have significant geostrategic repercussions and further points up the need to build a genuine European strategic autonomy;

Amendment

G. whereas the COVID-19 pandemic must not be used as a pretext for increasing or promoting any further military build-up or for using civilian EU funds to boost the military and defence sectors;

Or. en

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Amendment 4 Özlem Demirel on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group

Report

Hannah Neumann Arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2020/2003 (INI))

Motion for a resolution Recital H a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Ha. whereas a large proportion of arms supplies continue to go to countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region; whereas in 2018 arms were exported to Saudi Arabia worth EUR 1.937 billion, to Egypt worth EUR 1.355 billion, and to the United Arab Emirates worth EUR 292 million; whereas these three states are part of the Saudi-led coalition in the Yemen conflict, and these exports constitute a clear violation of the Common Position; whereas the current situation in Libya is similar since European arms exports are being authorised to states which are directly involved in the conflict and are providing the conflict parties with arms;

Or. en

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Amendment 5 Emmanuel Maurel, Manuel Bompard on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group

Report

Hannah Neumann Arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2020/2003 (INI))

Motion for a resolution Paragraph 2 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

Stresses that it is absurd to talk 2a. about 'strategic autonomy' when EU Treaties consider that the common defence of the Member States is carried out within the framework of NATO, and therefore under the supervision of the United States of America; stresses that President Trump's injunction that each NATO Member Country should devote 2 % of their GDP to military expenditure serves in particular to sell off the output of the USA's military-industrial complex, and reinforces the interoperability of European armaments with American equipment, which threatens the independence and security of Europeans;

Or. en

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9.9.2020

Amendment 6 Manuel Bompard, Emmanuel Maurel on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group

Report Hannah Neumann Arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2020/2003 (INI))

Motion for a resolution Paragraph 6 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

6a. Requests all Member States that have not provided complete information to submit additional information on their past exports for the next annual report;

Or. en

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Amendment 7 Özlem Demirel on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group

Report Hannah Neumann Arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2020/2003 (INI))

Motion for a resolution Paragraph 25 a (new)

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

25a. Calls for the eight criteria to be extended and applied also to the transfer of military, security and police personnel, to arms exports-related services, knowhow and training, security technology, and to private military and security services; calls, further, for an upgrade of criterion 8 by making the denial of export licences automatic if they are incompatible with development;

Or. en

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Amendment 8 Özlem Demirel on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group

Report

Hannah Neumann Arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2020/2003 (INI))

Motion for a resolution Paragraph 29

Motion for a resolution

29. Notes an increase in the transfer of knowledge and technology, which allows third countries to undertake licensed production of European military technology; believes that this process should not limit the EU's capacity to control weapons, arms and military equipment production, but should, rather, *foster the convergence of public oversight and transparency standards in defence production and accelerate the creation of internationally recognised and respected rules on arms production and exports;*

Amendment

29. Notes an increase in the transfer of knowledge and technology, which allows third countries to undertake licensed production of European military technology; believes that this process should not limit the EU's capacity to control weapons, arms and military equipment production, but should, rather, encourage Member States to undertake a more detailed examination of licensed production by third countries, and to ensure stronger safeguards against undesired uses; demands the strict application of the Common Position for licensed production in third countries, as well as within the EU for subsidiary companies;

Or. en

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Amendment 9 Özlem Demirel on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group

Report Hannah Neumann

Arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2020/2003 (INI))

Motion for a resolution Paragraph 32

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

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32. Notes that a first attempt to regulate intra-European transfers was the Schmidt-Debré harmonisation agreement between France and Germany with the 'de minimis' rule; notes in this regard the Franco-German Agreement on defence export controls; believes that such bilateral agreements can only be a first step towards an EU-level system for arms transfer controls and must facilitate further convergence of Member States' arms exports policies; stresses that in order to achieve this, all bilateral and other mechanisms should be analysed carefully;

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A9-0137/9

Or. en

Amendment 10 Özlem Demirel on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group

Report

Hannah Neumann Arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2020/2003 (INI))

Motion for a resolution Paragraph 34

Motion for a resolution

34. Notes that bilateral cooperation on industrial defence-related projects between Member States *leads* to export control agreements *which can* provide a baseline for the EU as a whole;

Amendment

34. Notes that bilateral cooperation on industrial defence-related projects between Member States, *such as cooperation between Germany and France, and the relevant parts of the Franco-German Treaty of Aachen lead to weakened* export control agreements *and should not* provide a baseline for the EU as a whole;

Or. en

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